Risk and inequality in rural Thailand by Shabab, Chowdhury Rashaad
   
 
A University of Sussex PhD thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
  
 
 
 
 
 
Risk and Inequality in Rural Thailand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chowdhury Rashaad Shabab 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
University of Sussex 
 
August, 2017 
  
 ii 
 
 
 
 
Declaration 
 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be submitted in whole or in 
part to another University for the award of any other degree. 
 
 
 
Signature:  
 iii 
University of Sussex 
Chowdhury Rashaad Shabab 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
Risk and Inequality in Rural Thailand 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
The first chapter of this thesis provides an introduction to the issues that will be covered 
in the remaining chapters, reviews the relevant literature on risk and insurance, and 
provides an overview of the data on rural Thailand that I will be using. 
 
The second chapter investigates the extent to which households at different parts of the 
income distribution among these Thai households differ in the extent to which their 
income streams are affected by droughts. I find that the income streams of relatively rich 
households are better insured than their poorer counterparts. I am able to empirically link 
the better insurance possibilities enjoyed by richer households to observable 
characteristics such as the education level of the head of household, the type of contract 
the head is likely to be employed in, and the relative youth of the heads of richer 
households.  
 
The third chapter demonstrates that income inequality among these households is 
declining, both over the duration of the panel, and over the lifecycles of the heads of these 
households. I show that this decline cannot be explained by standard lifecycle 
considerations. Rather, I find that remittances from the adult children of the heads of 
household account for the entirety of the reduction in income inequality over the 
lifecycles of the heads of household. 
 
Chapter 4 models the probability with which a household receives remittances (the 
‘extensive margin’) and the share of remittances in household income (the ‘intensive 
margin’) as functions of observable household characteristics. Using these models, I 
construct counterfactual distributions of income which permit me to identify the extent to 
which the extensive and intensive margins of remittance receipts account for the reduction 
in inequality that these models are able to explain. Chapter 5 concludes.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
This collection of essays studies inequalities and insurance behaviour among village 
households in rural Thailand using especially high quality data that has been made 
available by the Townsend Thai Project (Townsend, 2011). In this introductory chapter I 
present a preview of the research questions that will be addressed in subsequent chapters. 
I go on to briefly review the relevant strands of the literature on the insurance behaviour 
of households, with an emphasis on the findings that will be most pertinent to a rural, 
developing country context. I also introduce the Townsend Thai data which I will use to 
analyse the economic behaviour of these village households.   
In the chapter 2, I investigate the extent to which households at different parts of the 
income distribution differ from one another in the degree to which their income streams 
are insured against the materialization of widespread, unanticipated, adverse shocks to 
income, using the example of droughts. I find that the income streams of relatively rich 
households are better insured than their poorer counterparts, even though richer 
households are just as likely as poorer ones to be involved in agriculture. I am able to 
empirically link the better insurance possibilities enjoyed by richer households to 
observable characteristics such as the education level of the head of household, the type 
of contract the head is likely to be employed in, and the relative youth of the heads of 
richer households.  
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In the third chapter of this thesis I demonstrate that income inequality among these rural 
Thai households is declining, both over the duration of the panel, and over the lifecycles 
of the heads of these households. I show that this decline cannot be explained by either a 
convergence in the distribution of the earnings of individuals within these households, or 
by standard lifecycle considerations such as differences in fertility and cohabitation rates 
of adult children of the heads of household between relatively rich and poor households. 
Rather, I show that remittances from children are a key channel through which these 
households insulate their income streams from the retirement-related dip in earnings that 
usually occurs later on in the lifecycle. I find that remittances from the adult children of 
the heads of household, who reside outside these villages of origin, account for the 
entirety of the observed reduction in income inequality over the lifecycles of the heads of 
household. 
In chapter 4, I model the probability with which a household receives remittances (the 
‘extensive margin’ of remittances) and the share of remittances in household income (the 
‘intensive margin’) as functions of observable household characteristics. I identify the 
extent to which each of these margins varies across the distribution of household income 
and thereby construct counterfactual income distributions where either the probability of 
receiving remittances, or the share of remittances in household income is allowed to vary 
as a function of household income, holding the other fixed. Using these counterfactual 
distributions, I identify the extent to which the extensive and intensive margins of 
remittance receipts account for the inequality reducing effect of remittances on the 
distribution of household income. 
I now turn to conducting a brief review of the substantial literature on the economics of 
the insurance decisions made by households, before introducing the Thai data. 
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 1.1 Economic Paradigms of Insurance 
The literature on the degree to which the measured consumption levels of households 
vary in response to unanticipated changes in measured income is as vast as it is important. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the numerous, celebrated contributions in 
this field in a manner which does them justice. Rather, I will briefly touch on those key 
contributions that help place the remaining chapters of this thesis in their proper context. 
I start by recalling some of the relevant results that pertain to what has come to be known 
as the complete markets hypothesis (Arrow 1951, Debreu 1952, Arrow-Debreu 1954), 
and the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman 1957, Ch 3; Ando and Modigliani 
1963), paradigms which Blundell et al. (2008) characterize as being the ‘two polar models 
[that] have highlighted the agenda’ on economic inquiry on insurance. Both of these 
portrayals of the risk environment within which households operate characterise 
households as not exerting an influence on the degree of risk in their income streams. The 
possibility that households reduce their exposure to income risk as an insurance strategy 
is formalized in the ‘income smoothing’ (Morduch 1994, 1995) literature, which I will 
also outline. 
 
The Complete Markets Hypothesis 
The complete markets paradigm assumes that there are no impediments whatsoever to 
the ability of households to trade their exposure to risk with one another. Indeed, Arrow 
and Debreu’s (1954) theoretical formulation assumes that households have access to a 
full set of state-continent claims, which allow them to insure themselves against every 
possible prospect before uncertainty was resolved. Under these circumstances, if the 
income streams of any two risk-averse households are less than perfectly correlated, then 
they can benefit from insuring each other against potential shortfalls in their individual 
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income streams. Indeed, the potential benefits to pooling risk in this way may exist until 
households have insured one another against all risk that is specific to individual 
households. If all households are equally risk averse then this benchmark predicts that the 
consumption level of any individual household varies over time only in response to 
changes in aggregate output, and not in response to changes in the income level of that 
individual household. As a result, households will be able to effectively insure one 
another against idiosyncratic shocks to income which affect individual households, but 
not against covariate ones which affect entire communities. Arrow and Debreu (1954) 
show that if markets are complete so that all households can freely trade their exposure 
to risk in every possible state of the world, then under some stringent assumptions about 
technologies, information and preferences, the risk pooling equilibrium described above 
exists and is Pareto efficient.  
Clearly, it is not possible for real-world economic agents at any given time to trade on the 
value of every good, in every possible state of the world, in all future periods. 
Nonetheless, households and individuals may have access to markets and other 
institutions which allow them to engage in a considerable degree of welfare enhancing 
risk pooling. If such institutions are effective, the complete markets benchmark makes 
distinct predictions about the way in which the consumption levels of individual 
households should respond to covariate shocks to income as opposed to idiosyncratic 
ones. Covariate shocks are unpredictable events which affect a whole community, such 
as drought and flooding. These will cause aggregate output for the community to fall and 
so cannot be insured against, even in the highly stylized case where markets are complete. 
As a result, the materialization of such a shock will engender a reduction in the 
consumption levels of all households in the community (in the case that all households 
are equally risk averse, this reduction will affect all households proportionately). 
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Idiosyncratic shocks, which affect individual members of the community can be 
successfully insured against by pooling risk between households and so, under the 
complete markets hypothesis, will not engender a change in the level of consumption 
enjoyed by an affected household. Tests of whether or not households interact with one 
another within a set of economic and cultural institutions which allow them to 
approximate this Pareto efficient outcome have been conducted in a wide range of 
settings. 
Cochrane (1991) used data from the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics and found 
that individual food consumption was not insulated from employment and health status 
of that individual, leading to a rejection of the complete markets hypothesis. Attanasio 
and Weber (1995) and Nelson (1994) also reject the complete markets hypothesis in the 
U.S. using the Consumer Expenditure Survey.  
In a developing country context, Townsend (1994) found evidence against the complete 
markets hypothesis for three Indian villages. Udry (1994) documented that though 
Nigerian households use informal credit transactions as instruments to pool risk, the 
degree of insurance offered by this institution was insufficient to fully protect 
consumption against idiosyncratic income risk, also leading to a rejection of the complete 
markets hypothesis.  
In a recent development, a number of papers have used heterogeneity in risk preferences 
to argue that earlier tests of the complete markets hypothesis were biased against the null 
hypothesis of full risk sharing. Accounting for risk preferences using responses to 
questions about hypothetical jobs in U.S. administrative data, Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) 
fails to reject the complete markets hypothesis. Mazzocco and Saini (2012) reject perfect 
risk sharing at the village level using data on India, but fail to do so at the caste level. 
Chiappori, et al. (2011) measure heterogeneity in risk preferences in Thai villages using 
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a full risk-sharing model. Finding strong evidence for this type of heterogeneity, they fail 
to reject the complete markets hypothesis, conditioning on the estimated risk-aversion 
parameters.  
This last study is especially salient to this thesis because it is also conducted on data from 
the Townsend Thai Project (although that study uses the monthly panel which is available 
for a smaller number of villages than the annual panel which is used in this thesis). 
Nonetheless, the findings of that paper suggest that covariate shocks to income may be 
particularly detrimental to the welfare of the rural Thai communities that I study. This is 
confirmed by Samphantharak and Townsend (2017) who decompose risk in the income 
streams of the households sampled by the monthly survey into an idiosyncratic and a 
covariate component and analyse the risk equivalised incomes with each of these types 
of risk. They find that covariate risks which affect entire communities and are therefore 
harder to insure against, command a larger risk premium than idiosyncratic risks, as 
predicted by economic theory. These communities are thus able to protect themselves 
against idiosyncratic shocks by pooling risk within the community. But the literature has 
found that such risk pooling does not tend to be effective across communities (Chiappori 
et al., 2011; Mazzocco and Saini (2012); and Urdy, 1994), so that households in different 
villages are unlikely to be able to pool their risks with one another. These findings are 
salient to chapter 2 of this thesis, where I find that the income streams of relatively poor 
households are particularly susceptible to shortfalls induced by drought, the most 
widespread of the covariate shocks that these villages report being affected by.  
 
The Permanent Income Hypothesis 
In contrast to the complete markets hypothesis, the permanent income hypothesis 
assumes that only capital markets are perfect. This characterization of the insurance 
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environment in which households operate therefore allows them to borrow and lend freely 
against their own future income. In the simplest version of the model, the extent to which 
households discount the future is exactly equal to the interest rate. So long as the 
preferences of households satisfy diminishing marginal utility, their optimal policy is to 
set consumption equal to the expected value of lifetime income (inclusive of any assets), 
averaged over all remaining periods.  
In this framework permanent and transitory shocks to income will have very different 
effects on lifetime income and thus current consumption (Hall, 1978; Hall and Mishkin, 
1982). A permanent shock to income will have a substantial effect on remaining lifetime 
income and therefore on the level of consumption, as households consume an amount that 
is in proportion to their expected remaining lifetime income. Since a transitory shock has 
a very small impact on lifetime income, consumption should respond negligibly to such 
a shock. Thus the textbook permanent income hypothesis predicts that consumption is 
not insured against permanent shocks, and almost fully insured against transient ones. 
Campbell and Deaton (1989) observed that macro-data on consumption in the U.S. for 
the post-war period was characterised by too much insurance against permanent shocks 
to income to be consistent with the standard permanent income theory. Deaton (1992), 
and Attanasio and Pavoni (2011) have also confirmed the ‘excess smoothness’ of 
consumption to permanent income shocks in micro data from the U.S. and U.K. 
respectively.  
In contrast, where the theory predicts that transient shocks should have little impact on 
consumption, Hall and Mishkin (1982) have found that consumption exhibits ‘excess 
sensitivity,’ to these short term fluctuations. Deaton (1991) shows theoretically, that even 
if all shocks to income are temporary, liquidity constraints can cause the optimal 
consumption stream to track changes in income.  
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Some of the most insightful implications of the permanent income hypothesis become 
apparent when one considers the way that the incomes of individuals evolve over the 
lifecycle1. On average, earnings decline precipitously when individuals reach retirement 
age, but since this decline is anticipated, it should not engender a corresponding decline 
in an individual’s level of consumption. Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis establish the role 
of remittances from the adult children of the ageing heads of these households in 
insulating their income streams from such lifecycle related declines in earnings. 
 
 
Insuring Consumption by Smoothing Income 
When markets for risky assets and credit are both incomplete, households can neither 
trade their exposure to risk with one another, nor insure themselves by borrowing against 
their own future incomes. Under these circumstances households may prefer income 
prospects with lower variances, even at the expense of potentially substantial reductions 
in the mean. Morduch (1994 and 1995) used the term ‘income smoothing’ to describe this 
type of insurance strategy, in contrast to the ‘consumption smoothing’ that is consistent 
with the complete markets or permanent income paradigms. 
‘Income smoothing’ as an insurance strategy has typically been studied among the poor 
and vulnerable, who may be more likely to be credit constrained. Much of the early 
evidence was based on data from rural India that was gathered by the International Crops 
Research Institute for the Sami-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) between 1975 and 1984. 
Morduch (1990) (cited in Morduch 1995) showed that asset-poor households, whose 
                                                     
1 These insights relate macroeconomic variables such as the savings rate and measures of inequality to the 
ageing of a population. The link between lifecycle theory and the evolution of inequality will be discussed 
at length in chapter 3, and so to avoid repetition I do not discuss them here. Since this thesis does not speak 
directly to the literature on aggregate savings, I also refrain from discussing that literature here.  
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consumption is most vulnerable to income shocks devote a greater proportion of their 
land to safer, but lower yielding, traditional varieties of crops than richer households. 
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) demonstrated that households surveyed by ICRISAT 
who were in lower wealth quartiles used production techniques that were less susceptible 
to rainfall variation, even though on average these techniques were less productive. 
Kochar (1999) found that households surveyed by ICRISAT protected their consumption 
levels by diverting labour from farm employment to off-farm employment when faced 
with a crop shock, thereby reducing income variability.  
These existing narratives of income smoothing assume that credit is the main dimension 
along which the insurance strategies available to poorer households are constrained, 
relative to their better-off peers. Chapter 2 of this thesis complements this narrative by 
observing that the choice of income generating activities available to richer households 
may offer greater insurance possibilities than those available to poorer households. The 
chapter documents that certain observable household characteristics are associated with 
better insured income streams. These characteristics are more common among relatively 
rich households. The chapter goes on to present evidence that the income streams of richer 
households are indeed better insured against covariate shocks than their poorer 
counterparts in this panel of village households. 
The findings of the third chapter of this thesis are also consistent with this insurance 
paradigm. Households in societies with well-functioning capital markets are likely to 
accumulate savings during the productive phase of the lifecycle, and run down those 
savings in retirement; that is, they use savings to buffer their consumption against an 
anticipated decline in income. In contrast, I find that ageing households in rural Thailand 
instead depend on transfers from younger generations to smooth out the slump in 
household income that might otherwise have occurred. Thus household income is itself 
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protected, perhaps because these households cannot depend on formal credit markets to 
protect consumption from this anticipated decline in income. The importance of 
migration as an instrument to protect the household against low productivity has been 
documented by previous studies in the Thai context. Paulson (2000) using data from the 
Thai Socio Economic Survey, demonstrates that migration patterns in Thailand are 
consistent with an insurance motive, that is, migrants tend to select destinations where 
incomes are negatively correlated with incomes in their communities of origin. Also using 
the Socio Economic Survey data, Yang (2004) demonstrates that there is a great deal of 
variation in output between Thai districts, but relatively little variation in household 
incomes. Yang finds that remittance transfers from high output areas to low output ones, 
supplement household income in low output areas, thereby accounting for the relatively 
even distribution of household income. One of the findings reported by Townsend (2013) 
uses the monthly series of the Townsend Thai Data to show that in certain areas, 
households headed by the elderly rely on remittances to supplement their income. Thus 
the fact that households in rural Thailand use remittances to smooth out fluctuations in 
productivity is already well established in the literature. Chapter 3 of this thesis will 
demonstrate that differentials in the receipt of these remittances across the distribution of 
income are sufficient to drive a downward trend in the dynamics of income inequality 
among these households. 
 
 
1.2 The Townsend Thai Data 
All the empirical work in this thesis is conducted on a panel of households that are 
sampled annually by the Townsend Thai Project (Townsend, 2011). The project also 
publishes a set of data for a different group of households representing a different (and 
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smaller) set of villages that are observed on a monthly basis, which I do not use. I have 
been able to access these data because Townsend Thai project has made them freely 
available for download from the “Harvard Dataverse” website2.  
The project started interviews in 1997, when 2,880 rural households comprised the 
baseline survey. A total of 4 provinces (Changwats) – 2 in the semi-arid Northeast and 2 
in the more developed central region near Bangkok – were chosen for survey. These 
particular provinces were chosen because of the availability of pre-existing data, that the 
project intended to use for comparison. Within each of the provinces, 12 sub-provinces 
(Tambons) were chosen at random. Within each sub-province, four villages were 
selected, also at random. Thus in total, 192 villages were surveyed, covering 2,880 
households.  
In 1998 one third of the original sample was chosen for resurvey. All four original 
provinces were covered, but only 4 out of the 12 sub-provinces in each were selected 
randomly for resurvey. Accordingly, from 1998 the sample size shrinks to 960 
households in each year. Additional areas were then added to the survey in 2004 (when 
the sample size rises to 1,080) and 2005 (when the sample size is 1,320), but due to the 
outbreak of conflict in some of the newly added areas, the sample size drops to 1,200 in 
2006 which is sustained until 2011.  
I will use a subset of this data set in the analysis here. To ensure that I am comparing like 
with like, I restrict my attention to the 64 villages that are sampled in all fifteen years for 
which data are available, that is I work with the panel of 960 households. Within this 
subsample, the year on year attrition rate reaches a maximum value of 6%, but is usually 
closer to 3%. These households are replaced with households from the same village to 
keep the number of observations in each cross section at 960.  
                                                     
2 Https://dataverse.harvard.edu 
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Depending on the particular research question being addressed, I will either use this 
unbalanced panel of 960 households per year, or a subset of 609 households which 
constitute the balanced panel. The difference between the balanced and unbalanced panel 
is accounted for by 288 households that are subject to attrition between 1997 and 2011; 
51 households that report missing values for key variables of interest – namely income or 
consumption – in at least one year; and 10 observations which I drop by hand for 
appearing spurious. The households that comprise the last of these groups are listed in 
appendix 1.  
In chapter 2, I will identify differences in the extent to which changes in income engender 
changes in consumption among these Thai households. Because the goal of this exercise 
is to identify household-level changes in variables over time, differences in the 
composition of the sample from one period to the next may pose a considerable threat to 
identification. Accordingly, this analysis is conducted on the balanced panel of 
households. 
The methodology I employ in chapter 3 is to follow cohorts of households, grouped by 
the decade of birth of the head of household, over the 15 years of the panel. Since cohort 
analysis averages over many households headed by people of similar age, the cost 
incurred due to comparing a slightly different set of households from one wave of the 
survey to the next is minimal. The benefits in terms of increased numbers of observations 
are substantial. For these reasons, my preferred specifications in chapter 3 are based on 
the unbalanced panel. Nonetheless, I check that the core insights of the paper are robust 
to using only the balanced panel.  
Chapter 4 disaggregates the inequality reducing effect of remittances (that will be 
documented in chapter 3) into extensive and intensive margins. In that context too, the 
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threats to identification posed by using an unbalanced panel are small, relative to the 
potential benefits of increased sample size. 
 
An attractive aspect of the annual series of the Townsend Thai data is that detailed 
household level information is complemented by information from interviews with a key 
informant from each village (typically the village headman) about a range of issues. These 
interviews provide information on the number of households in each village that are 
affected by droughts in each year. In chapter 2 I use this variable as an exogenous, 
covariate shock to household income. These key-informant interviews are also the source 
of the information on the mass migration histories of individual villages which I use as 
an instrument for current remittance receipts from the migrant children of the heads of 
these household in chapter 4.  
 
Empirical applications of the Townsend Thai data 
The annual series of the Townsend Thai data have been used extensively, in a wide variety 
of applications3. Perhaps the most celebrated contributions evaluate the effects of the 
“Million Baht Village Fund” – a large scale government initiative to provide microcredit 
to over 77,000 villages that was rolled out in 2001. Kaboski and Townsend (2011 and 
2012) exploit the quasi-random nature of the per-capita effect of this policy (villages 
received the same amount of money regardless of their population) and concluded that 
the widespread provision of microcredit had a positive effect on consumption levels, but 
an ambiguous effect on investment. They present evidence of positive spill-over effects 
from entrepreneurs who take up microcredit to the wage growth of those who they 
                                                     
3 As have the monthly data, but since I do not use the monthly series in any of the analysis in this thesis, I 
do not review the numerous contributions that were made on the basis of that data, except to point out 
those applications which are directly related to the research agenda of this thesis.  
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employ, but also note that the intervention did not appear to create more and better 
businesses, as proponents of microcredit might have hoped.  
Poggi (2015) uses the quasi-random nature of the Million Baht Fund to identify the effect 
of credit on internal migration from these rural communities, and concludes that a greater 
provision of credit in a community decreases the likelihood of that community producing 
internal migrants. In chapter 3 of this thesis, which studies the effect of remittances on 
inequality among these rural households, I check to see that the results are not driven by 
this, or any other village-specific process, checking that the results are robust to a fully 
interacted set of village and time fixed effects. 
Kaboski and Townsend (2005) also study microcredit institutions, but this study is 
conducted on the first wave of the data, from 1997, before the Million Baht Fund was 
announced. They find that the presence of microfinance institutions can promote asset 
growth, consumption smoothing and occupational mobility, so long as these institutions 
provide a certain set of services, namely savings services, emergency services and 
training and advice.  
The annual series of the Townsend Thai data has also been used extensively to study the 
effects of financial liberalization and financial deepening in transitioning economies. 
Alem and Townsend (2014) study the effect of different financial institutions on 
household level outcomes. They find that the presence of a government development 
bank results in substantially smoother consumption and investment streams, thereby 
embedding an insurance function in their lending activities. Gine and Townsend (2004) 
show that increases in financial intermediation not only benefit entrepreneurs, by 
relieving their credit constraints and allowing them to invest and expand their businesses; 
but also those who come to be employed by these larger and more productive businesses. 
Paulson and Townsend (2004) found that financial constraints in these villages were 
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associated with reduced entrepreneurial activity, particularly in the relatively poor North-
eastern region. 
The data have also shed light on the geographic concentration of enterprises in developing 
countries. Felkner and Townsend (2011) show that high levels of firm concentration in 
an area predict subsequent growth near that area. Furthermore, they report that the 
physical geography of an area is correlated with the level of enterprise activity, leading 
some areas to be prone to an agglomeration of enterprises while others are left behind. 
 
Thus the Townsend Thai data provide a detailed account of the economic lives of these 
rural Thai households. These data have been extensively used in highly regarded 
empirical work that has substantively enhanced our understanding of such communities. 
Nonetheless, there remain aspects of the economic behaviour of these village households 
that have not yet been studied.   
While the extent to which the consumption streams of these households are insured 
against income shocks has been studied thoroughly using these data (for example by, 
Kaboski and Townsend (2011, 2012) and Alem and Townsend (2014), the extent to which 
the income streams themselves perform an insurance function has not. Empirical studies 
of this type of insurance behaviour have typically been conducted using data with a 
narrower temporal range and geographic coverage. Dercon (2006) used data 15 from 
Ethiopia villages that spanned 5 years. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), Morduch 
(1990, 1995) and Kochar (1999), are able to exploit variation across 3 villages in rural 
India over 9 years from 1975 – 1984. In comparison, the Townsend Thai data allows me 
to investigate insurance behaviour across 64 different villages over 15 years from 1997 
to 2011. Not only do the Thai data cover a wider range of villages over a longer time 
span, but these villages are at a different stage of economic development from the Indian 
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villages studied by Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), Morduch (1994, 1995) and 
Kochar (1999). In the late 1970s and early 1980s the Indian economy was still poor and 
insular. This contrasts sharply with the economy of Thailand in the late 1990s and the 
first decade of the 2000s. At this time, the Thai economy was already integrated into the 
global economy and by the end of the survey period, in 2011, had already achieved upper-
middle income status (World Bank, 2016).  This thesis therefore, contributes to the 
income smoothing literature not only by using data that has wider temporal and 
geographic coverage, but also by studying this form of insurance in an economy that is at 
a relatively advanced stage of development, over a much more recent time period. 
The annual series of the Townsend data have been used to study the effect of relaxing 
credit constraints on migration behaviour, but they have not been used to study the extent 
to which remittance receipts are linked to the lifecycles of the heads of these households. 
Pawasutipaisit and Townsend (2010) and Townsend (2016) use the monthly series to 
study the lifecycle dynamics of remittance receipts in a different set of Thai villages 
(which are fewer in number than those covered by the annual data series). This set of 
studies observe that wealth inequality is declining in these communities but that this 
“decline is largely due to savings rather than incoming gifts and remittances” 
(Pawasutipaisit and Townsend, 2010: 56). The authors note that these findings are “not 
robust to annual data” (page 57), which is the series I study here. The research question 
of chapter 3 of this thesis is thus distinct from this body of empirical work in two ways: 
first, where these studies have sought to understand wealth inequality, I am interested in 
income inequality; and second I document and explain declining inequality in the villages 
covered by the annual series of the Townsend Thai project whereas those papers study 
the monthly series. Furthermore, the work in this thesis is novel among the broader 
literature on the effect of remittances on income inequality field (which will be discussed 
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in more detail in chapter 3) in that it explicitly studies these effects in the context of 
lifecycle theory. Because I observe these households over a much longer period than 
preceding studies in this, I am able to credibly discuss lifecycle effects, where previous 
studies were constrained to either cross sectional effects or relatively short panels. 
This thesis will fill these particular gaps in our understanding of this set of rural 
households, so as to further our understanding of insurance and inequalities in rural 
communities more generally. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Income Smoothing Among Thai Households 
 
 
 
Introduction 
When markets for credit and insurance are incomplete, households have an incentive to 
insure their consumption by obtaining their income from less volatile sources. In an 
influential pair of papers, Morduch (1994, 1995) used the term ‘income smoothing’ to 
describe this phenomenon and contrasted it with the ‘consumption smoothing’ that we 
consider more commonly. The literature on income smoothing has focused on 
documenting the use of this type of insurance among the poor and vulnerable (Morduch, 
1994 and 1995; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; and Kochar, 1999), under the 
maintained hypothesis that credit is the only dimension along which the insurance 
decisions of risk averse households are constrained. Hence, poorer households, with less 
access to credit markets are more likely to need to insure themselves using income 
smoothing. In this paper, I allow for the possibility that poorer households may also be 
constrained in their ability to secure low-risk income. Then, on the one hand, richer 
households are less likely to be liquidity constrained and therefore less likely to insure 
themselves through smooth income; while on the other, they may have privileged access 
to low-risk income streams which makes them more likely to insure themselves using 
smooth income. It is then an empirical question as to whether or not richer households 
are more likely to depend on low-risk income to satisfy their insurance needs than their 
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poorer counterparts. In this chapter, I present evidence from rural Thailand that the 
income streams of relatively well-off households are better insured against covariate 
shocks than their worse-off counterparts.  
 
 
 
Figures 2.1 to 2.3 provide some descriptive statistics that motivate this paper. In the first 
figure, the y-axis measures the sample standard deviation in the log of each individual 
household’s real1, equivalised2 level of consumption over the fifteen years of the panel, 
?̂?𝑐. This is a crude measure of the extent to which the amount consumed by individual 
households varies over time, or equivalently the extent to which the consumption streams 
of these households exhibit a lack of insurance. The variable on the x-axis is intended to 
convey a sense of the level of well-being enjoyed by each of these households, relative to 
one another. Temporary fluctuations in income will cause any ordering based on the level 
of income observed in a particular period to be an unreliable measure of underlying 
                                                     
1 All figures are inflated to 2011 Thai Baht using Consumer Price Index data from the Bank of Thailand 
website 
2 Per-adult equivalence is calculated using the ‘old OECD’ scale where the first adult receives a weight of 
1, all additional adults receive a weight of 0.7 and each child is weighted by 0.5. 
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relative wellbeing. Averaging over observed incomes for the duration of the panel 
partially addresses this concern, although in the permanent income view (Friedman 1957, 
Ch3; Ando and Modigliani 1963) averaging over consumption may be an even more 
reliable signal of relative wellbeing. In this view, the amount consumed by a household 
in each period will be equal to the amount of income that the household expects to 
generate over the remainder of their lives, net of any assets they may have, divided by the 
number of remaining periods for which they expect to survive. Thus the comparison of 
averages over time for each household may provide a misleading impression of relative 
wellbeing if these households are at different stages of the lifecycle. This is because 
households headed by retirees who, for example may consume out of savings rather than 
income, will have systematically higher wellbeing than their incomes indicate. Thus the 
average of a household’s observed level of (equivalised, real) consumption is likely to 
provide a more reliable signal of that household’s relative wellbeing than the average of 
observed income. For these reasons, on the x-axis, I measure the average over time of 
each individual household’s log real, equivalised consumption. Figure 1 plots the measure 
of consumption variability against this measure of permanent income for the 609 
households that comprise the balanced panel3 in the annual series of the Townsend Thai 
data. The figure also plots a line of best fit through these points. I defer a discussion of 
some of the subtler points around the use of this measure of relative wellbeing until 
section 2.4.4, later in this chapter. 
Figure 2.1 suggests (and a t-test reported in the first column of table 2.1 confirms) that 
the level of insurance, as measured by the variability in household consumption, does not 
differ significantly across the spectrum of households ranked by permanent income.   
 
                                                     
3 The specifics of how I identify the balanced panel were discussed on page 10 
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Bearing in mind Morduch’s (1995: 104) advice that ‘One cannot simply look at the 
smoothness of consumption and know which type of smoothing is at work,’ figure 2.2 
plots the estimated standard deviation of log income, ?̂?𝑦, against mean consumption for 
the same 609 households. Here, there is a clear downward trend, the coefficient for which 
is reported in the second column of table 2.1. Thus relatively well-off households appear 
to have smoother income streams than their worse-off counterparts.  
 
Table 2.1: Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent 
variable 
SD(c) SD(y) SD(c)/SD(y) 
Mean  0.0147 -0.0852*** 0.206*** 
Consumption (1.02) (-4.06) (6.21) 
Constant 0.372*** 1.545*** -1.201*** 
 (2.65) (7.60) (-3.73) 
N 609 609 609 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Recalling that the standard deviation of consumption is similar across households and 
that ‘the two types [of insurance] can act as substitutes for one another’ (Morduch, 1994: 
104), I then compute the ratio, ?̂?𝑐/?̂?𝑦 to gauge the extent to which consumption is 
  
22 
smoothed, relative to income. Figure 2.3 plots estimates of this consumption smoothing 
measure against mean household consumption. The proportion of income variation that 
is allowed by households to pass uninsured into consumption variation increases with the 
level of mean consumption. Poorer households smooth consumption more, relative to 
income, whereas better-off households seem to achieve the same degree of insurance in 
their consumption stream (from figure 2.1) by relying more heavily on low variance 
income streams. Appendix 2 demonstrates that these patterns are robust to a more 
restrictive definition of consumption that includes only food, alcohol, tobacco and 
gasoline expenditures, and an alternative measure of variability, namely the coefficient 
of variation.  
 
 
 
These patterns of insurance are not compatible with theories of income smoothing that 
assume different access to credit markets. Such models predict that the relatively poor, 
who have less access to credit markets will use more income smoothing for their 
insurance needs. Rather, these descriptive statistics suggest that in rural Thailand, it is the 
relatively rich who rely more heavily on low-risk income streams to satisfy their 
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insurance needs than the relatively poor, possibly because they have access to income 
streams that offer greater insurance possibilities. In other words, households may be 
constrained in the set of income generating activities that they have access to. Dercon 
(2002) and Dercon and Krishnan (1996) document how constraints to occupation choice 
which bind for relatively poor households in Ethiopia and Tanzania cause their income 
streams to exhibit higher risk for a given return than their relatively rich counterparts. 
This chapter draws similar conclusions from rural Thailand. 
 
To pursue these issues further and to understand what forces are at work, I combine 
household-level income data with information on external shocks measured at the village 
level. Covariate shocks will be defined as shocks which are common to villages and have 
a demonstrable adverse effect on the income levels of households within those villages. 
Other studies of the Townsend Thai data have demonstrated that covariate risks are 
especially detrimental to the welfare of households in rural Thailand. Chiappori et al. 
(2014) show that household consumption exhibits a lack of insurance against aggregate 
shocks and Samphantharak and Townsend (2017) find that aggregate risk commands a 
greater risk premium than idiosyncratic risk, to compensate for this lack of insurance 
possibilities. This paper will show that such shocks have a disproportionate adverse effect 
on the income levels of certain groups of households, namely those that are headed by 
people with low levels of education, those that are employed in jobs that do not pay a 
monthly wage, those that are headed by the elderly, those that are headed by women, 
those that are headed by people with multiple jobs and those that own a business. The 
chapter will also document that a number of these characteristics are more commonly 
observed among the relatively poor households in the sample. Furthermore, this chapter 
also finds that there is an important regional component to this phenomenon – drought 
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has a particularly strong adverse effect on village incomes in the relatively poor 
Northeastern region, but no statistical effect on incomes in the relatively rich central 
region. As a result of these forces, opportunities to insure their income streams against 
covariate shocks disproportionately benefit richer households, and I demonstrate that the 
income streams of these households are indeed better insured against covariate shocks. 
These forces explain the patterns of insurance observed in figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.1 I review the income smoothing 
literature, noting how this type of insurance behaviour has typically been studied among 
the relatively poor and vulnerable, in contrast to these preliminary findings. In section 
2.2, I discuss the possibility that households may differ in the expected returns they must 
sacrifice in order to access risk-free income, within the context of Morduch’s (1994) 
theoretical model of income smoothing. Section 2.3 describes the data from the Townsend 
Thai Project (Townsend, 2011). Section 2.4 uses the Thai data to examine if the income 
streams of relatively well-off households are indeed better insured against covariate 
shocks than their worse-off counterparts. I also identify observable characteristics of 
better-off households that are linked in the data to their ability to reduce the exposure of 
their income streams to these covariate shocks. Section 2.5 concludes.  
 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
The standard models of insurance such as the text book versions of the permanent income 
hypothesis (Friedman 1957, Ch3; Ando and Modigliani 1963) and the complete markets 
hypothesis (Arrow 1951, Debreu 1952, Arrow and Debreu, 1954) assume perfect capital 
markets. Such a characterization of markets implies that even risk-averse households will 
make production decisions that maximize the mean of net income, and use borrowing and 
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lending to insure consumption against the risk in the resulting income stream. Thus 
different forms of savings can play a crucial role in household insurance decisions. In the 
Thai context however, Chiappori et al. (2014), Chiappori et al. (2014), Townsend (2013) 
and Paulson (2000) have established that consumption smoothing is achieved by a 
somewhat different mechanism. They find that consumption smoothing in this context is 
achieved by households pooling their exposure to risk with one another, so that when a 
household experiences an adverse income shock, a transfer from another household that 
has not experienced the same adverse income shock is used to smooth out the effect of 
the shock on consumption. As such, savings are not the primary channel through which 
consumption smoothing is achieved. Savings, however, are important to the welfare of 
these households because Townsend (2013) has found that they vary systematically over 
the lifecycles of these households and also because differentials in savings rates have 
important implications for the evolution of wealth inequality among these households. 
These issues are discussed in detail in chapter 3 which deals explicitly with the evolution 
of inequality over the lifecycles of these households.    
Morduch (1994 and 1995) notes that when capital markets are imperfect so that 
households are unable to insure consumption against shocks to income, they have an 
incentive to seek income-earning activities which themselves have lower variances.  
The use of income smoothing as an insurance strategy has far reaching implications for a 
wide range of important research areas in economics. As Morduch (1995) observes, 
attempts to estimate underlying income processes that neglect this form of insurance will 
underestimate the true extent of rick in the underlying income process and the degree of 
insurance used by households. In the Morduch model, such low variance is only available 
at the expense of lower mean income. If a large proportion of households in the economy 
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use income smoothing4, economy-wide mean income will almost surely be lower than it 
would be under perfect capital markets, where each of these households would choose 
the income earning activity with the highest mean available to them. Thus income 
smoothing may be a source of substantial inefficiencies on the production side of such 
economies (Morduch, 1995).  
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993, page 58) observe that when income smoothing is 
common among households at the lower end of the wealth distribution, not only “Average 
incomes are […] lower, but income inequality is exacerbated”.  This is because income 
smoothing among households which are already at the lower portion of the distribution 
of income implies that these households earn lower mean incomes than they would have, 
if they were not trying to reduce their exposure to income risk.  
Within households and over time, such inequality may be exacerbated because the choice 
of low-risk but low-return income streams may also affect the ability of households to 
save and accumulate assets. Carter and Barrett (2006) present a framework where there 
is a threshold value of assets, below which the rate of return per unit of assets decreases. 
This non-convexity in the payoff to assets creates a poverty trap – households with small 
asset holdings receive low returns on average and are therefore unable to save enough to 
accumulate sufficient assets to access high returns. Thus the inability to smooth 
consumption in response to shocks to income and the consequent need to smooth income 
itself can be a cause of persistent poverty and poverty traps (Dercon, 2006). 
   
Much of the existing empirical evidence on income smoothing, guided by Morduch’s 
(1994) theoretical model, which assumes that access to credit markets is the only 
dimension along which household insurance is constrained, has searched for this type of 
                                                     
4 The argument assumes that the resultant income streams are independently distributed across 
households. 
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insurance strategy among the relatively poor and vulnerable, who are more likely to be 
excluded from credit markets. Morduch (1990), using household-level data on Indian 
villages gathered by the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) between 1975 and 1984, finds that asset-poor households, whose 
consumption is most vulnerable to income shocks, devote a greater proportion of their 
land to safer, but lower yielding, traditional varieties of crops than richer households. 
Also using the ICRISAT data on rural India, Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) find 
that Indian households in lower wealth quartiles make systematically different decisions 
with respect to production inputs than households in higher quartiles. By adjusting the 
ratios of farm inputs such as irrigated and unirrigated land, draught animals, milk animals, 
other animals, farm implements, modern machinery, liquid capital and consumption 
assets; households achieve profit functions which differ in their responsiveness to weather 
shocks. Poorer households in areas with high rainfall variability employ asset portfolios 
whose returns are more insulated against this source of risk than their better-off 
counterparts. But as the authors note, this safety comes at a cost.  
“A one-standard-deviation increase in the onset date coefficient of variation 
lowers average profits by 264 rupees or 4.5% [...] while for farmers with holdings 
below the 25th percentile, average profits are lowered by 555 rupees. This cost of 
risk reduction represents 35% of average profits for the lowest quartile of 
farmers.” 
 
Bliss and Stern (1982, cited in Morduch 1994) find that Indian farmers could greatly 
increase expected profits by increasing the application of fertilizer, which sells at a price 
that is less than one-third its marginal product. They conclude that farmers abstain from 
using this productive input with a view to minimizing risk – in the event that the harvest 
fails, farmers reduce their losses by not having borne the cost of fertilizer, a clear example 
of households reducing income variability at the expense of its mean.  
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The literature has shed some light on the mechanisms households use to smooth their 
income. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) show that among their sample of Indian 
farmers, households adjust the ratios of farm inputs, to insulate their profits against 
weather variability. 
Also using the ICRISAT data from India, Kochar (1999) finds that households protect 
consumption by diverting labour from farm employment to off-farm employment when 
faced with a crop shock. Kochar presents evidence that this mechanism is used to protect 
consumption against crop shocks, but does not compare the extent to which income itself 
is insulated across households with differing levels of welfare, as I do here.  
In section 2.4, I check to see if different types of labour contract account for differences 
in income variability. One such contract is what Morduch (1995: 100) calls ‘Perhaps the 
most extreme case of income smoothing’, in which Bardhan (1983) (cited in Morduch, 
1995) analyses ‘tied labour,’ where the labourer accepts a very low wage to avoid bearing 
any risk. More recently, Gutierrez (2014) finds that increased prevalence of salaried jobs 
in Mexico plays an important role in insuring workers against shocks to productivity, 
such as illness. In this paper, I find that contract types that are more common among 
better-off households, are also better insured against certain types of shock. 
In the present paper, I add a number of potential income smoothing mechanisms to those 
considered in previous papers. The literature on income smoothing has focused almost 
entirely on agricultural households. In the Thai data, a greater variety of households are 
represented, so that the characteristics which enable households to smooth income are 
also potentially more varied. In Section 2.4.5 of this paper I attempt to uncover the 
characteristics of better-off households in rural Thailand that are associated with their 
ability to protect income against covariate shocks. I check if different characteristics of 
the household including the level of education, the type of wage contract for their primary 
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occupation, sex, birth cohort, whether or not they have multiple occupations and the 
employment rate among household members, can be statistically linked to the extent to 
which household income is insulated against covariate shocks. I find that the level of 
education of the household head, the type of wage contract in the household head’s 
primary occupation, whether or not household is dependent on agriculture, and the cohort 
of birth of the household head are systematically related to the ability of households to 
insure their income streams against a shock.  
These results confirm and extend the findings of Dercon and Krishnan (1996) who 
explicitly studied constraints to occupation choice and the implications of such 
constraints for the type of risk faced by the poor and vulnerable in rural Ethiopia and 
Tanzania. They found that poorer households engaged in activities which had lower entry 
costs such as collecting firewood and dung-cakes, making charcoal and working as day 
labourers. Entry into high return activities such as cattle rearing and shopkeeping were 
restricted to richer households, even though the poor stated a desire to enter these 
activities. In the Thai context, I find that households across the distribution of income are 
equally likely to be business owners, in contrast to these results from Ethiopia and 
Tanzania. Dercon and Krishanan (1996) also find that a lack of education restricts the 
ability of relatively poor households to gain low risk salaried employment. I confirm that 
relatively poor Thai households are similarly constrained. 
 
 
2.2 A Theoretical Model of Income Smoothing 
In this section I explore the implications of heterogeneity in the cost at which risk-free 
income is available to households within the context of Morduch’s (1994) theoretical 
model of income smoothing. I find that when households are required to sacrifice a 
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smaller proportion of mean risky income to secure risk-free income, they use a greater 
degree of income smoothing than they otherwise would. If I assume that relatively well-
off households have a greater choice of income streams that offer more insurance 
possibilities (such as access to jobs which pay a monthly wage), they may depend more 
heavily on income smoothing to satisfy their insurance needs than their worse-off 
counterparts. It then becomes an empirical issue, whether relatively rich households are 
more or less likely to use income smoothing than poorer counterparts. 
 
I now recall the key elements of Morduch’s (1994) theoretical model of income 
smoothing. The model describes an agricultural household that is set in two periods. The 
household may choose between an absolutely safe activity that yields a return s and a 
risky activity that yields a return of h when in state 1H and a negative return l in state 1L. 
Morduch assumes that each state occurs with probability 0.5 and that (h+l)/2≥s>0 so that 
on average the risky activity is more remunerative than the riskless one. All uncertainty 
is resolved in the first period and income in the second period is known with certainty to 
be Y2. The household chooses   [0,1], the proportion of its portfolio that is dedicated to 
the safe income earning option. Thus when state 1H is realized, income Y1H = s + (1-) 
h; when state 1L is realized, Y1L = s + (1-) l. Given state 1L in the first period, the 
household’s utility maximization problem may be written as: 
Max U(C1L) + U(C2L)  
s.t. C2L  (Y1L – C1L)(1+r)  + Y2     (2.1) 
When there are no credit constraints, consumption will be optimized where the marginal 
utilities are equal so that U’(C1L) = (1+r) U’(C2L). Let UL denote lifetime utility in the 
low-income state and UH denote lifetime utility in the high-income state, and b*L denote 
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the optimum level of borrowing in this case. As Morduch notes, this result depends on 
there being no limit to borrowing. 
Supposing that the borrowing constraint takes the form that a household can only borrow 
a fraction  of Y2 in period 1, so that the constraint binds whenever state 1L is realized 
and b*L <  Y2. Let the welfare loss associated with the binding liquidity constraint be 
denoted by , so that  
  = UL – [U(Y1L + Y2) +U(Y2 - Y2[1+r])]>0,   (2.2) 
recalling that UL is lifetime utility when there is no borrowing constraint, the first term in 
the square brackets is first period utility in state 1L, where the household has exhausted 
all borrowing opportunities and the second term is the utility in the second period, where 
the household consumes all of Y2 that was not borrowed to finance first-period 
consumption. Assuming, as Morduch does, that the borrowing constraint does not bind 
in state 1H, the household chooses the proportion  to maximize lifetime utility: 
Max 0.5 UH + 0.5(UL - )      (2.3) 
The first order condition for this problem is:  
0.5(s-h)U’H + 0.5(s-l)U’L – 0.5 (s-l)  = 0    (2.4) 
Rearranging and simplifying yields: 
UH’ /[UL’-’ ] = (l-s)/(s-h)      (2.5) 
As Morduch notes, the borrowing constraint is captured explicitly in this equation by the 
’ expression in the denominator of the left hand side. An increase in y1, decreases the 
utility lost due to the liquidity constraint, so that ’ is negative. Its presence therefore 
causes the denominator on the left hand side to be larger than it would otherwise be. 
Therefore, the numerator must also be larger, for equality with the right hand side to hold. 
Thus marginal lifetime utility in the good state of the world is higher than it would 
otherwise be, so lifetime utility must be lower. This happens only if more resources are 
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allocated to the less risky asset with payoff s<h. Thus d/d <0, that is, when the 
borrowing constraint is tightened, a household will dedicate more of its resources to safe 
activities.  
This yields the result that when constraints leave households unable to smooth 
consumption in the face of income fluctuations, households respond by choosing lower 
risk, and potentially lower return income streams.  
Given the plausible assumption that relatively well-off households are less likely to be 
liquidity constrained, this model of income smoothing does not account for the pattern 
observed in figures 2.1 – 2.3 where better-off households use more income smoothing. 
This may be because better-off households have access to income streams that offer 
greater insurance possibilities than their worse-off counterparts. This can be formalized 
in Morduch’s model, either by assuming that better off households have access to a higher 
s than others, or by assuming they have higher l. The effects of these two, alternative 
explanations are discussed in turn. 
The effect of heterogeneity in s on the optimum level of income smoothing can be easily 
understood with reference to equation 2.5. When s is high, so that household incomes 
streams offer insurance at a relatively low cost, the numerator on the right hand side of 
equation 2.5 is a relatively large, negative number and the denominator is a relatively 
small, negative number. The right hand side then, is positive and relatively large. Holding 
liquidity constraints constant, households that can access risk-free income streams at a 
relatively low cost, will have high marginal utility in the good state of the world. Thus 
total utility must be relatively low, which can only happen in the good state of the world 
if the household generates a relatively large proportion of their income from the riskless 
stream.  
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Alternatively, if we assume that better-off households have higher l, the distance h-l 
decreases. Thus under this assumption, the income streams of relatively well off 
households are inherently better insured than their worse off counterparts. A relatively 
high l causes the right hand side of equation 2.5 to be a relatively small, negative number 
so that marginal utility in the high state of the world is relatively low (holding liquidity 
constraints constant), which occurs when utility in the high state is relatively high. Thus 
under this assumption, these households use less income smoothing, because their income 
streams are inherently smoother than their worse off counterparts, so they require less 
total insurance.   
 
Under either theoretical explanation, the degree to which the income streams of 
households are insured against risk at different welfare levels is subject to two conflicting 
forces: on the one hand, poorer households are more likely to be liquidity constrained, 
decreasing their ability to consumption smooth; but on the other, their income streams 
may be less suited to providing insurance, increasing their need to consumption smooth. 
 
This observation – that households may differ not only in the extent to which they are 
liquidity constrained but also in the degree to which their income streams are suited to 
providing insurance – potentially reconciles the theory of income smoothing with the 
insurance patterns observed in figures 2.1-2.3. These figures suggest that relatively well-
off households appear to rely more heavily on low-risk income streams for their insurance 
needs than on consumption smoothing. But this explanation hinges on relatively well-off 
households differing from their poorer counterparts in ways that enable them to more 
easily access low-risk income. In so far as these differences are observable, the theory 
presents a number of testable hypotheses. First, does the degree to which household 
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income is insured differ across the income distribution? Second, are differences in the 
observable characteristics of households empirically linked to these differences in 
insurance behaviour? In the following sections of this paper I test these hypotheses using 
household and village level data gathered by the Townsend Thai Project (Townsend, 
2011). The next section of the paper describes the data. 
 
2.3 The Data 
The analysis in this chapter will be done on data gathered by the Townsend Thai Project 
from the 64 villages that are interviewed in every year from 1997 to 2011, i.e. the panel 
of 960 households. Within this subsample, the year on year attrition rate reaches a 
maximum value of 6%, but is usually closer to 3%. These households are replaced with 
households from the same village to keep the number of households in each cross section 
at 960. Because I am interested in the dynamics of income and consumption, I focus on 
the balanced panel of 609 households so as not to conflate these dynamics with the entry 
and exit of households to and from the panel.  
Household composition accounts for a significant proportion of the variation in the 
household income and consumption figures. For this reason, the variables presented here 
are all per adult-equivalents, using the ‘old OECD scale’ (OECD, 1982). Using this scale, 
the head of household receives a weight of 1, additional adults (16 and over) receive 
weights of 0.7, while children (under 16) are weighted by 0.5.  
I have adjusted for inflation using Bank of Thailand figures for headline consumer price 
inflation. All figures are inflated to 2011 Baht. 
 
The key outcome variables discussed in this paper are income and consumption, which 
are defined as follows. Net income is the difference between a household’s gross income 
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and agricultural and business expenses over the last 12 months. In the data, the 
interviewer notes their perception of the accuracy of this figure, and if inaccurate, they 
write what they believe to be a more accurate figure, after consulting the respondent. 
Where appropriate, I have used the latter (presumably more accurate) figure. These 
numbers are then revalued to allow for inflation and equivalised. The summary statistics 
for the resulting income data are reported in the first row of table 2.2.    
The consumption variable that I use is constructed from two distinct parts of the 
questionnaire: annual consumption items and monthly consumption items. The annual 
consumption items include spending on household and vehicle repairs, education, 
clothing and eating outside the home. Monthly consumption items include various food 
items, gasoline, alcohol and tobacco. Information on these is elicited on the basis of a 
typical month in the last year. To make these figures comparable to expenditure on annual 
consumption goods and income, I multiply these values by 12. These figures are then 
inflated to 2011 Baht and equivalised as described above, and the resulting summary 
statistics are presented in the second row of table 2.2. For some of the analysis, I use the 
value of household assets as an explanatory variable. These include the amount of money 
spent over the last year on the purchase of a television, refrigerator, motorcycle, boat, 
bicycle, and the like. The questions used to solicit these values are consistent over the 
duration of the survey with one exception. From 1998 to 2011 there is a question 
specifically on household assets purchased over the last year. In 1997 (the baseline year), 
however, the question is on the stock of all assets owned by the household, with a sub-
question on when each asset was purchased. For the sake of comparability, in the 1997 
data I only keep the value of assets purchased in the last year. Following Alem and 
Townsend (2014) I impose an annual depreciation rate of 10% on all household assets. I 
also account for inflation in asset values for new purchases over the duration of the panel 
  
36 
using Bank of Thailand data. However, some assets are very old, and for historical asset 
purchases (those bought before 1997) I use an annual inflation rate of 3%, the sample 
average.  
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Household Data 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Income 49,510 71,087 175 1,956,726 
Consumption 21,128 22,817 466 667,738 
Assets 83,494 160,960 0 2,870,177 
Birth Year 1948 13 1903 1988 
Sex 0.300 0.458 0 1 
Second Occupation 0.640 0.480 0 1 
Involved in Agriculture 0.904 0.295 0 1 
Number of household 
members in employment 2.645 1.247 0 10 
Contract Type     
Business Owner 0.639 0.480 0 1 
Unpaid Family Worker 0.037 0.189 0 1 
Daily Wage 0.140 0.348 0 1 
Monthly Wage 0.031 0.173 0 1 
Piece Rates 0.015 0.123 0 1 
Government Work 0.021 0.144 0 1 
Other 0.003 0.054 0 1 
Maximum Schooling:     
None 0.109 0.312 0 1 
Kindergarten 0.048 0.214 0 1 
Primary 0.762 0.426 0 1 
Secondary 0.053 0.224 0 1 
Vocational 0.011 0.104 0 1 
University 0.017 0.128 0 1 
Other 0.000 0.010 0 1 
* 31.5147 Thai Baht = 1 U.S. Dollar on 31st Dec. 2011 (source: exchangerates.org.uk) 
These data are combined with the stock of business assets and agricultural assets to 
compute the stock of total assets the household owns. The summary statistics for these 
asset holdings are also presented in table 2.2. I note here that whenever assets are used as 
a conditioning variable in a regression with income and consumption, I use the lagged 
value of assets to address the obvious endogeneity problem. 
The remaining rows of table 2.2 present summary statistics on other variables of interest. 
The mean year of birth of a household head is 1948, while the oldest was born in 1903 
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and the most recent in 1988. Since most of the analysis is performed on a balanced panel 
of households, it is important to note that over the duration of the panel heads of 
households are, on average getting older. Women head 30% of the households and 64% 
of household heads have more than one occupation. By far the most common type of 
employment is ‘business owner’, followed by those who are in a contract that pays them 
a daily wage. 90% of households are involved in some kind of agricultural activity. The 
most common education level of household heads is to the primary level, accounting for 
76% of the sample while the next most common is ‘none’. The mean number of employed  
Table 2.3: Observable Characteristics of Households with Below 
and Above Median Permanent Income  
Level of permanent income: Below median  Above median  
Education level of head (%)   
None 16.68 4.59 
Kindergarden 0 0.11 
Primary 80.90 81.03 
Secondary 1.97 9.06 
Vocational 0.30 1.78 
University 0.12 3.40 
Other 0.00 0.02 
Primary contract type of head 
(%)    
Government work 0.24 4.03 
Other monthly wages 1.15 4.92 
Daily wages 17.86 10.50 
Piece rates 1.32 1.80 
Business owner 59.84 68.02 
Other 0.16 0.35 
Decade of birth of head (%)   
1930s 26.05 14.45 
1940s 23.51 18.51 
1950s 22.65 37.22 
1960s 13.49 21.62 
Other characteristics   
More than one breadwinner (%) 62.68 64.74 
Head holds multiple jobs (%) 58.60 71.27 
Headed by women (%) 36.14 24.54 
Involvement in agriculture (%) 90.30 91.20 
Lagged log of assets 9.73 11.10 
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people in a household is 2.6, and there is substantial variation in this number. The 
maximum number of employed people in one household is 10, but households who have 
5 for fewer employed members account more than 99% of the data. The median number 
of employed people per household is 2, accounting for almost 42% of the data. 
Table 2.3 presents some descriptive statistics which assess whether or not these 
observable characteristics differ across the distribution of income. To construct this table, 
I use mean log of equivalised real consumption of households over the duration of the 
panel as a proxy for permanent income (as was done in figures 2.1 - 2.3), and divide 
households into two groups based on whether or not their mean consumption is above or 
below the sample median. The table shows that households which have permanent 
income higher than the sample median differ in many observable characteristics from 
those which do not. Such households are more likely to be in government work or other 
jobs that pay steady monthly wages, as opposed to varying daily wages or unpaid family 
work. They are likely to be better educated than their worse-off counterparts. They are 
less likely to be dependent on a sole breadwinner. The head of household is more likely 
to have more than one source of income. On average, they are headed by younger people. 
Unsurprisingly, they have larger asset holdings than their worse off counterparts. In the 
analysis that follows I will test if any of these differences in observable characteristics 
can be statistically linked to the ability of relatively well off households to insure their 
income against shocks.  
Potential heterogeneity in risk preferences could in principle pose a threat to the central 
thesis of this chapter – the proposition that richer households have privileged access to 
better insured income streams. If poorer households happened to have a greater risk 
tolerance, they may select relatively risky income streams even if they were afforded the 
same insurance possibilities as their richer counterparts. This narrative however, is not 
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consistent with the descriptive statistics in table 2.3. Households headed by the elderly 
tend to be more risk averse than their younger counterparts. The fact that households 
headed by people who were born in the 1930s and 1940s are much more common among 
the relatively poor, whereas those headed by people born in the 1950s and 1960s are more 
common among the relatively rich, suggests that if anything poorer households that are 
on average headed by older people, are likely to be more risk averse than the richer ones. 
In section 3.5.2 of the next chapter, I will also present evidence that poorer households 
are more likely to exhibit higher fertility, another demographic factor that is generally 
associated with high risk aversion. These characteristics suggest that poorer households 
are unlikely to be more risk averse than their richer counterparts. Furthermore, using the 
monthly series of the Townsend Thai Data, Chiappori et al. (2014) estimate household 
risk preferences in rural Thailand (albeit on a distinct, but similar set of villages to those 
covered by the annual survey which I use here) using a full risk-sharing model and they 
find that though there is substantial evidence of heterogeneity in risk preferences, this 
heterogeneity is unrelated to household wealth, or indeed any other characteristic. 
Chiappori et al. (2013) use an alternative methodology, which exploits variation in the 
different income portfolios chosen by different households, to identify risk preferences, 
also in the monthly series of the Townsend Thai data.  Their results are qualitatively 
similar to those of the preceding paper, in that they also find no evidence that risk 
preferences are correlated with demographic variables or household wealth. Taken 
together, these factors lead me to conclude that heterogeneity in risk preferences is 
unlikely to pose a credible threat to the key contributions of this paper.  
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2.3.1 Measures of Exogenous ‘Shocks’ to Household Income 
To identify differences in the degree to which the income streams of different households 
are insured, I require variables which are likely to exogenously affect household 
productivity. The literature has met this requirement by using observations of involuntary 
job loss (Cochrane 1991), adverse weather (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Dercon 
2004; Kochar 1999), or adverse health outcomes (Cochrane, 1991; Gutierrez, 2014). 
Unfortunately, not all of these shocks are identified in the Townsend Thai Project. I now 
turn to identifying exogenous variation in household income from those potential shocks 
which are measured in the data. 
The Townsend Thai Project does measure information on involuntary job loss. However, 
because of the agricultural and entrepreneurial nature of households in the Thai sample, 
involuntary job loss in the form of layoffs and factory closures is very rare: in the twelve 
years for which this information is available, there were only two reported layoffs, and 
four jobs lost due to factory closures.  
The Townsend Thai data also collects information on the occurrence of adverse weather 
and communicable disease, though these are measured at the village level, rather than the 
household level. These data are collected from interviews with a key informant, typically 
the village headman. They were not gathered in the first year of the survey (1997), but 
are available for all subsequent years (1998-2011)5.  
Data are available on the number of households in each village affected by crop disease, 
drought, flood, polluted drinking water, polluted irrigation water, soil erosion, storm, 
HIV/AIDS, cholera, hemorrhagic fever, malaria, other disease, smallpox and typhoid. 
Table 2.4 presents some summary statistics of these variables.  
                                                     
5 Nonetheless, information on household characteristics in 1997 remains useful because some of the 
covariates are potentially endogenous to adverse weather and health outcomes, which leads me to use 
their lagged values as instruments in the empirical work which follows. 
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My goal is to identify exogenous shocks to household income. Because the data on these 
potential shocks are measured at the village level, the best I can do is to identify ‘covariate 
shocks’ to household income. For a village level occurrence to serve as a useful ‘covariate 
shock’, it must satisfy two properties: 
1. When the shock materializes, it must be widespread enough to be justifiably 
considered ‘covariate’ 
2. It must exhibit enough variation over time within each village as to be considered 
a ‘shock’. 
The first column of table 2.4 reports that drought is the most wide-spread among these 
potential shocks, affecting on average 2,082 households a year. Crop disease and flood 
are also reasonably wide-spread, affecting on average 1,194 and 452 households, 
respectively. These are unconditional averages. To understand if a potential shock 
satisfies point 1 above, I calculate the average proportion of village households affected 
by each potential shock, given the occurrence of that shock in that village in that year.  
These are presented in the second column of table 2.4. These figures show that the 
average outbreak of crop disease, drought, flood, polluted drinking water, polluted 
irrigation water or soil erosion, affect a substantial proportion of households. Among 
these the average flood is the least widespread, still affecting 28% of households in a 
village. Therefore, I consider these potential shocks, as being sufficiently ‘covariate’ to 
use in my empirical analysis.  
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Village-level Data 
Shock Average 
number of 
households 
affected per 
year 
Minimum 
households 
affected in 
one year 
Maximum 
households 
affected in 
one year 
Mean 
proportion 
of villages 
affected, 
given 
occurrence 
of shock 
Measure of 
variation 
over time 
within 
villages 
Crop disease 1194.07 238 2,149 0.351 0.465 
Drought 2081.5 492 6,396 0.519 0.492 
Flood 451.93 90 1,345 0.281 0.345 
Polluted drinking water 54.86 0 256 0.590 0.039 
Polluted irrigation water 87.21 0 398 0.510 0.061 
Soil erosion 199.71 0 1,255 0.295 0.104 
Storm 103.07 24 180 0.053 0.327 
HIV/AIDS 31.71 17 54 0.018 0.295 
Cholera 16.79 0 110 0.054 0.087 
Haemorrhagic Fever 98.79 23 407 0.028 0.430 
Malaria 21.64 0 99 0.037 0.122 
Other disease 61.57 0 218 0.052 0.277 
Smallpox 0.43 0 3 0.007 0.013 
Typhoid 3.93 0 14 0.019 0.075 
 
The rest of column 2 of table 2.4 illustrates that storms and the average outbreaks of 
HIV/AIDS, cholera, haemorrhagic fever, malaria, other disease, smallpox and typhoid, 
affect a relatively small proportion of village households. Cholera is the most widespread 
among these potential shocks, yet the average outbreak affects only 5.4% of households 
in a village. This prevents me from justifiably using any of these occurrences as 
‘covariate’ shocks.  
The third and fourth columns of the table present the minimum and maximum number of 
households affected by each potential shock in any year. While these numbers are 
illustrative summary statistics, they are not sufficient to determine the extent of variation 
over time in village exposure to the remaining potential shocks. For example, if some 
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villages were persistently affected by soil erosion, but others were never affected, then 
soil erosion would be more appropriately classified as a time invariant village 
characteristic, rather than an exogenous shock.  
To measure the magnitude of variation within villages over time exhibited by each of 
these potential shocks, for each of the 64 villages, I construct a dummy variable that takes 
on a value of 1 if a shock occurs in a given year and 0 otherwise. I measure the variability 
in each potential shock over time, within each village by computing the standard deviation 
of this dummy variable for each of the 64 villages. Finally, I compute the mean of these 
standard deviations, over the 64 villages, and the resulting number is presented in the 6th 
column of table 2.4. The widespread shocks identified above, are readily classified into 
two groups: the materialization of crop disease, drought and flood exhibit a relatively 
large amount of variation over time within the average village; whereas the 
materialization of polluted drinking water, polluted irrigation water and soil erosion do 
not.  
Guided by these characteristics of the data, I retain drought, crop disease and flood as 
potential covariate shocks to income.   
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2.4 Estimating the Effect of Shocks on Income  
My goal is to test for differences in the degree to which household income is insured 
against risk. This requires that I identify sources of variability in the income dynamics of 
different households. To this end, I assume that the dynamics of household income are 
driven by: 
1. A permanent component, which may be a function of ‘fixed’ household 
characteristics, such as education and year of birth of the head of household. 
2. Village–level characteristics, such as soil fertility and distance to nearest city. 
3. A transitory, household-specific component. 
4. Village-level shocks, such as the occurrence of a drought. 
Thus the observed income of household i in village v at time t, which I denote by 𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑡 is 
composed of the following:  
 𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑡 ≡  ?̅?𝑖 +  ?̅?𝑣 + 𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑦𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡,     (2.6) 
where ?̅?𝑖, ?̅?𝑣, yit, and yvt denote the components described by 1, 2, 3 and 4 above, 
respectively. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡 is a mean zero error term.  
The average level of household i’s income, ?̅?𝑖, is determined by that household’s ‘innate,’ 
characteristics, such as the year of birth, sex and the level of education of the head of 
household.  
Holding these characteristics constant, the average level of household income may vary 
systematically with the village in which a household is resident. Some villages may be 
more fertile than others, increasing returns to agricultural labour; some may be better 
connected to urban centres, increasing returns to labour employed in services. Such 
heterogeneity between villages (if it exists) will be a component of permanent household 
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income for all households in that village, and is denoted by ?̅?𝑣6. Section 2.4.1 will model 
permanent component of household income. 
The transitory, household-specific component of income, yit, will include shocks to 
household income such as involuntary unemployment (Cochrane, 1991) and waves of 
illness (Cochrane, 1991 and Gutierrez, 2014). Observed yit will also include endogenous 
household responses to these unanticipated shortfalls to income, such as increases in the 
labour brought to market by other household members (Mincer, 1962). Furthermore, in 
practice it is difficult to separate yit from the error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡, because of measurement 
error7 and unobserved heterogeneity8.  
For these reasons, and given the available data, I focus the analysis on village level 
transient income, 𝑦𝑣𝑡. In section 2.4.3, I extend the model of household income using 
information from the village level shocks, identified in the section 2.4.2, using lags of 
potentially endogenous variables as instruments in a two stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation strategy. Having adequately identified the effect of a covariate shock on the 
income of the mean household, in section 2.4.4 I test if the income streams of relatively 
well-off households are better insured against the covariate shock than their poorer 
counterparts. All the results for different models of household income are presented in 
table 2.5. 
 
 
                                                     
6 It is of course possible that over time, households respond to heterogeneous payoffs by migrating to 
villages that offer better employment opportunities, driving down wages at these destinations, until such 
differences no longer exist. 
7 If measurement error is independently and identically normally distributed, across households and over 
time, and ‘shocks’ are to be used as explanatory variables, these errors decrease the efficiency of estimates. 
If, however they are systematically related to any variable of interest (for example, if richer households are 
more likely to underreport their income) then estimated coefficients may be biased and inconsistent. 
8 Insofar as such heterogeneity is time invariant, one could take the first difference of panel data during 
analysis to remove the effect of this potential bias. But if the effects of heterogeneity varied over time, for 
example if poorer households were more likely to receive ‘gifts’ during lean times than their wealthier 
counterparts, 𝑦𝑖𝑡  and 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡 would be correlated. 
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Table 2.5: Models of Household Income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Model 
‘Permanent’ 
household 
income 
Baseline 
model of the 
effect of 
drought on 
income 
The effect of 
drought 
after 
accounting 
for 
endogeneity 
Permeant 
income 
moderates 
the effect of 
drought 
Households 
with above 
median 
permanent 
income 
Households 
with below 
median 
permanent 
income 
Estimation Strategy OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Drought  -0.000777** -0.00101*** -0.00118*** -0.000470 -0.00168*** 
  (-2.45) (-3.12) (-4.26) (-1.17) (-4.06) 
Drought  permanent     0.00260***   
income    (4.11)   
Head has more than   0.0751** 0.0822 0.0637 -0.0941 0.111 
one job  (2.44) (1.26) (1.12) (-0.90) (1.33) 
Employment rate   0.367*** 0.396*** 0.327*** 0.522*** 0.290** 
within household  (4.86) (3.63) (3.74) (3.37) (2.35) 
Less than primary  -0.181*** -0.160** -0.150** -0.0720 -0.0959 -0.101* 
education (-2.75) (-2.53) (-2.42) (-1.44) (-0.64) (-1.83) 
More than primary  0.400*** 0.402*** 0.401*** 0.147** 0.304*** -0.00502 
education (4.88) (4.88) (4.91) (2.48) (3.26) (-0.05) 
Sex of head 0.0138 0.0482 0.0563 0.0241 -0.0399 0.0656 
 (0.38) (1.32) (1.63) (0.84) (-0.70) (1.45) 
Lagged log assets 0.149*** 0.145*** 0.144*** 0.0306*** 0.187*** 0.0387** 
 (12.71) (12.19) (11.54) (2.82) (8.31) (2.46) 
Monthly wages 0.572*** 0.587*** 0.607*** 0.399*** 0.487*** 0.293* 
 (6.27) (6.36) (6.47) (7.66) (5.36) (1.78) 
Household size -0.0626*** -0.0470*** -0.0413*** -0.0248** -0.0253 -0.0414** 
 (-6.26) (-4.10) (-3.30) (-2.24) (-1.41) (-2.56) 
Involvement in  0.0433 -0.0612 -0.0583 -0.0597 -0.108 0.0366 
agriculture (0.77) (-1.06) (-0.92) (-1.08) (-1.10) (0.55) 
Time 0.0725*** 0.0691*** 0.0753*** 0.0750*** 0.0730*** 0.0770*** 
 (19.77) (17.68) (18.70) (19.18) (15.09) (14.89) 
Birth Cohort Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Permanent income    0.848***   
    (15.07)   
Constant 9.299*** 9.135*** 7.888*** 9.392*** 7.854*** 8.963*** 
 (30.96) (33.10) (28.81) (41.25) (26.83) (35.09) 
N 8230 8229 7653 7653 3943 3710 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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2.4.1 Modelling the ‘Permanent’ Component of Household Income 
 
To model the ‘permanent’ component of household income I estimate: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑣 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜷
′𝑿𝒊 + 𝛾𝑉 + 𝜏𝑇 + 𝑒𝑖𝑣     (2.7) 
where yiv is the average over time of household income from 1997 to 2011. Xi is a vector 
of innate household characteristics and V is a matrix of village dummies, T is a time trend 
and e is a mean zero error term. The parameters that will be estimated are , ,  and . 
The results of this regression are presented in the first column of table 2.59.  
Equivalised real income is on average, 16.5%10 lower in households that are headed by 
people who have not completed a primary education, than in households headed by people 
who completed only primary school. Those who have attained an educational 
qualification higher than the primary level (for example, secondary, vocational or a 
university degree) on average receive equivalised real income that is 49% more than those 
who have completed only a primary education. Households headed by people whose 
primary occupation pays a monthly wage (including government employees) on average 
earn 77.1% more real income per adult equivalent than those which are headed by people 
who do not receive monthly wages. On average, an increase in household size of one 
person, is associated with a fall in real equivalised income of 6.1%. Real incomes are 
growing at the rate of 7% per annum over the sample period. There are no statistically 
significant differences in income levels between households that are headed by men and 
women. Nor is there a statistically significant difference between the level of income 
enjoyed by households which are and are not involved in agriculture.  
The 63 village fixed effects are jointly highly significant. A test of the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of all the village fixed effects are jointly equal to zero yields an F(63, 
                                                     
9 Standard errors are clustered at the village level, since the variables include a mix of observations at the 
household and village level. 
10 exp[-0.181]-1 = -0.165 
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1851) value of 16.9911. Therefore, I strongly reject the null hypothesis, in favour of the 
alternative that the level of average household income varies systematically from village 
to village. For the sake of brevity, the coefficients of the 63 village fixed effects are not 
reported here. Nonetheless, they are economically as well as statistically significant – 
even after controlling for ‘fixed’ household characteristics (as I have done here), average 
real income per adult equivalent in the wealthiest village is 73.3% higher than the sample 
mean, whereas that in the most deprived village is 38.2% lower than the sample mean.  
The remaining columns of table 2.5 will present models of household income which 
identify the effect of a covariate shock on the income streams of different households. 
Before I can construct these models, I must first identify a covariate shock to household 
income. 
 
2.4.2 Identifying a Covariate Shock to Transient Income 
Section 2.3 concluded that crop disease, drought and flood be retained as potential shocks 
to village level income. I now identify if any of these potential shocks are associated with 
significantly low transient household income.  
Equation 2.7 modelled the permanent components of household income. I now work with 
the residuals from that model, which contain information on transient income at the 
household level, yit; transient income at the village level, yvt; and an error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡. I 
assume that village level shocks are mutually uncorrelated with the error term, i.e. that: 
Cov (yvt, 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡)= 0,       (2.8) 
In table 2.6 I test the null hypothesis that mean transient income (the residual from 
equation 2.7) is equal to zero when villages report instances crop disease, drought or flood 
                                                     
11 
(𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅− 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑈)÷𝑞
𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑈÷(𝑛−𝑘)
 = 
(5282.25−4469.24)÷63
4469.24÷(8230−79)
 = 16.99 
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against the alternative that it is not. I find that drought is associated with significantly 
lower levels of transient income. For crop disease and flood, I fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that mean transient income is the same whether or not villages experience 
these events. 
 
Table 2.6: Effect of Potential Shocks on Transient Income 
Potential shock Difference in residual 
(given shock – without 
shock) 
t-statistic 
Crop disease 0.027 1.554 
Drought -0.046 -2.700 
Flood 0.000 0.012 
 
Given these findings I conclude that of the three potential ‘covariate shocks’ shortlisted 
in section 2.3, drought is the only one which is associated with significantly lower levels 
of transient income. Dercon (2004) demonstrated that drought was a very persistent 
covariate shock to household income in rural Ethiopia. Rosenzweig and Binswanger 
(1993) found that rainfall variability in a semi-arid setting (which captures the effect of 
drought) was strongly associated with household insurance behaviour. In accordance with 
this literature, and guided by the properties of the data at hand, I now use drought as a 
covariate shock to village level income. 
 
2.4.3 Extending the Model of Income to Include Transient Components 
I can now construct a model of household income, including its time varying components, 
with the goal of identifying differences in the extent to which the income streams of 
different households are insured against covariate shocks. The number of household 
members in employment and the number of jobs held by the head of household were not 
included as explanatory variables in the model of ‘permanent’ household income 
presented above, because the literature has documented evidence that households adjust 
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these variables over time (Mincer, 1962; and Kochar, 1999 are examples that will be 
discussed below). Now, I introduce these variables into my model of household income, 
and also include my primary variable of interest, the proportion of households in the 
village a household is resident in which are affected by a drought in a given year, 𝑑𝑣𝑡. 
Thus I estimate the equation: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜷
′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝛿𝑑𝑣𝑡 + 𝛾𝑉 + 𝜏𝑇 + 𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑡 ,   (2.9) 
where  is a parameter to be estimated and all other variables are as they have been 
defined before. The second column of table 2.5 presents the results of this regression. 
First, I note that introducing these transient components of household income has no 
significant effect on the parameter estimates of the ‘permanent’ component. The 
coefficient on the variable for the proportion of households in each village affected by 
drought has the correct sign, and a reasonable magnitude: at the sample mean, a ten 
percentage point increase in the proportion of households affected by drought decreases 
the real, equivalised income of the mean household in that village by 0.7%. Households 
which are headed by people who have more than one job enjoy on average 7.8% more 
income per adult equivalent than households that are not. A ten percentage point increase 
in the employment rate within the household is associated with an increase in income per 
adult equivalent of 3.7%.  
 
Importantly, households are not passive recipients of an income such as drought, as 
alluded to above. There is a large literature on ‘the added worker effect’, going back at 
least as far as Mincer (1962), who documents that the labour supply of married women 
in the U.S. is greater when their husbands experience spells of unemployment. 
Households also respond to temporarily low returns to labour in one market by selling 
their labour in another, as documented by Kochar (1999), who finds that when farm 
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earnings in rural India are hit by an adverse shock, households divert labour to off-farm 
activities. So while the time varying component of household income may be affected by 
exogenous shocks, this effect is potentially confounded in the data by endogenous 
household responses to the shocks. Failing to adequately account for this endogeneity 
may cause OLS estimates to be biased and inconsistent. In particular, if the head of 
household takes on a non-agricultural job in the event of drought, the OLS estimates of 
the effect of drought on income would be biased towards zero. A similar argument applies 
to the number of household members in employment. 
To address this problem, I use lags of the endogenous variables as instruments in a 2SLS 
estimation strategy. While these lags are likely to be highly correlated with the 
contemporaneous values, they are not likely to vary in response to unpredictable shocks 
to transient income that have not yet materialized. Indeed, I find that the first and second 
lags of both instruments are highly relevant. When I perform two, separate regressions 
with the employment rate within the household as the dependent variable, and its first and 
second lags as independent variables, the regressions yield R-squared values of 0.498 and 
0.330, respectively. Similar regressions performed on the variable for whether or not the 
head of household has multiple jobs yield R-squared values of 0.352 and 0.238. A Sargan 
test of the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly uncorrelated with the error term 
fails to reject the null for both the employment rate within the household (p-value: 0.558) 
and for the whether the head holds multiple jobs (p-value: 0.279). Accordingly, I proceed 
with 2SLS, using two lags of the potentially endogenous variables to instrument for their 
current values. 
In the first stage I use OLS to estimate the following equations: 
 x1it = c + bx1it-l + eit  𝑙 ∈ {1,2}    (2.10) 
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where l is either the first or second lag and x1 denotes the subset of household 
characteristics that are likely to vary in response to shocks. These are the number of 
household members in employment and the number of jobs held by the head of 
household. I then compute the predicted values from this estimation: 
 𝒙’̂it = ?̂? + ?̂?x1it-l       (2.11) 
and use them in place of the original variables for the number of household members in 
employment and the number of jobs held by the head of household in equation 2.9, which 
thus becomes: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜷
′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜃′𝒙𝒊?̂? + 𝛿𝑑𝑣𝑡 + 𝛾𝑉 + 𝜏𝑇 + 𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑡  (2.12) 
where the vector Xit no longer includes the potentially endogenous variables and  is a 
parameter to be estimated.  
The third column of table 2.5 presents these 2SLS results. The estimated coefficient of 
drought on income increases in magnitude, so that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
number of households affected by drought decreases income per adult equivalent by 1%. 
This increase in the estimated coefficient when compared that of the second column 
suggests that heads of household may indeed take on additional jobs or that other 
household members may bring their labour to market to reduce shortfalls to income 
brought about by a drought.  
 
2.4.4 Are the Incomes of the Better off more Insured against Drought? 
The preceding section estimated the effect of the prevalence of drought on the mean 
household. I now extend that model to answer the key research question of this paper, 
namely to test for heterogeneity in the extent to which household income streams are 
insured against shocks, across the distribution of income. 
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I adopt a reduced form approach to answering this question with the data at hand by 
interacting drought with a measure of relative wellbeing and testing whether or not this 
interaction term is statistically significant. This frames the problem as a moderated 
relationship (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003; Aiken and West, 1991), where I test if the effect 
of drought on income is moderated by relative well-being12.  
To implement this approach, I need to identify a suitable variable that summarizes the 
relative wellbeing of each household over the 15-year duration of the panel. One 
candidate is the household’s permanent income, which was modelled in equation 2.7. The 
use of income as an outcome variable obviously rules out this choice. However, under 
the textbook permanent income hypothesis (Friedman 1957), consumption in each period 
is equal to the expected value of a household’s permanent income. Therefore, the value 
of consumption at any one point provides a measure, not only of household welfare at 
that particular point in time, but also of how well-off that household expects to be in the 
future. As was argued in the introduction to this chapter, (equivalised) consumption is 
also likely to provide a cleaner measure of relative well-being for households which are 
at different stages of the lifecycle. It is true that in any one period, a household may 
misjudge their future prospects, or be temporarily liquidity constrained. There may also 
be issues of measurement error. Together, these issues imply that consumption in any one 
period is at best a noisy indicator of permanent income. The Townsend Thai data, contain 
a balanced panel of 609 households for which I observe consumption data in all 15 
periods. Averaging over the observed values of consumption is likely to cause errors in 
individual periods to cancel each other out, yielding a cleaner signal of relative wellbeing 
than a single observation. These benefits of employing this measure of relative wellbeing 
                                                     
12 Quantile regressions are an attractive alternative estimation strategy. However, they are not used as the 
primary strategy here because existing statistical software packages do not have established routines for 
two-step quantile estimation which is required to properly to address endogenous regressors. Nonetheless 
I present results of quantile regressions using lags of endogenous variables in appendix 3. 
  
54 
must be weighed against some potential costs. Households may exhibit heterogeneity in 
their rates of time preference. Such differences can cause the consumption streams of 
households to evolve differently even if their income streams are held constant. Thus 
early in the lifecycle, a relatively patient household may have a low level of consumption 
compared to a relatively impatient one, even if they both expected to enjoy the same level 
of lifetime income, and thus relative wellbeing. Similar issues arise if we are to make 
allowances for heterogeneous risk preferences and risky income streams. Furthermore, 
while using consumption instead of income and averaging over multiple periods can help 
address issues arising due to transient shocks, they cannot address the possible presence 
of permanent shocks. The presence of permanent shocks to household income would 
imply that household permanent income, and hence relative well-being was changing 
over the duration of the panel, raising fundamental issues with a time-invariant ranking 
of households by relative well being. Thus using the average of log real, equivalised 
consumption as a proxy for household permanent income implicitly makes a number of 
very strong assumptions about the preferences of households and the type of risk in their 
income streams. Nonetheless in my opinion, these disadvantages are more than balanced 
by the advantages listed above and so I proceed with the use of this proxy for household 
permanent income. 
Figure 2.4 plots the values of average of the log of (real, equivalised) consumption and 
income against one another. There is a strong, positive association between the two. This 
is confirmed by running a regression with mean, log household consumption over the 
duration of the panel as the dependent variable, and mean, log household income (and a 
constant) as the independent variable, which yields a correlation coefficient of 0.588, and 
a t-statistic of 34.5 (distributed with 607 degrees of freedom). Thus there is evidence of a 
strong, positive association between income and consumption. The coefficient is 
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significantly different from one (so that the measured propensity to consume out of 
permanent income is less than unity) most likely because the consumption variable does 
not include purchases of household assets and durable goods. The R-squared of this 
regression is also reasonably high, with mean income explaining over 66% of the 
variation in mean consumption. Supported by this highly significant coefficient and this 
large R-squared value, I proceed by assuming that the mean of log consumption over the 
15-year duration of the panel is an acceptable proxy for the level of household permanent 
income, and thus the level of wellbeing a household enjoys, the concerns raised earlier 
notwithstanding. For each of these households, I compute the average level of log 
consumption, 𝑐̅i.  
 
If I were to simply use 𝑐?̅? in an interaction with dvt, the resulting coefficient on drought 
would have to be interpreted as being conditioned on a household consuming 1 Thai Baht 
per year, on average. Following the advice of Jaccard and Turrisi (2003), I subtract the 
mean value of 𝑐?̅? over the entire sample from each household’s estimated permanent 
income. That is, I define the quantity,  
 𝑐?̅?𝑖= 𝑐?̅? − 𝜇,        (2.13) 
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where  is the average 𝑐?̅? observed in the sample. Thus 𝑐?̅?𝑖 continues to increase 
monotonically with permanent income, and therefore remains a valid measure of 
household i’s wellbeing, relative to the sample average. Using 𝑐?̅?𝑖  as a proxy for 
permanent income, I estimate: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜷
′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜃′𝒙𝒊?̂? + 𝛿𝑑𝑣𝑡 + 𝜒(𝑑𝑣𝑡 × 𝑐?̅?𝑖) + 𝛾𝑉 + 𝜏𝑇 + 𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑡
 (2.14) 
where 𝑐?̅?𝑖 is also an element of the vector of household characteristics, Xi. Again, I 
account for the endogeneity of the number of jobs held by the household head and the 
employment rate within the household by instrumenting for these variables using their 
first and second lags, as discussed in section 2.4.3. Village fixed effects and a time trend 
also remain present.  
Here, the key parameter of interest is the coefficient of the interaction term, 𝜒. If the 
income streams of households with higher levels of permanent income are indeed better 
insured against covariate shocks, 𝜒 will be positive and significant.  
The fourth column of table 2.5 presents the results. Indeed, 𝜒 is positive and significant, 
so that the adverse effect of drought on income is moderated by high levels of permanent 
income. The estimated effect of drought at the sample mean is unchanged, while that of 
mean consumption is large and significant, as expected. 
Thus I strongly reject the null hypothesis that the effect of a drought is the same for 
households with different levels of permanent income, in favour of the alternative that 
the income streams of richer households are better insured against this shock. Indeed, the 
magnitude of the coefficient is such that at the sample mean, a one standard deviation 
increase in mean consumption (0.459 log points) nullifies the impact of drought on 
income, while a one standard deviation decrease from the sample mean, doubles the effect 
of drought on income. 
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These results are corroborated when I split the sample into households with permanent 
income above or below the sample median and re-estimate equation 2.12. The resulting 
estimates are presented in column five and six of table 2.5, respectively. Column five 
shows that there is no statistically significant effect of drought on income for households 
whose permanent income is above the sample median. Column six, however, confirms 
that there is a strong negative effect of drought for households with permanent income 
below the sample median. Indeed, the coefficient in this sub-sample is almost double that 
estimated at the mean of the entire sample. 
Thus I find evidence that relatively well-off households in rural Thailand enjoy income 
streams that are better insured against this covariate shock. The next section of this paper 
attempts to identify the characteristics of better-off households that enable them to better 
insulate their income streams against drought.  
 
2.4.5 The Effect of Drought by Households’ Observable Characteristics 
The preceding section found evidence that was consistent with the hypothesis that the 
income streams of better-off households in rural Thailand are better insulated against a 
covariate shock. Table 2.3 illustrated that households which have levels of permanent 
income higher than the median differ in many observable characteristics from those which 
do not. Such households are more likely to be in government work or other jobs that pay 
steady monthly wages, as opposed to varying daily wages or unpaid family work. They 
are likely to be better educated than their worse-off counterparts. They are less likely to 
be dependent on a sole breadwinner. The head of household is more likely to have more 
than one source of income. On average, they are headed by younger people, who may be 
better able to adapt to changes in the agricultural markets. They have larger asset holdings 
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Table 2.7(a): Effect of drought on income by household characteristic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sub-group 
Whole 
sample 
Monthly 
wage 
earners 
More than 
primary 
education 
Born in 
1930s 
Born in 
1940s 
Born in 
1950s 
Born in 
1960s 
Head has more  0.0822 -0.470*** 0.346 0.0734 0.283* 0.158 -0.0400 
than one job (1.26) (-2.77) (0.96) (0.51) (1.75) (0.97) (-0.19) 
Employment rate  0.396*** 0.364 0.863** 0.715*** 0.249 0.278* 0.362 
in household (3.63) (1.37) (2.36) (2.91) (0.88) (1.86) (1.43) 
Drought -0.00101*** -0.000345 -0.000925 -0.00193*** -0.000885 -0.000537 -0.000575 
 (-3.12) (-0.28) (-0.96) (-3.29) (-1.27) (-1.28) (-0.89) 
Time 0.0753*** 0.0372*** 0.0267** 0.0690*** 0.0650*** 0.0833*** 0.0787*** 
 (18.70) (3.52) (2.31) (8.46) (8.65) (14.40) (10.68) 
Less than primary  -0.150** 0 0 -0.124 -0.106 -0.356** -0.464*** 
education (-2.42) (.) (.) (-0.69) (-0.75) (-2.35) (-2.59) 
More than  0.401*** 0.682*** 0 0.116 0.183 0.580*** 0.339 
primary education (4.91) (3.19) (.) (0.46) (0.62) (5.30) (1.47) 
Cohort of birth Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Sex of head 0.0563 0.0230 0.377*** 0.121 0.200 -0.0646 0.0974 
 (1.63) (0.22) (2.69) (1.20) (1.55) (-1.11) (0.80) 
Lagged log  0.144*** 0.238*** 0.251*** 0.120*** 0.141*** 0.173*** 0.136*** 
assets (11.54) (4.47) (3.86) (4.31) (3.40) (7.53) (4.05) 
Monthly wages 0.607*** 0 0.0750 0.778*** 0.433*** 0.657*** 0.116 
 (6.47) (.) (0.95) (3.62) (3.42) (5.29) (0.87) 
Household size -0.0413*** -0.0521 -0.0597 0.00667 -0.0892*** -0.0472** -0.0908** 
 (-3.30) (-1.46) (-1.44) (0.32) (-4.32) (-2.26) (-2.38) 
Involved in  -0.0583 0.135 -0.548** -0.203 -0.0929 -0.123 0.0946 
agriculture (-0.92) (0.91) (-2.47) (-1.42) (-0.81) (-0.86) (0.59) 
Village fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
_cons 7.888*** 8.499*** 7.800*** 8.333*** 8.279*** 8.153*** 8.377*** 
 (28.81) (15.04) (9.76) (24.13) (18.06) (26.26) (21.03) 
N 7653 409 664 1516 1598 2368 1378 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01      
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t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
Table 2.7(b): Effect of drought on income by household characteristic 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sub-group 
Whole 
sample 
Business 
owners 
Female head Head has 
more than 
one job 
More than 
one bread 
winner 
Not in 
agriculture 
Head has more  0.0822 0.129 -0.134 0 0.0686 -0.303 
than one job (1.26) (1.58) (-0.97) (.) (0.96) (-0.66) 
Employment rate  0.396*** 0.327*** 0.470*** 0.278** 0.385*** 0.985*** 
in household (3.63) (2.61) (2.60) (2.20) (3.01) (2.65) 
Drought -0.00101*** -0.00109*** -0.000943* -0.00105*** -0.00102*** 0.000983 
 (-3.12) (-2.79) (-1.78) (-2.81) (-2.83) (0.84) 
Time 0.0753*** 0.0778*** 0.0781*** 0.0786*** 0.0739*** 0.0479*** 
 (18.70) (17.48) (12.23) (19.18) (18.06) (2.82) 
Less than primary  -0.150** -0.206** -0.305*** -0.191** -0.125** -0.167 
education (-2.42) (-2.24) (-2.75) (-2.12) (-2.03) (-1.15) 
More than  0.401*** 0.277*** 0.453** 0.346*** 0.362*** 0.656*** 
primary education (4.91) (3.29) (2.57) (4.36) (4.36) (2.63) 
Cohort of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sex of head 0.0563 0.0426 0 0.0223 0.0408 0.229 
 (1.63) (0.91) (.) (0.48) (1.16) (1.35) 
Lagged log  0.144*** 0.152*** 0.133*** 0.168*** 0.155*** 0.0986** 
assets (11.54) (9.08) (5.35) (10.79) (11.56) (2.50) 
Monthly wages 0.607*** 0 0.455*** 0.472*** 0.616*** 0.700*** 
 (6.47) (.) (3.39) (5.87) (6.64) (2.95) 
Household size -0.0413*** -0.0630*** -0.0403* -0.0659*** -0.0469*** 0.0756* 
 (-3.30) (-4.39) (-1.85) (-4.53) (-3.39) (1.83) 
Involved in  -0.0583 -0.293*** -0.0187 -0.168* -0.107 0 
agriculture (-0.92) (-2.62) (-0.22) (-1.86) (-1.40) (.) 
Village fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 7.888*** 8.312*** 7.907*** 8.067*** 7.818*** 6.921*** 
 (28.81) (20.78) (21.27) (21.28) (23.96) (7.75) 
N 7653 4896 2305 5034 6713 708 
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which may be leveraged to engage in production techniques that insulate their revenue 
streams against covariate shocks.  
To understand if any of these observable characteristics can be related to the ability of 
households to insure their income streams against drought, I re-estimate equation 2.12 on 
groups of households which exhibit each of these characteristics. The results are 
presented in tables 2.7(a) and 2.7(b). To ease comparison, the first column of each of 
these tables reproduces the results of estimating equation 2.12 on the full sample.  
In the second column, I restrict attention to those households who are in government work 
or other jobs that pay monthly wages. The impact of drought on the income streams of 
these households is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Tellingly, in this subgroup 
there are insufficient observations of household heads with less than a primary education 
to identify a parameter for the corresponding variable. This supports the hypothesis that 
the income streams of better-off households are better insulated against shocks because 
their educational qualifications enable them to access government or other jobs which 
pay steady, monthly wages.  
The results in column 3 complement this finding, by restricting attention to households 
that have completed an educational qualification greater than the primary level, that is 
one of secondary, university or vocational degrees. The effect of drought on the income 
streams of these households is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Relatively well-
off households are much more likely to have these high levels of education, as illustrated 
by table 2.3. An important caveat here, however is that these households only account for 
8% of the sample.  
The remaining columns of table 2.7(a) restrict the sample to households which are headed 
by people born in the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s13 respectively. I find that drought 
                                                     
13 Households headed by people born before 1930 account for only 7.8% of the sample while those born 
after 1970 account for only 3.4% of the sample 
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has a strong, negative effect only on the income streams of households headed by the 
eldest cohort. For households headed by cohorts born after 1940, the estimated effect of 
drought is smaller than for the cohort born in the 1930s, and never significantly different 
from zero. The data thus suggest that households headed by people born after 1940 are 
better able to adapt to the occurrence of drought, though I cannot be sure why this is. 
Nonetheless, the heads of relatively well-off households tend to be younger than those of 
poorer households (from table 2.3), so the age of the household head may help explain 
why the income streams of richer households are better insured against covariate shocks 
than their poorer counterparts. 
Table 2.7(b) presents results from regressions which restrict attention to business owners, 
female headed households, households where the head has more than one job and 
households where there is more than one breadwinner. The degree to which drought 
affects the income streams of all these subgroups is similar to the result for the whole 
sample, and thus I am unable to relate these characteristics to differences in the extent to 
which the income streams relatively well-off households are insured against drought. 
In the sixth column, I focus on households which report that they are not involved in any 
kind of agricultural activity. For obvious reasons, I find that the income streams of this 
subgroup are also well insured against crop disease. This finding, however, may not be 
linked to the ability of better-off households to access low-risk income because 
households above and below the median level of permanent income are almost equally 
likely to be involved in agriculture. Again, it is important to note that these households 
account for less than 10% of the sample. 
The villages sampled by the Townsend Thai Project are drawn from two regions in 
Thailand. Some of the villages are from the semi-arid Northeastern region while the 
others villages from in the more developed central region. Other studies of the Townsend 
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Thai Data have found important differences between these regions with regard to the 
types of risks faced by households (Samphantharak and Townsend, 2017), the ways in 
which households utilize savings (Townsend 2013) and the factors which drive household 
wealth accumulation (Pawasutipaisit and Townsend, 2011). In light of this literature, 
Table 2.8 allows for drought to affect village households differently in each of these areas. 
The resulting estimates from the relatively rich central region are presented in the second 
column of the table, while those from the relatively poor Northeastern region are are in 
the third column. Again, for comparison I have included the full sample results in the first 
column. In the relatively affluent central region, the presence of drought does not exert a 
statistically significant effect on household income. In contrast, the presence of a drought 
exerts a strong, negative effect on household income in the relatively poor Northeastern 
region. Thus there is some evidence that geographic factors may constrain the ability of 
relatively poor households to generate low risk income streams.  
This section has demonstrated ability of better-off households in rural Thailand to insure 
their income streams against drought is empirically linked to a number of observable 
characteristics of these households. Better-off households are more likely to hold an 
educational qualification above the primary level, and to be in jobs which pay relatively 
stable monthly wages, thereby helping insure their income streams against covariate 
shocks. Intuitively, households that are in no way dependent on agriculture also have 
income streams that are better insured against drought, though this characteristic is not 
more common among relatively well-off households. Better-off households are more 
likely have younger heads, who may be better able to adapt to changing conditions in 
agricultural markets. Finally, better off households are more likely to reside in the 
developed central region which may offer lower risk income generating possibilities than 
the less developed Northeastern region. 
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Table 2.8: Effect of Drought on Income by Region 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sub-group 
Whole 
sample 
Central 
region 
Northeast 
region 
Head has more  0.0822 -0.0719 0.167** 
than one job (1.26) (-0.77) (2.12) 
Employment rate  0.396*** 0.756*** 0.0179 
in household (3.63) (5.50) (0.15) 
Drought -0.00101*** -0.000170 -0.00197*** 
 (-3.12) (-0.48) (-4.84) 
Time 0.0753*** 0.0702*** 0.0798*** 
 (18.70) (14.81) (14.76) 
Less than primary  -0.150** -0.242*** -0.0419 
education (-2.42) (-2.77) (-0.51) 
More than  0.401*** 0.341*** 0.414*** 
primary education (4.91) (3.01) (3.56) 
Cohort of birth Yes Yes Yes 
Sex of head 0.0563 0.0944* 0.0445 
 (1.63) (1.65) (1.09) 
Lagged log  0.144*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 
assets (11.54) (9.77) (8.53) 
Monthly wages 0.607*** 0.623*** 0.616*** 
 (6.47) (4.55) (5.90) 
Household size -0.0413*** 0.00396 -0.0940*** 
 (-3.30) (0.25) (-6.85) 
Involved in  -0.0583 -0.0600 0.0801 
agriculture (-0.92) (-0.81) (0.63) 
Village fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 7.888*** 7.605*** 7.869*** 
 (28.81) (17.74) (28.51) 
N 7653 3460 4239 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01      
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper started by observing that the use of low-risk income streams as a means of 
insurance has typically been studied among the poor and vulnerable. It speculated that 
this may be because the literature has been guided largely by Morduch’s theoretical 
contribution which assumed that credit was the only dimension along which household 
insurance decisions were constrained, implying that the poor, who are more likely to be 
credit constrained, are also unable to smooth consumption in response to shocks to 
income. This standard model of income smoothing was at odds with the patterns of 
insurance observed in figures 2.1-2.3, which suggest that richer households in rural 
Thailand use low-risk income streams to satisfy a greater proportion of their insurance 
needs than poorer households. In section 2.2, the paper showed analytically that if poorer 
households were also constrained in their ability to secure low-risk income, then whether 
or not they used a greater degree of consumption smoothing to satisfy their insurance 
needs than richer households, became an empirical question.  
Section 2.4 identified drought as a covariate shock to income from among the village 
level information collected by the Townsend Thai Project.  The paper then used the mean 
level of household consumption over the duration of the panel as a proxy for permanent 
income, and found that the effect of this covariate shock was moderated by the level of 
household permanent income.  
Section 2.4.5 attempted to discern the characteristics of better-off households which 
enable them to insure their income streams against covariate shocks. It found that access 
to government jobs and other jobs which paid monthly wages; high levels of education; 
and relatively young household heads were associated income streams that were insured 
against drought.  
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The evidence supports the hypothesis that the income streams of relatively well-off 
households in rural Thailand are indeed better insured against covariate shocks than their 
poorer counterparts. This is a novel contribution within the income smoothing literature, 
which has usually focused on identifying this type of insurance among the relatively poor 
and vulnerable, in exclusively agrarian settings. These findings suggest that the poor may 
be at a disadvantage relative to their richer counterparts not only in their ability to secure 
credit, but also in their ability to access low-risk income opportunities.  
Where the existing literature on income smoothing has warned about underestimating the 
true extent of risk in the income streams of the poor and vulnerable (Morduch, 1995) the 
analysis in this chapter suggests we run the same risk if we fail to account for the 
insurance role played by low-risk income at the top end of the distribution, as well. In 
rapidly industrializing parts of the world, particular attention should be paid in evaluating 
the impact of increasing access to jobs that pay monthly wages. These jobs have the 
potential to contribute to household welfare not only by increasing average earnings, but 
also by serving a potentially crucial insurance function for households. If we 
acknowledge that there is an element of insurance inherent in regular, monthly wages, 
and then estimates of insurance that relay exclusively on consumption smoothing may 
underestimate the total amount of insurance used by households in a wider range of 
settings than previously thought.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Inequality and Remittances in Rural Thailand: 
A Lifecycle Perspective 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper will study the dynamics of income inequality in a panel of rural Thai 
households, from a lifecycle perspective, using especially high quality income data made 
available by the Townsend Thai Project (Townsend, 2011). It finds that income inequality 
between these households is decreasing over time, even within groups of households 
headed by people from the same cohort of birth. It fails to find evidence to support the 
hypotheses that declining inequality is driven either by a convergence in the distribution 
of individual incomes, or by differences in the dynamics of household composition. 
Rather, it presents evidence that differences in the receipts of remittances from adult 
children of the heads of these households account for the entirety of the observed 
convergence in the distribution of income in the sample of village households.  
The paper finds that the reason remittances from children generate falling income 
inequality over the lifecycle of the heads of household derives from two key 
characteristics of the distribution of remittances between households: first, remittances 
from children constitute a larger proportion of the incomes of relatively poor households 
than relatively rich ones; and second, they become an important component of household 
income only later on in the lifecycle of the head of household. Thus, as households in the 
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panel (or indeed, any fixed membership group such as a cohort) age over time, households 
within the group become increasingly likely to receive this inequality reducing transfer, 
explaining why inequality declines over time. The paper demonstrates that these findings 
are not driven by differences in the propensity to receive remittances between villages, 
and that they are robust to a variety of different measures of inequality.  
The proportion of remittances in the incomes of poorer households is greater than that of 
richer households, in part because poorer households have a larger number of children 
who reside outside the village of origin and remit back to their parent’s households, but 
also because the average annual amount remitted by each child from a relatively poor 
household is a greater proportion of household income than that remitted by their richer 
peers.  
The paper contributes to the literature which studies the link between remittances and 
income inequality, a path of inquiry started (at the University of Sussex) by Michael 
Lipton (Lipton, 1980). The perspective of this paper, however is slightly different from 
what has since been done in this literature: rather than ask whether remittances increase 
or decrease income inequality, this paper documents a pattern of decreasing inequality in 
net household income (including remittances from children) over the lifecycle of the 
sample heads of households and demonstrates that remittances account for the entirety of 
the observed reduction in inequality. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first paper to 
study the effect of remittances on income inequality from a lifecycle perspective.  
This paper also contributes to the literature that studies the role of intergenerational, intra-
family transfers on the applicability of the lifecycle theory, particularly in the developing 
country context. It does so by documenting the importance of remittances from the 
children of the heads of households over the lifecycles of the parents. The previous 
literature (Willis, 1979; Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981; and Deaton, 1989; among others) 
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found that the cohabitation of adult children with their parents helped insure1 the 
household against the dip in lifecycle earnings associated with the age-related decline in 
the productivity of the household head. This paper confirms that remittances from adult 
children who live outside the family home also serve this purpose. This literature suggests 
that the extent of insurance provided by transfers between family members may be 
important because the household can overcome many of the informational and 
commitment issues that can impede market-based insurance solutions. This paper 
provides evidence that supports this hypothesis, as the quality of insurance offered by 
remittances from children is sufficient to reverse the increase in income inequality that is 
typically observed over the course of the lifecycle (for example, by Deaton and Paxson, 
1994; Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston, 2008; and Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010; among 
many others). This is an interesting counterpoint to studies that have found that transfers 
from older generations to younger ones typically tend to perpetuate inequality (Becker 
and Tomes, 1979 and Piketty, 2013; among others) whereas the current paper documents 
a transfer in the reverse direction, that is from younger generations to older ones, which 
reduces income inequality.  
Where this paper studies income inequality, earlier work on the Townsend Thai Data have 
found that wealth inequality is declining rural Thailand. Pawasutipaisit and Townsend 
(2010) and Townsend (2013) present evidence that in the monthly series of the Townsend 
Data (which is drawn from a different and smaller set of villages from the annual data 
that I use here) differences in savings rates and differences in returns on assets between 
richer and poorer households account for the reduction in wealth inequality that they 
document. The authors explicitly state that incoming remittances do not account for the 
                                                     
1 To the extent that the decline in productivity and longevity can be perfectly predicted, this is a relatively 
broad use of the word ‘insurance’. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in rural Thailand 
which could cause there to be substantial uncertainty around each of these variables so that the term 
‘insurance’ may indeed be appropriate. 
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reduction in wealth inequality, though they note that that finding is ‘not robust to the 
annual data’. In the present paper, I use the annual series of the data and document 
declining income inequality. Furthermore, I find that this decline is indeed explained by 
remittances originating from the migrant children of the head of household. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1 reviews the related 
literature, while section 3.2 introduces the data. Section 3.3 establishes that inequality in 
household income is decreasing, not only in the balanced panel of households, but also 
within year of birth cohorts of the head of household. It also confirms that this decrease 
is driven neither by convergence in the distribution of individual incomes, nor by the 
dynamics of household composition, as previous literature might lead one to suspect. 
Section 3.4 establishes that differences in the receipt of remittances from the children of 
the heads of these village households explain the entirety of the observed reduction in 
income inequality within decade-of-birth cohorts of the heads of household. The section 
also demonstrates that this result is robust to a range of different measures of inequality 
and is not driven by differences in income or remittance dynamics between villages. 
Section 3.5 studies the characteristics of the distribution of remittances across households 
and over time which explain their redistributive effect, while Section 3.6 concludes.  
 
 
3.1 Literature Review 
The Dynamics of Inequality and the Permanent Income Hypothesis 
It is a robust prediction of the permanent income (Friedman 1957, Ch3) and lifecycle 
(Ando and Modigliani 1963) hypotheses, that income inequality will be increasing in any 
fixed-membership group. The theory behind this result is simple: suppose that 
innovations to individual incomes consist of a permanent component (typically, modelled 
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as a random walk2) and a transitory component. Then to the extent that permanent shocks 
are not correlated between individuals, the distribution of incomes within any group of 
individuals will diverge. Indeed, since permanent shocks affect not just contemporaneous 
but permanent income, under the permanent income hypothesis, consumption inequality 
too, will increase over time. 
Deaton and Paxson (1994) demonstrate that these (and other) predictions of the 
permanent income hypothesis hold in repeated cross sectional data in countries as diverse 
as Taiwan, the United States and the United Kingdom. Recent papers have reported 
similar findings from Australia (Chatterjee et al., 2015), Germany (Bonke et al., 2015), 
Italy (Rosati, 2003; and Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010) and Japan (Yamada, 2009).  
 
Developing Countries May Have Different Inequality Dynamics 
It is no coincidence that the studies cited above rely almost exclusively on data from rich, 
industrializing countries. Income in poorer countries tends to consist of a larger share of 
small-holder agriculture. Two aspects of uncertainty in the income stream in communities 
which are heavily dependent on agriculture, such as rural Thailand (where 91% of 
households in the balanced panel receive at least some part of their income from 
agriculture), are particularly salient to a discussion of the evolution of income inequality: 
their covariate3 nature and lack of persistence. 
The literature has documented a number of instances where agricultural shocks have been 
demonstrated to include a strong covariate component (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; 
                                                     
2 A random walk is a stochastic process where the value of a random variable in a particular period, say  𝜀𝑡, 
is equal to its value in the immediately preceding period plus a mean-zero innovation term. That is, 𝜀𝑡 =
 𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝑡 . The innovation term, 𝜗𝑡 is typically assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
over time. Most economic applications also assume that it is normally distributed.  
3 Shocks to agricultural productivity such as droughts, floods and pestilence affect whole villages or areas 
at a time rather than individual households. As a result, these may change the level of village income but 
not its cross-sectional variance. 
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Udry 1994; Morduch, 1994; Townsend, 1994 and Dercon 2006, among others). But even 
the highly stylized case where all shocks to household income are covariate, only explains 
why income inequality within cohorts does not increase – it cannot account for the 
reduction in inequality that this paper documents. 
Deaton (1989, 1991) observes that in agricultural contexts, where income risk is very 
much driven by weather, innovations to income will be predominantly temporary, rather 
than persistent, lending some plausibility to models where income is a mean-reverting 
process. If we are prepared to make the extreme assumption that all shocks to household 
income are transient (so that there is no permanent component), a positive shock to a 
household in one period will on average be offset by a negative shock in a future period, 
leaving the distribution of income unchanged. But again, this extreme assumption can 
only explain why income inequality does not increase; it cannot account for the 
convergence in the distribution of income over time that this paper will document. 
If the observed convergence in household income inequality cannot be generated by 
placing reasonable restrictions on the exogenous stochastic processes that determine 
household income4, then they must be linked to some margin of adjustment within the 
household. Added worker effects (Mincer 1962) and the substitution of household labour 
from farm to non-farm activities in the presence of an agricultural shock (Kochar, 1999) 
are well known channels through which households may smooth out temporary 
fluctuations in income, which have been studied elsewhere in this thesis. These forces 
however, do not appear to account for the persistent decline in inequality that is 
documented here (as will be demonstrated later).  
It is well known that one of the crucial differences between the nature of households in 
developed and developing countries is the increased likelihood of observing multiple 
                                                     
4 In section 3.3, I use the limited data available on the earnings of individual members of the household to 
look for direct evidence of such convergence in the distribution of individual earnings, and fail to find any. 
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generations of adult members within the same household in the latter. Within the context 
of the lifecycle model, the literature has understood this type of household structure to 
internalize an insurance function that would otherwise require hump-shaped lifecycle 
saving: parents invest in their children when parental productivity is high, and children 
support their parents later on in the lifecycle when parents’ productivity declines (Deaton, 
1989; Cai et al., 2006; Banerjee et al., 2010; Oliveira, 2016). If the children of relatively 
poor households were more likely to stay on and cohabitate with their parents after 
entering adulthood, these households would have a larger number of potential 
breadwinners, possibly explaining the convergence in the distribution of household 
income noted above. However, this paper finds that differences between richer and poorer 
households in the rates of cohabitation with adult children of the head of household do 
not vary in ways which explain the observed reduction in household income inequality.  
There is a related macroeconomic literature which studies the effect of fertility and 
various transfers from older generations to younger ones of human, financial and physical 
assets (Lam, 1986; Kremer and Chen, 2002; Mare, 2011 and Piketty 2013). In general, 
this literature finds that such transfers tend to increase inequality, both directly and 
through general equilibrium effects. As such, these forces are unlikely to explain the 
convergence in the distribution of income that I observe among this sample of Thai 
households. 
 
Remittances and Inequality 
Cohabitation with younger generations is only one strategy that households can use to 
insure themselves against low productivity later in the lifecycle. Children may attempt to 
uphold their end of this intergenerational bargain by sending remittances to their parents, 
even when they no longer cohabit with them. Remittances from the children of the head 
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of household prove to be particularly important in rural Thailand, as the average of the 
proportion of household income accounted for by this particular transfer5 is one quarter 
(even more, if we restrict attention to that part of the lifecycle where heads are likely to 
have children of working age, as will be documented in section 3.4)6.  
The relationship between income inequality and the receipt of remittances has been a rich 
area of economic research, with mixed results. Lipton (1980) reasoned that migration 
from rural areas was likely to increase rural income inequality, because the available 
evidence at the time suggested that remittance flows were likely to disproportionately 
benefit households that were better-off to begin with. Stark et al. (1986) on the other hand, 
found that Gini coefficients in two Mexican villages calculated with the inclusion of 
remittance flows were lower than those calculated without them. They hypothesized that 
the diffusion of information on migration possibilities and early migration outcomes 
across households in migrant-sending regions reversed the initial increase in income 
inequality documented by Lipton (1980). Adams (1989) noted that simply excluding 
remittances from income data does not adequately describe the counterfactual of ‘no 
migration’, as people who migrate would presumably have been working in their home 
communities, had they not migrated. By comparing observed income with predicted 
household income if migrants had stayed, he finds that remittances increase income 
inequality in three Egyptian villages. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) note that migration 
may impact inequality through a host of other channels such as multiplier effects on goods 
and services produced in the migrant sending communities and other general equilibrium 
effects of remittance flows. Attempting to account for these effects, they find that the 
                                                     
5 A priori, we may expect that government assistance and retirement compensation also play an important 
role in supporting income later in the lifecycle. In the balanced panel, only 6.44% of households receive 
the former, and only 4.67% receive the latter, so that their contribution to the income of the average 
household is very small. 
6 The proportion of the average household’s income, by contrast is 14.3%, and also increases when we 
restrict attention to later in the lifecycle. 
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overall effect of migration among their sample of Mexican villages is to reduce inequality, 
so long as communities have sufficiently high levels of past migration.  
In some respects, the goals of this paper are quite modest, relative to the state of the art 
in this literature. I do not attempt to construct a counterfactual distribution of income for 
a whole community or group of communities. Rather, I observe a reduction in income 
inequality in a specific set of households that does not appear to be easily explained by 
the standard lifecycle considerations outlined above. This leads me to consider remittance 
flows as an intra-family, intergenerational transfer that insures members against lifecycle-
related declines in productivity. The ‘quality’ of the insurance provided by this transfer 
is sufficient to explain the entirety of the observed reduction in inequality. As mentioned 
in the introduction, to the best of my knowledge, this is an innovative attempt to study 
the effect of remittances on income inequality within a lifecycle context. 
 
This paper is not the first to study either remittances or inequality in rural Thailand. 
Paulson (2000) demonstrated that internal migration patterns in Thailand are consistent 
with a model where households select migration destinations based on an insurance 
motive. Paulson finds that households are more likely to send migrants to locations where 
rainfall variation, a key component of income risk in this agrarian setting, was less 
correlated with rainfall variation in the community of origin. Yang (2004) explicitly 
studied the link between income inequality and remittances by documenting high 
inequality in output between provinces, but relatively low inequality in income between 
provinces. Yang finds that remittance transfers are the equalizing force that explain these 
differences. In this paper I use more recent data and a longer panel dimension to study 
the role of remittances in explaining the dynamics of income inequality in these villages.  
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As was briefly alluded to above, inequality in rural Thailand has also been studied using 
data from the Townsend Thai Project itself. Pawasutipaisit and Townsend (2011) and 
Townsend (2013) establish that wealth inequality is falling among another set of Thai 
villages which are sampled on a monthly basis by the Project. By imposing an accounting 
framework on survey data on household income and expenditure, these papers show that 
differentials in savings between relatively poor and relatively rich household account for 
the convergence in net worth that they observe over the seven-year span of their data. 
Specifically, the authors find that poorer households save more relative to their richer 
counterparts, but also that poorer households earn relatively high returns on the assets 
which they do manage to accumulate. Together, these factors enable poorer households 
to close the gap with richer ones in terms of wealth. In contrast to what I find here (for 
income inequality in the annual series), the authors note that remittances and gifts play a 
relatively minor role in explaining the reduction in wealth inequality among the 
communities sampled in the monthly series. However, the strong relationship between 
high savings rates and high returns on assets to which the authors attribute falling wealth 
inequality are qualified by the important caveat that they are ‘not robust to annual data’ 
(Pawasutipaisit and Townsend, 2010: page 57). This chapter will demonstrate that in the 
annual data and in regard to income inequality, it is indeed remittances, specifically from 
the adult children of the heads of household who reside outside these villages of origin, 
which account for the decrease in income inequality over time. 
 
 
 
3.2 The Data 
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As was described in chapter 1, the coverage of the Townsend Thai Data varies from year 
to year. Households from different survey regions may exhibit systematically different 
patterns of inequality. Therefore, to study the dynamics of income inequality, it is 
necessary to restrict the sample to only those 64 villages that are surveyed by the 
Townsend Thai Project in all fifteen years, i.e. the panel of 960 households. As mentioned 
in chapter 1, within this subsample, the year-on-year attrition rate reaches a maximum 
value of 6%, but is usually closer to 3%. Households that are subject to attrition from the 
sample are replaced by a randomly selected household from the same village, to keep the 
number of households in each cross section at 960. 609 of these households comprise the 
balanced panel that are interviewed in every period, without missing or obviously 
spurious7 values for key variables of interest in any period. The main results in this paper 
will be informed by the full panel of 960 households, though in some select cases I use 
the balanced panel of 609 households. 
This paper is about the evolution of income inequality, and so the key variable of interest 
is household income. I reiterate here that net income is the difference between the 
household’s gross income and agricultural and business expenses over the last 12 months 
and that these numbers are revalued to allow for inflation using Bank of Thailand data. 
The summary statistics for the resulting income data are reported in the first row of table 
3.1.   
  
                                                     
7 Values that I have dropped for appearing spurious were reported in appendix 1. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
Net household 
income 
14,163 157,570.5 274,221 419.66 12,050,222 
Individual monthly 
wages 
2,929 10,561.66 7,805.43 136.43 85,744.91 
Individual daily 
wages 
6,695 180.63 59.82 11.99 1231.19 
Year of birth of 
household head 
14,244 1,949.17 13.304 1903 1989 
Number of resident 
children 
14,263 1.39 1.14 0 10 
Remittances from 
children 
9,570 21,374.46 43,037.53 0 1,096,907 
Number of children 
living outside village 
13,907 2.35 2.29 0 13 
Number of children 
who remit 
14,574 1.131124 1.561793 0 12 
* 31.5147 Thai Baht = 1 U.S. Dollar on 31st Dec. 2011 (source: exchangerates.org.uk) 
Incomes in developing countries are notoriously difficult to measure. The Townsend Thai 
Project is designed to overcome some of the more common pitfalls of measuring income 
in these contexts. The survey records both ‘net income’ and the contribution of individual 
sources. The enumerator ensures that the latter add up to the former, providing a basic 
check on accuracy. Goods that are produced by the household for its own consumption 
are explicitly recorded as a part of income, as are gifts received by the household, 
addressing potentially important sources of underestimation. Despite the best efforts of 
the survey, measurement error is likely to remain a concern, as in most empirical work, 
and due care must be taken to think through the implications this may have for the analysis 
here. The presence of measurement error would lead me to an overestimate of income 
inequality, as the variance of these errors would be added to the true variance of 
underlying household income, when inequality in observed incomes is calculated. To 
study the evolution of income inequality over different stages of the lifecycle, it is 
therefore necessary to assume that the distribution of measurement error is independent 
of the age of the heads of household. It is difficult to see how a plausible violation of this 
assumption could generate the results presented in this paper: measurement error would 
need to be declining in age within, but not between, decade of birth cohorts.  
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Concerns about measurement error in household income are further allayed by recalling 
that the income data satisfy some reasonable properties that have been established 
elsewhere in this thesis. First, in the balanced panel, mean household income strongly 
predicts mean household consumption. Second, the downward trend in income inequality 
across households over time is also reflected in a downward trend in consumption 
inequality, though the magnitude of the decline in consumption inequality is less. Finally, 
the usual predictors of household income such as the level of education of the head of 
household, the number of income earners in the household, and the level of agricultural 
assets, all have significant predictive power. These observations lead me to conclude that 
though measurement error is almost always an issue, the income data in the Townsend 
Thai Project appear to be reasonably reliable.    
The Townsend Thai Project also collects information on individual members of the 
household that will be relevant to the analysis that follows. Where household members 
are employed in jobs that pay either monthly or daily wages, these wage rates are 
recorded. Unfortunately, the 1997 data on individual wages appear to be inconsistent with 
the rest of the panel. In 1997 the data report 100 individuals as earning monthly wages 
that are less than 300 Baht a month. This compares with a total of 8 observations in all 
the remaining 14 years of the panel. This is either an error, or evidence that the 1997 
sample is systematically different from other years. For this reason, I drop the 1997 data 
from the part of the analysis that is conducted on individual (as opposed to household) 
level data, in the analysis that follows. The second and third rows of table 3.1 show the 
summary statistics for monthly and daily wages, respectively. These figures have also 
been also inflated to 2011 Baht.  
The year of birth of the head of household is of particular importance because it is with 
respect to this variable that I identify the lifecycle effects. A very small fraction of 
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households report having multiple heads. These are dropped from the analysis in the years 
that they report having multiple heads. The resulting summary statistics for the years of 
birth of the heads of household are presented in the fourth row of table 3.1. The oldest 
head of household in the sample was born in 1903, while the youngest was born in 1989. 
The average head of household is older than the average household member by 
approximately 21 years. 
As discussed previously, the literature suggests that in a rural, East Asian context, the 
dynamics of household composition may be crucially important to understanding the 
evolution of the distribution of household income over the lifecycle. The Townsend Thai 
Project collects detailed data on all individuals who either live in the household for at 
least six months out of the year, or who are in school and are financially supported by the 
household (so that those who are in school are counted as a part of the household of 
origin). The relationship of each individual to the head of household is recorded, and it is 
using these numbers that I trace the dynamics of the number of children cohabiting with 
their parents over the lifecycle. As the fifth row of table 3.1 demonstrates, on average 
each head has less than one-and-a-half of their children living in their household at a 
given time, though the standard deviation of this number is high, and as will be 
demonstrated in section 3.4, much of this variation is over the lifecycle of the head. 
What makes the Townsend Thai data exceptionally suitable for investigating this research 
question is the section of the questionnaire dedicated to children of the head of household 
living outside the village. Along with some of the characteristics of these children, this 
section collects specific information on the amount remitted from these children to the 
household of origin. This permits the study of the intergenerational aspect of remittance 
transfers, without confounding the data with remittances from other sources, such as the 
spouse of the head of household, or extended family living outside the villages. The 
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summary statistics of the real value of remittances from children in 2011 Baht are reported 
in the sixth row of table 3.1. 
The amount of remittances received from non-resident children of the head of household 
is likely to depend on the number of such children. The seventh row of table 3.1 presents 
the summary statistics of the number of the head of household or the spouse of the head 
of household, who do not reside outside the village. The average number of such children 
in each household over the duration of the panel is 2.35. Section 3.5 will study whether 
differences in the number of non-resident children between richer and poorer households 
can help explain differences in remittance receipts.  
Not all the children of the head of household who reside outside the village remit money 
to their households of origin. The final row of table 3.1 presents the summary statistics 
of the number of children from each household who remit a positive amount in a given 
year of the survey. The average household receives remittances from 1.13 children, 
substantially less than the average number of total children living outside the household. 
 
Table 3.2: Remitter Status and Gender of Non-resident Children  
Gender  Non-remitters Remitters 
Male 7,984 7,309 
Female 7,340 8,983 
Total 15,324 16,292 
 
Table 3.2 tabulates the gender of children living outside the household against whether 
or not they remit money back to their parents’ household. Approximately 48% of the 
children of the heads of household who live outside the village of origin are male, whereas 
the remaining 52% are female. The average woman living outside the village of the head 
of household is more likely to remit to their parent’s households than the average man, 
with 55% of women remitting in a mean year, as opposed to only 48% of men. This 
pattern is also true of the amount of money remitted to the parents’ household. On 
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average, female children of the head remit 12,461.27 Baht, whereas male ones remit 
9,135.18 Baht (at 2011 prices). The difference is statistically significant, and a difference 
in means test rejects the null that the average man remits the same amount as the average 
woman, in favour of the alternative that women remit more, with a t-statistic of 8.79 with 
19,448 degrees of freedom. 
Unfortunately, there are some characteristics of children living outside the village of 
origin that I do not observe, which nevertheless are potentially relevant to understanding 
the role of remittances from children in reducing income inequality among their parents’ 
households. The Townsend Thai Project does not collect information on either the reasons 
why these children choose to leave the village, or their earnings at their destination. I 
therefore cannot separate economic migrants from other migrants whose behaviour may 
be systematically different, such as those who migrate for marriage. Nor can I study 
potentially important and interesting questions about the share of income at destination 
that migrant children remit, and how this may vary with respect to observable 
characteristics of their parents’ households. 
Bearing in mind these characteristics (and limitations) of the data, I now proceed with 
studying the evolution of income inequality over this sample of Thai village households.  
 
3.3 Inequality Over the Life-cycle 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the evolution of income inequality in a balanced panel of 609 
households, sampled by the Townsend Thai Project from 64 Thai villages between 1997 
and 2011. Inequality, as measured by the standard deviation of the log of real income, is 
declining over the 15-year duration of the panel. The 95% confidence interval around the 
line of best fit shows that the decline is statistically significant. This is confirmed in table 
3.3, which presents the results of a regression of a time trend and a constant term on the 
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level of income inequality, which confirms that this decline is statistically significant at 
all conventional levels.  
 
 
 
On the face of it, this pattern of inequality appears to disagree with what has been 
demonstrated by the literature to be a very robust prediction of the lifecycle model and 
the permanent income hypothesis. However, this depiction of the data can only be 
suggestive of declining inequality, because a number of important (and potentially 
offsetting) effects are presented together. Each cross section contains households headed 
by people who are drawn from different year of birth cohorts, and are at different stages 
of the lifecycle. There is a rich literature documenting that income inequality varies 
systematically between cohorts, and evolves over the lifecycle (Hall, 1978; Deaton and 
Paxson 1994; Blundell and Preston, 1998; and Dickens, 2000, among many others). 
Guided by this literature, I now turn to studying the evolution of income inequality within 
cohorts defined over the dates of birth of the heads of households. 
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Table 3.3: Decreasing Income 
Inequality  
S.D. of log real 
income 
Year -0.0162*** 
 
(-5.82) 
Constant 33.52*** 
 
(6.00) 
N 15 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05   
 
3.3.1 Household Income Inequality Declines Over the Lifecycle  
In figure 3.2, I divide the sample into cohorts defined by the decade of birth of the head 
of household and follow the evolution of income inequality within each decade of birth 
cohort. With a view to enhancing cohort-year cell sizes, the analysis is based on all 960 
of the households that are interviewed in each cross section, rather than the 609 which 
form the balanced panel. This choice opens the door to the possibility that the inequality 
dynamics that I will analyse here are influenced by selective attrition from the panel. To 
check that this is not the case, I will verify that the key insights of this paper are robust to 
following cohorts over the balanced panel, while retaining the larger, unbalanced panel 
as my primary and preferred sample. In the Townsend Thai data, the households in the 
survey are randomly chosen from the surveyed villages in the first wave, and so are 
representative of these villages in 1997. In the actual population new, younger households 
are continually replacing older ones, where this panel attempts to track the same 
households which are ageing over this period. Thus, even in the best case scenario of 
purely random attrition, the unbalanced panel will not be representative of the village 
economies in any year other than 1997. 
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Due to the relatively small number of households in each cross section (approximately 
960), I have not constructed a separate cohort for every observed year of birth of the head 
of household. Rather, I define a cohort by each decade of birth of the heads of household. 
I experiment with using a narrower range of ages to define each cohort, because this 
would potentially allow me to observe finer differences in inequality over the lifecycle, 
but doing so also reduces the number of households in each cohort-year cell, thereby 
increasing noise in the observations. As table 3.4 illustrates, constructing cohorts in this 
way yields reasonable cell sizes over the duration of the panel for households headed by 
cohorts born in the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s.The ‘age’ of a cohort is short-hand for 
the number of years that have elapsed from the year that is at the centre of the range of 
birth years that defines that cohort. Figure 3.2 plots the evolution of income inequality 
between households headed by people from each of these four cohorts. The remaining 
cohorts, which are not well identified for the whole panel, are dropped from the analysis.  
As before, I use the standard deviation of the log of real income as my measure of 
inequality. These figures confirm that the decrease in income inequality observed in 
figure 3.1 is not driven by younger (and potentially less unequal) households replacing 
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older ones as the panel progresses, but is a genuine (if somewhat surprising, from a 
theoretical point of view) feature of the lifecycle of Thai households. This general trend 
appears to hold true for every cohort for which I have a reasonable number of 
observations in each cohort-year cell. Furthermore, at a given age, younger cohorts tend 
to exhibit less income inequality than older ones. The level of income inequality at the 
beginning of the panel does not appear to vary systematically between cohorts, as it does 
in other studies (Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston, 2008 for example). It is possible that 
there is some heterogeneity in the rate at which inequality is declining: the oldest cohort 
may be experiencing a faster decline than others.    
 
Table 3.4: Cohort – Year Cell Sizes for Household Income 
Decade of birth: 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 
Year          
1997 2 33 87 210 194 258 150 12 0 
1998 2 27 88 208 195 253 148 17 0 
1999 0 23 83 200 195 265 145 18 0 
2000 0 20 84 196 203 273 148 19 0 
2001 0 19 84 192 200 270 154 14 1 
2002 0 17 86 181 202 269 158 21 2 
2003 0 17 82 181 206 274 160 21 2 
2004 0 16 74 183 210 270 161 26 2 
2005 1 10 57 188 205 270 172 35 4 
2006 2 9 51 181 208 276 174 37 3 
2007 0 6 41 160 208 288 182 55 7 
2008 0 5 29 138 209 288 208 63 8 
2009 0 5 20 135 210 281 216 74 10 
2010 0 4 18 120 207 286 223 83 11 
2011 0 2 17 106 203 285 232 95 12 
 
To pin down whether or not these observations are statistically significant, I now model 
the evolution of income inequality as an initial condition for each cohort, and a cohort-
specific time trend. The objective is to test econometrically if inequality within each 
cohort is declining over time.  
The model I estimate is: 
  𝜎𝑐𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑐 ∙ 𝑡0 + 𝛾𝑐 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐𝑡      (3.1) 
  
86 
where 𝜎𝑐𝑡 is the standard deviation of household income in cohort c in year t. The variable 
c is a set of cohort dummies. These are first interacted with a dummy variable that takes 
on a value of 1 in 1997, the first year of the panel, and a value of zero in all other years. 
The vector of coefficients , will thus estimate of the level of initial income inequality in 
each cohort. The next term is an interaction between c, and a linear time trend, t. The 
vector of coefficients on this interaction, , is the key variable of interest in this part of 
the analysis: if inequality within a cohort is declining over time, then  will be negative 
and significantly different from zero. The error term 𝑢𝑐𝑡 is assumed to have mean zero, 
and  is a constant.  
An advantage of estimating an initial condition for each cohort, rather than a full cohort 
effect, is that I do not encounter the ‘dummy variable trap’ and can estimate initial 
inequality for all four cohorts. Thus identification is achieved by assuming that the time 
trends are linear within each cohort, permitting me to simultaneously model the evolution 
of inequality within each cohort over the entire duration of the panel (at the expense of 
omitting an overall time effect). The results are presented in table 3.5.  
The estimated coefficients for the initial levels of inequality in the three younger cohorts 
are very similar. The 95% confidence intervals demonstrate that they are statistically 
indistinguishable from one another. Only households headed by the oldest cohort have 
significantly higher initial income inequality than households in other cohorts. With 
respect to the estimated cohort-specific time trends, for every cohort I reject the 
hypothesis that  = 0 in favour of the alternative that  < 0. Thus I conclude that income 
inequality is declining over time, within each group of households categorized by the 
cohort of birth of the head of household.  
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Table 3.5: Income Inequality Declines Within Cohorts 
Dependent variable S.D. of log real income 
Sample used to construct 
cohorts 
Unbalanced 
Panel 
Balanced 
Panel 
Initial Inequality for 
cohort born in 1930s 
0.2253*** 
(13.7) 
0.2839*** 
(13.17) 
Initial Inequality for 
cohort born in 1940s 
0.1315*** 
(8.03) 
0.1042*** 
(4.82) 
Initial Inequality for 
cohort born in 1950s 
0.0881*** 
(5.48) 
0.1359*** 
(6.38) 
Initial Inequality for 
cohort born in 1960s 
0.1164*** 
(7.19) 
0.0655*** 
(2.98) 
Time × born in the 
1930s 
-0.0264*** 
(-10.08) 
-0.0223*** 
(-8.04) 
Time × born in the 
1940s 
-0.0237*** 
(-11.68) 
-0.0157*** 
(-5.39) 
Time × born in the 
1950s 
-0.0250*** 
(-9.55) 
-0.0176*** 
(-5.31) 
Time × born in the 
1960s 
-0.0222*** 
(-8.63) 
-0.0177*** 
(-6.28) 
Constant 1.1293*** 
(63.26) 
1.0389*** 
(43.93) 
t statistics in parentheses, robust standard errors, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. The initial conditions are identified as the coefficient on 
interactions between cohort dummies and dummy that is ‘on’ in 1997 and 
‘off’ in all other years. Thus the ‘omitted category’ is the set of 
observations which are from all years other than 1997. Identification of 
the four within-cohort time trends is achieved by the assumption of 
linearity and the omission of an overall time trend. 
 
Figure 3.2 was suggestive of possible heterogeneity in the rate at which income inequality 
was declining within cohorts. Table 3.5, on the other hand indicates no statistically robust 
evidence of such heterogeneity. All estimated coefficients are within two robustly 
calculated standard errors of one another. To test these hypotheses formally, I conduct F-
tests of pairwise comparisons between all estimated cohort-specific time trends. The 
results are presented in table 3.6. In every case I fail to reject the null hypothesis that each 
pair of trends is the same, against the alternative that they are not, even at the 10% level 
of significance. Thus income inequality is declining significantly within cohorts, and 
there is no evidence that the extent of the decline is different between cohorts. 
To ensure that these inequality dynamics are not influenced by the attrition of households 
from the unbalanced sample, or the subsequent addition of replacement households, I re-
estimate equation 3.1 following decade of birth cohorts of the heads of household over 
the balanced sample, of 609 households. Doing so yields the results presented in the 
  
88 
second column of table 3.5.  These results are very similar to those in the first column. 
The estimated coefficients are all of the same sign by and large, of similar magnitudes. 
The key result that inequality in household declines significantly over time for every 
decade of birth cohort carries over to this sample.   
 
Table 3.6: F-tests for Differences between Cohorts of Time 
Trends in Household Income Inequality  
1930s 1940s 1950s 
1940s 1.11 
(0.2967) 
. . 
1950s 0.23 
(0.6370) 
0.33 
(0.5668) 
. 
1960s 2.19 
(0.1453) 
0.44 
(0.5096) 
1.18 
(0.2833) 
F-statistics distributed with (1, 51) degrees of freedom; p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
3.3.2 Inequality in Individual Wages Over the Lifecycle  
So far, this section has presented evidence of a significant decline in income inequality 
between households over the lifecycles of the heads of household. This convergence in 
the distribution of household income could be driven by convergence in the income 
streams of individuals who comprise the household, in ways that are exogenous to the 
household or by differences in the number and behaviour of earning adult members of 
the households, or by both of these factors. To distinguish between these two potentially 
important channels, I would ideally observe the contribution of each individual earning 
member to total household income. In practice, income within these rural Thai 
households cannot be unambiguously disaggregated, since much of household income is 
agricultural, where investments in agricultural assets are combined with the (potentially 
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heterogeneous) unpaid labour of different members of the household before yielding 
income8. 
Given this problem, I focus on the 26% of working household members who are in a form 
of employment that pays either a daily or monthly wage. These household members are 
very likely to differ from those who are in non-wage paying employment, both in their 
observable and unobservable characteristics. As a result, it will not be possible to 
generalize findings based on these selected sub-samples to the broader population of 
household members. Nonetheless, it is the only check on dispersion in individual earnings 
that I can perform given the nature of these households and the available data.  
 
I resist the temptation to simply multiply daily wages by 21 (the number working days in 
an average month) and pool the resulting values with the information available on 
monthly wages. Doing so would most likely underestimate the relative riskiness of daily 
wages, because there may be constraints on the number of days of work available to a 
daily wage earner. I recall here that some of the data on individual wages appeared to be 
miscoded or erroneous in 1997. For this reason, data on the year 1997 is dropped from 
the remainder of the analysis that is conducted on the individual (as opposed to 
household) income. 
  
                                                     
8 Circumventing these issues of disaggregation, appendix 4 tracks the evolution of inequality in 
agricultural incomes over the lifecycle of the heads of household and finds that this type of income also 
fails to explain the convergence in the distribution of household income documented above. 
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Inequality in Monthly Wages 
Monthly wage earners (including those with government jobs) are relatively rare in this 
sample of Thai village households, and on average I observe 251 individuals a year who 
earn monthly wages in their primary occupation (including those who are in government 
work). The resulting cell sizes (which are presented in appendix 5) lead me to expect that 
wage inequality will be reasonably well identified from when the cohort born in the 1980s 
reach 17 years of age to when the cohort born in the 1950s reach 53 years of age.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 depicts the evolution of monthly wage inequality from these four cohorts. 
There is some evidence that monthly wages among older cohorts are more unequal. 
Importantly, however, over the part of the lifecycle for which we have reasonable cell 
sizes (between 17 and 52), inequality does not seem to systematically fall within cohorts.  
To test if inequality in monthly wages is decreasing within cohorts, I estimate the 
following model on the data: 
  𝜎𝑐𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑐 + 𝛾𝑐 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐𝑡,     (3.2) 
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using the standard deviation of monthly wages as the dependent variable. Figure 3.3 
suggests that the levels of inequality in monthly wages may differ between cohorts. For 
this reason, I model them using cohort effects, rather than initial conditions, as was done 
in equation 3.1. I restrict the sample to individuals aged between 17 and 52, ages for 
which I have a reasonable number of observations in each cohort-year cell. The results of 
the regression are presented in the first column of table 3.7. There is some evidence that 
older cohorts are more unequal. This is consistent with the literature on wage dispersion 
over the lifecycle in developed countries, such as Dickens’s (2000) study of UK wages, 
and Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston’s (2008) study of US incomes. Importantly however, 
within-cohort time trends are all statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 95% level 
of significance.   
Table 3.7: The Evolution of Inequality in Monthly and 
Daily Wages 
Dependent Variables S.D. of 
Monthly 
Wages 
S.D. of Daily 
Wages 
Cohort born in the 1940s 
 
-0.0090  
(-0.33) 
Cohort born in the 1950s 0.4612*** 
(5.03) 
0.1209*** 
(4.3) 
Cohort born in the 1960s 0.3602***  
(3.77) 
0.1342*** 
(5.01) 
Cohort born in the 1980s 0.0822 
 (0.98) 
-0.0019 
(-0.08) 
Time × born in the 
1940s  
-0.0015  
(-0.52) 
Time × born in the 
1950s 
-0.0086  
(-0.76) 
-0.0100***  
(-4.47) 
Time × born in the 
1960s 
-0.0073  
(-0.96) 
-0.0108*** 
(-4.73) 
Time × born in the 
1970s 
0.0022  
(0.54) 
-0.0032*** 
(-3.07) 
Time × born in the 
1980s 
-0.0116* 
(-1.94) 
-0.0031 
(-1.62) 
Constant 0.3922*** 
(8.79) 
0.2735*** 
(32.76) 
N 48 70 
R-squared 0.8848 0.5955 
t statistics in parentheses, robust standard errors, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.0. There are insufficient observations of monthly wages to form 
reliable estimates for the cohort born in the 1940s. The cohort born in the 
1970s is the omitted category in both the monthly and daily wage models. 
Identification of the within cohort time trends is achieved by the 
assumption of linearity and the omission of an overall time trend. 
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Thus inequality in monthly wages may explain part of the reduction in inequality over 
the balanced panel, as younger, more equal cohorts are replacing older ones. Nonetheless, 
they provide scant support for the hypothesis that the reduction in inequality in incomes 
within cohorts can be explained by a reduction in inequality of individual earnings.  
 
Inequality in Daily Wages 
The relationship between household income inequality and inequality in daily wages is 
less direct than that between income inequality and monthly wages because there are 
likely to be heterogeneous constraints (which are not directly observed in the data) to the 
number of days of paid work that daily wage labourers can find. Therefore, these results 
need to be interpreted with some care.  
In each year from 1998 to 2011, on average I observe 522 daily wage earners in these 
households. Appendix 6 presents the sizes of the resulting cohort-year cells. The oldest 
cohort for which I have reasonable cell sizes over the duration of the panel was 53 years 
old in 1997 and the youngest was 13. Together, these 5 cohorts provide a synthetic view 
of a large part of the lifecycle of daily wage earners.  
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Figure 3.4 depicts how inequality in daily wages evolves within these 5 cohorts. The 
figure suggests that inequality may be decreasing for the middle cohorts, though any such 
pattern is accompanied by a great deal of noise. I test for declining inequality by re-
estimating equation 3.2 using the standard deviation of daily wages as the dependent 
variable, and report the results in the second column of table 3.7. The declines in 
inequality for the cohorts born in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s are indeed statistically 
significant, though the estimated declines for cohorts born in the 1940s and 1980s are not. 
Thus the evidence for declining inequality in daily wages is mixed. The data certainly do 
not exhibit the unambiguous decline observed in figure 3.2. Taken together with potential 
heterogeneity in the hours of work available to this group of earners, these results are 
unlikely to explain the entirety of the convergence in the distribution of household income 
documented above. 
 
3.3.3 The Dynamics of Household Composition and Income Inequality 
The presence of multiple generations of adults within a household could potentially drive 
the observed reduction in household income inequality. If more of the children of poorer 
households are likely to stay on in their parents’ households throughout adulthood, these 
households would have a larger number of potential income earners, explaining the 
observed reduction in income inequality.  
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Figure 3.5 plots the evolution of the mean number of children of the heads of household 
who are resident in relatively rich and relatively poor households over the ages of the 
heads of household from when they are 35 to 75 years old. Each ‘x’ represents an 
estimated mean for the sub-sample of households who are in the bottom quartile of 
permanent income9, that is households that are ‘relatively poor’, and each ‘o’ represents 
an estimated mean for the sub-sample of households that are in the top quartile, the 
‘relatively rich’ ones. The local polynomials through these points (and their 95% 
confidence intervals) are also presented. The evidence suggests that poorer households 
have significantly more children than their richer counterparts, and these children start to 
exit their parents’ households later than their richer counterparts. Until their heads reach 
52 years of age, households in the bottom quartile of permanent income have, on average 
approximately one-third of an extra child residing with them as compared with household 
heads in the top quartile of permanent income, and the difference is statistically 
                                                     
9 ‘Relatively rich’ and ‘relatively poor’ are defined in a similar way to how they were used in the 
preceding chapter. I take the average level of real, equivalised consumption for each household over the 
duration of the panel as an observed proxy for permanent income. It should be noted here that in using 
this proxy for permanent income, I am restricting the data to that sample for which I have observations on 
consumption in every year, that is, the balanced panel of 609 households. 
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significant. Throughout their 50s, the heads of households in the bottom income quartile 
continue to experience the departure of their children from their households while exit of 
children from households in the top quartile appears to halt10. When heads in the top 
income quartile reach their 70s, on average they continue to have approximately one child 
resident with them, whereas those in the bottom income quartile have, on average, one-
third fewer cohabiting children.  
Under the maintained hypothesis that the only way in which the incomes of parents’ 
households are supplemented by the productivity of their adult children is through 
cohabitation, these dynamics of household composition cannot account for the 
convergence in the distribution of household income documented above. If anything, in 
this view, the fact that the children from poorer households are more likely to leave their 
parent’s household upon entering adulthood, so that these households have fewer resident 
children contributing to household income than their richer counterparts, would cause the 
distribution of household income to diverge over time, rather than to converge as it does 
in figures 3.1 and 3.2. But this interpretation neglects the possibility that children may 
continue to contribute materially to their parents’ household, even after exiting the 
household. As Stark and Bloom (1985) observe, the family is not “an entity that is split 
apart as its independence seeking younger members move away in an attempt to 
dissociate themselves from familial and traditional bondage, regardless of the 
externalities thereby imposed upon their families.” Indeed, figure 3.10 suggests poorer 
households have more adult children living outside the household, and thus a larger pool 
of potential remitters than their richer counterparts, especially later on in the lifecycle of 
the household heads. This finding provides further motivation to examine whether or not 
                                                     
10 Indeed, from their mid-50s to their early 60s, the average number of cohabiting children for richer 
heads of households appear to increase, but this difference is not statistically significant.  
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remittances from the children of the head of household are a key driver of the reduction 
in inequality documented earlier in this section.  
 
 
3.4 Do Remittances from Children Explain Falling 
Income Inequality? 
 
The analysis so far has established that income inequality within a sample of Thai 
households is falling over time, both within a balanced panel and within cohorts of heads 
of household born in the same decade. I found scant evidence that the decline could be 
linked to falling inequality in individual incomes; or that it could be explained by the 
dynamics of children staying on in their parent’s households, thereby supplementing 
household income. First, this section will establish that remittances from children account 
for the entirety of the convergence in the distribution of household income documented 
in the preceding section. Then, it will demonstrate that this result is not driven by 
differences in the dynamics of remittance receipts between villages. Finally, it will verify 
that the key findings of this paper – that income inequality is declining within decade of 
birth cohorts in the Thai sample, and that this decline is explained by the receipt of 
remittances – are robust to a range of different measures of inequality. 
 
3.4.1 The Distribution of Income Without Remittances 
I will now study the evolution of inequality over the lifecycle, for the component of 
household income that is not remitted by children. Simply subtracting the remittance 
contributions of children from household income (as I do here) clearly does not provide 
any information on the counterfactual where the children of heads of household did not 
migrate. Adams (1989) noted that if household members had not migrated and remitted, 
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they would presumably have been in some other form of employment, potentially 
contributing to the income of the household of origin. McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) 
added that remittances also induce multiplier and other effects across the communities 
that receive them. The objective of the exercise in this section is not to compare observed 
income inequality with these counterfactuals, but rather to ask whether or not this 
particular transfer to the household explains the convergence in the distribution of 
household incomes documented in section 3.3. It is with the goal of answering this 
question that figure 3.6 traces the lifecycle profiles of income inequality among these 
households, after subtracting the contribution of remittances from the children of the head 
of household who do not reside with their parents.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 illustrates that inequality in the component of household income that is not 
remitted by children, does not appear to decrease over the lifecycle of the heads of 
household. To the contrary, the figure gives the impression that inequality in this 
component of household income may indeed be increasing over the lifecycle, in line with 
the standard narrative where shocks to income contain a permanent component (as was 
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discussed in section 3.1). This particular visual representation of the data gives a strong 
impression of linearity in the relationship between inequality in this component of 
household income and the age of the household head. Guided by this characteristic of the 
data, I first test for rising inequality in this component of household income by assuming 
that income inequality varies linearly with age, that is: 
  𝜎𝑐𝑡
−𝑟 =  𝛼 + 𝛾𝑎 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡     (3.3) 
where the superscript “-r” emphasises that remittances from children have been 
subtracted from household income before calculating the standard deviation of the log, 
and all other variables are as previously defined. In this simple specification, inequality 
in each cohort in each year is regressed against the ‘age’ of the birth cohort of household 
head and a constant term. The estimated coefficients are presented in the first column of 
table 3.8. They suggest that on average, an increase in the age of the head of household 
of one year is associated with an increase in the standard deviation of this component of 
household income of 0.0078 log points. The t-statistic on this coefficient is 6.11 and is 
distributed with 54 degrees of freedom, so that in this basic specification I strongly reject 
the hypothesis that inequality in the component of household income that is not remitted 
by the children of the head of household, does not vary with age in favour of the 
alternative that it is increasing with age.  
 
As noted earlier, my preferred specifications are based on cohorts constructed from the 
unbalanced panel, because this sample yields larger cohort-year cell sizes, and is therefore 
more likely to deliver reliable results. However, it is important to verify that none of the 
key insights of this paper hinge on this particular choice of sample. For this reason, I re-
estimate equation 3.3, but using the cohorts constructed from the balanced panel of 609 
households. The results are presented in the second column of table 3.5. The coefficient 
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on age remains positive, and significantly different from zero. Indeed, the magnitude is 
slightly larger than in the model that was based on the unbalanced panel.  
 
Table 3.8: The Evolution of Inequality in Income Not Remitted by Children of the 
Head of Household 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample used to construct 
cohorts 
Unbalanced 
panel 
Balanced 
panel 
Unbalanced 
panel 
Unbalanced 
panel 
Dependent variable 
S.D. of 
income not 
remitted by 
children 
S.D. of 
income not 
remitted by 
children 
S.D. of 
income not 
remitted by 
children 
S.D. of 
income not 
remitted by 
children 
Age of the head of 
household 
0.00783*** 0.0105*** 0.00415 0.0119*** 
(6.11) (7.89) (1.05) (3.50) 
Cohort born in the 1940s   0.0179  
   (0.28)  
Cohort born in the 1950s   -0.116  
   (-1.14)  
Cohort born in the 1960s   -0.0936  
   (-0.71)  
Time × born in the 
1930s 
   -0.0157 
   (-1.63) 
Time × born in the 
1940s 
   -0.00478 
   (-0.67) 
Time × born in the 
1950s 
   -0.0104* 
   (-1.96) 
Time × born in the 
1960s 
   0.000105 
   (0.02) 
_cons 0.781*** 0.6141**** 1.033*** 0.623*** 
 (10.75) (8.39) (3.67) (3.80) 
N 56 56 56 56 
R-Squared 0.3662 0.4820 0.4272 0.3863 
t-statistics in parentheses, robust standard errors, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The cohort born in the 
1930s is the omitted, base category for the specification. Simultaneous identification of all four time trends is 
achieved by the assumption of linearity and the omission of an overall time trend. 
 
Though these simple models have fairly high R-squares of 0.36 and 0.48 (that is, age and 
a constant term explain between one-third and almost one half of the observed variation 
in this component of income risk depending on the sample used to construct the cohorts), 
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they neglect a number of potentially important and well-known sources of heterogeneity, 
such as the possibility that inequality varies systematically between cohorts.  
Simultaneous identification of age and cohort effects is problematic, due to the dummy 
variables for each decade of birth cohort, by construction, capturing the average effect of 
the age-related variation for households headed by people born in that decade. Thus when 
estimated in the same regression, both the cohort effects and the age effects are likely to 
be biased towards zero.  The point of the exercise here, however, is not to identify these 
effects, but rather to ascertain whether there is any evidence of heterogeneity between 
cohorts above and beyond that accounted for by the linear age effect. To allow for the 
level of inequality in this component to vary between cohorts, while retaining the 
assumption that it is linearly related to age, I estimate the following specification: 
  𝜎𝑐𝑡
−𝑟 =  𝛼 + 𝜆𝑐 + 𝛾𝑎 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡.     (3.4) 
To estimate these results, I return to using the larger, unbalanced panel to construct the 
cohorts. The results are presented in the second column of table 3.8. Because the 
simultaneous estimation with the cohort effects biases the coefficient on age to zero, it is 
smaller in magnitude than in the first column and no longer statistically significant. The 
estimates do not provide any statistical evidence that the cohort effects are significantly 
different from one another. An F-test of the hypothesis that the cohort effects are jointly 
equal to zero yields an F (3, 51) statistic of 1.73, where the critical value is 2.79, for the 
5% level of significance. These results suggest that the level of inequality in this 
component of household income does not vary systematically between cohorts and 
recommend the use of the simpler model from equation 3.3.  
Despite the average levels of inequality not varying systematically between the cohorts, 
it is possible that the rate at which inequality increases within each cohort may differ from 
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one cohort to another. To test this hypothesis, I estimate the following equation on the 
data: 
  𝜎𝑐𝑡
−𝑟 =  𝛼 + 𝜆𝑐 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝛾𝑎 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡,    (3.5) 
where cohort-specific time trends are estimated in addition to the linear age effects and 
the constant term. The results are presented in third column of table 3.8. The age effect is 
slightly larger in magnitude, but to that the one which was estimated from equation 3.3 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level. There is some evidence that inequality in 
the component of household income that is not remitted by children is increasing less 
rapidly for the households headed by people born in the 1950s than for other cohorts. To 
interpret this coefficient, however, we must note that as time passes, the cohort is also 
ageing. Therefore, to test if inequality in this component of household income continues 
to decrease over time, I must test the null hypothesis that the sum of this coefficient and 
the age coefficient is equal to zero against the alternative that it is negative. This test 
yields an F statistic of 0.07 that is distributed with (1, 50) degrees of freedom, with a 
critical value of 4.03, leading me to fail to reject the null. Thus this regression provides 
no evidence that inequality in the component of household income that is not remitted by 
children is declining over the duration of the panel, for any of these decade of birth 
cohorts. 
The statistical analysis that is summarized in table 3.8 thus supports the narrative that 
emerges from figure 3.6: when the contribution of remittances from the children of the 
head of household is removed, household income inequality increases over the lifecycle 
in a way that is explained by the standard model where household incomes are hit by a 
variety of shocks that are imperfectly correlated and have varying degrees of persistence. 
Thus this type of remittance accounts for the entirety of the convergence in the 
distribution of household income that was documented in section 3.3.  
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3.4.2 Robustness of the Results 
Does variation between villages drive the results? 
The households in the sample represent 64 different villages over a period of 15 years. 
Systematic differences between villages, such as the proximity to an urban centre or 
heterogeneity in the depth of available financial services, could conceivably predispose 
some villages to receiving a greater share of their income from remittances than others. 
It is therefore possible that the pattern of declining inequality documented above is driven 
by differences between villages, rather than between households and within villages. To 
learn whether or not this is the case, I regress household income on a fully interacted set 
of village and time fixed effects, and repeat the analysis on the residuals from that 
regression. That is, I estimate the econometric model: 
  𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝜗𝑣 × 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡     (3.6) 
and use the resulting coefficients to compute the vector of residuals, 𝜀?̂?𝑣𝑡. I then group 
these residuals into decade of birth cohorts and calculate the standard deviation of this 
residual within each cohort-year cell.  
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The resulting dynamics of the income residuals are presented in figure 3.7. This figure 
illustrates that income inequality within decade of birth cohorts of the heads of household 
is declining over time, even after the removal of all village-level income dynamics by 
means of the model in equation 3.6.  
To verify that these declines in inequality are statistically significant, I re-estimate 
equation 3.1 using the standard deviation of the residuals from equation 3.6, rather than 
the standard deviation of reported net income, as the dependent variable. The results are 
presented in table 3.9. The key result that income inequality is decreasing over time within 
decade of birth cohorts of the heads of household is robust to the removal of all village-
level income dynamics by means of the model in equation 3.6. 
 
Table 3.9: Declining Inequality in Residual From Fixed 
Effect Regression 
Dependent variable Income Residual 
Cohort born in the 1930s 0.0480*** 
 (-3.09) 
Cohort born in the 1940s 0.0743*** 
 (-4.75) 
Cohort born in the 1950s -0.00528 
 (-0.34) 
Cohort born in the 1960s -0.0131 
 (-0.85) 
Time × born in the 1930s -0.0207*** 
 (-8.37) 
Time × born in the 1940s -0.0212*** 
 (-12.28) 
Time × born in the 1950s -0.0218*** 
 (-9.64) 
Time × born in the 1960s -0.0197*** 
 (-7.96) 
_cons 1.002*** 
 (-58.69) 
N 60 
R-Squared 0.7882 
t statistics in parentheses, robust standard errors, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. The initial conditions are identified as the coefficient on interactions 
between cohort dummies and dummy that is ‘on’ in 1997 and ‘off’ in all other 
years. Thus the ‘omitted category’ is the set of observations which are from 
all years other than 1997. Identification of the four within-cohort time trends 
is achieved by the assumption of linearity and the omission of an overall time 
trend. 
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Figure 3.7 and table 3.9 have established that the declines in inequality documented in 
section 3.3 are not driven by village-level income dynamics. I now verify that inequality 
in the component of income that is not remitted by children increases over the lifecycle, 
after accounting for these village – time fixed effects. I re-estimate equation 3.6 using the 
component of income that is not remitted by children to purge this variable of all village-
level income dynamics, and check whether the resulting residuals of income not remitted 
by children continue to increase in the standard way, as they do in figure 3.6.  
Figure 3.8 plots the evolution of inequality in the residuals of the component of income 
that is not remitted by children, once the fully interacted set of village and time fixed 
effects have been removed. A univariate regression through the points in this graph yields 
a coefficient of 0.0066 that is significantly different from zero with a t-statistic of 7.69. 
Thus the finding that the differences between households in the receipt of remittances 
from their children accounts for the entirety of the convergence in the distribution of 
income observed in this panel is not driven by differences between villages in the 
propensity to attract remittances. 
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Other studies from the Townsend Thai Project have documented sharp differences 
between households residing in the relatively poor Northeastern region of Thailand and 
those residing in the relatively rich central region (Samphantharak and Townsend, 2017; 
Townsend 2013; Pawasutipaisit and Townsend, 2011), as was discussed in section 2.4.5. 
In light of that literature table 3.10 separates sampled households into two geographic 
groups and illustrates that the key insights of this paper – that inequality in total income 
is declining within decade of birth cohorts, but inequality in the component of income 
that is not remitted by the children of the head of household does not --  apply to 
households residing in both of these regions. 
The first column of table 3.10 estimates equation 3.1 on the subset of households that are 
samples from the Northeastern region, whereas the second column estimates the same 
equation on households which were sampled from the central region. In both subsamples, 
I reject the null hypothesis that within cohort inequality is constant over the duration of 
the panel in favour of the alternative that it is declining at the 1% level of significance. 
The third column estimates equation 3.1 on the component of income that is not remitted 
by the children of the heads of household for households from the Northeastern region. 
For all cohorts, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that inequality remained constant over 
the duration of the panel. Finally, the fourth column estimates the equation on the 
component of income that is not remitted by the children of the heads of household on 
households from the central region. Here, there is some statistical evidence that inequality 
is actually rising for the oldest cohort. On the other hand, for the cohort born in the 1950s, 
there is some evidence that inequality in this component of income is falling, but if one 
is prepared to relax the standard of statistical significance to the 10% level. When 
compared with the robust declines documented in the the second column, the overall 
impression that remittances exert a downward pressure on inequality in these 
  
106 
communities is confirmed, regardless of the region from which the households are 
sampled.   
Table 3.10: Inequality Northeastern and Central Region  
Dependent variable Net income Net income Income not 
remitted 
Income not 
remitted 
Region Northeastern Central Northeastern Central 
Cohort born in the 1930s 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.281*** 0.0388 
 (7.68) (7.68) (5.49) (0.86) 
Cohort born in the 1940s 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.0972* -0.129*** 
 (5.73) (5.73) (1.93) (-2.84) 
Cohort born in the 1950s 0.0504* 0.0504* 0.204*** 0.197*** 
 (1.92) (1.92) (3.99) (4.43) 
Cohort born in the 1960s -0.0984*** -0.0984*** -0.343*** -0.666*** 
 (-3.73) (-3.73) (-6.71) (-14.48) 
Time × born in the 1930s -0.0210*** -0.0210*** 0.0124 0.0112** 
 (-5.70) (-5.70) (1.62) (2.17) 
Time × born in the 1940s -0.0293*** -0.0293*** 0.00488 0.00771 
 (-9.68) (-9.68) (0.57) (1.56) 
Time × born in the 1950s -0.0243*** -0.0243*** -0.00507 -0.0121* 
 (-6.51) (-6.51) (-0.66) (-1.96) 
Time × born in the 1960s -0.0201*** -0.0201*** -0.00829 -0.00141 
 (-5.56) (-5.56) (-1.10) (-0.20) 
_cons 1.092*** 1.092*** 1.132*** 1.127*** 
 (37.89) (37.89) (20.13) (22.78) 
N 60 60 60 60 
R-Squared 0.6873 0.6551 0.2574 0.4418 
t statistics in parentheses, robust standard errors, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The initial conditions are identified as the 
coefficient on interactions between cohort dummies and dummy that is ‘on’ in 1997 and ‘off’ in all other years. Thus the 
‘omitted category’ is the set of observations which are from all years other than 1997. Identification of the four within-cohort 
time trends is achieved by the assumption of linearity and the omission of an overall time trend. 
 
Are the Results Sensitive to the Measure of Inequality Used? 
This paper has used the standard deviation of the logarithm of income to measure 
inequality, because this is the measure used by much of the literature on the evolution of 
inequality and the dynamics of income processes (Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston, 2008; 
Dickens, 2000, among others) from which this paper draws some inspiration. Much of 
that literature deals with the residuals from regressions of various observable 
characteristics on the log of income, so that the standard deviation of these residuals arises 
naturally as a measure of income dispersion. The broader inequality literature however, 
has employed a range of different measures of inequality, depending on the nature of the 
particular research question being addressed. Dalton (1920) made the point that a 
researcher’s choice of inequality measure also implies a choice over a social welfare 
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function. Rather than place ad-hoc restrictions on an implied social welfare function, I 
now demonstrate that the key insights of this paper are robust to a range of different 
measures of inequality and are therefore not overly sensitive to the choice of social 
welfare function being considered. I use the statistical package developed by Jenkins 
(2015) to calculate these different inequality measures and plot their evolution within 
decade of birth cohorts over the age of the cohort in figure 9. The panels in the left column 
of figure 3.9 depict the evolution of net household income, whereas those panels in the 
right column depict the evolution of income that is not remitted by children. The results 
for different inequality measures are presented in different rows. 
 
The Gini Coefficient 
I start with one of the most commonly used measures of inequality, the Gini coefficient. 
Graphically, the Gini coefficient is the area between the line of perfect equality and the 
Lorenz curve, divided by the area under the line of perfect equality11. It is well known 
that compared to the standard deviation of the log (which is most sensitive to transfers 
near the bottom of the distribution), the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to transfers 
around the mode of the income distribution. 
  
                                                     
11 Consider a graph where the y-axis measures the cumulative share of income, and the x-axis measures 
the cumulative share of the population. If the population were ranked in ascending order of income, then 
the locus of points traced out by the resulting graph is a Lorenz curve. In this case, the line of perfect 
equality is the 45-degree line.  
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Table 3.11: Inequality in Net Income within Cohorts Using Different Measures 
Dependent variable Gini Mean Log 
Deviation 
Theil-T 
Cohort born in the 1930s 0.0603*** 0.217*** 0.157*** 
 (6.43) (10.61) (4.83) 
Cohort born in the 1940s 0.0175* 0.0969*** 0.0423 
 (1.85) (4.76) (1.30) 
Cohort born in the 1950s 0.0377*** 0.120*** 0.144*** 
 (4.00) (5.90) (4.44) 
Cohort born in the 1960s 0.0131 0.0732*** 0.00681 
 (1.42) (3.65) (0.21) 
Time × born in the 1930s -0.0118*** -0.0232*** -0.0224*** 
 (-7.00) (-7.92) (-5.23) 
Time × born in the 1940s -0.00916*** -0.0194*** -0.0164*** 
 (-7.30) (-7.44) (-3.31) 
Time × born in the 1950s -0.00999*** -0.0211*** -0.0210*** 
 (-7.37) (-7.78) (-5.18) 
Time × born in the 1960s -0.00868*** -0.0181*** -0.0155*** 
 (-4.97) (-5.50) (-2.78) 
_cons 0.579*** 0.626*** 0.650*** 
 (55.89) (28.06) (18.33) 
N 60 60 60 
R-Squared 0.6812 0.7425 0.4524 
t statistics in parentheses, robust standard errors, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The initial conditions are 
identified as the coefficient on interactions between cohort dummies and dummy that is ‘on’ in 1997 and ‘off’ in 
all other years. Thus the ‘omitted category’ is the set of observations which are from all years other than 1997. 
Identification of the four within-cohort time trends is achieved by the assumption of linearity and the omission of 
an overall time trend. 
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The evolution of income inequality (by decade of birth cohorts of the heads of household 
in the sample), as measured with the Gini coefficient, is presented in panel (a) of figure 
3.9. It is evident from the figure that on this measure, inequality continues to exhibit a 
declining trend within each cohort. I re-estimate equation 3.1 using the Gini coefficient 
as the dependent variable and present the resulting coefficients in the first column of table 
3.11. This table confirms that the declines are statistically significant within each cohort. 
To the right of figure 3.9, panel (a), in panel (b) I plot the evolution of income inequality 
as measured by the Gini coefficient for that component of income that is not remitted by 
children. As was the case when the standard deviation of the log was used to measure 
inequality, overall, inequality in this component of income appears to increase over the 
lifecycle. The only exception is within the cohort born in the 1950s, for which inequality 
continues to decline, albeit at a much slower rate than in panel (a). Re-estimating equation 
3.3 using the Gini coefficient of the component of income that is not remitted by children, 
in place of the standard deviation of the log yields the coefficients in the second column 
of table 3.12. The coefficient on age in this regression confirms that the observed overall 
increase in inequality with the age of the head of household is statistically significant, 
under this alternative measure of inequality. 
 
Table 3.12: Inequality in Income Not Remitted and Age of 
the Head Using Different Inequality Measures 
Measure Gini Mean Log 
Deviation 
Theil-T 
Age 0.00286*** 0.00837*** 0.00909*** 
 (5.54) (6.31) (4.54) 
_cons 0.405*** 0.205*** 0.129 
 (13.36) (2.74) (1.22) 
N 60 60 60 
R-Squared 0.3611 0.3912 0.2502 
t statistics in parentheses, robust standard errors, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
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Generalized Entropy Index 
This paper has not yet answered whether it is differences in the receipt of remittances 
from children between or within villages that drive the observed reduction in inequality. 
Despite their intuitive transparency, neither the standard deviation of the log, nor the Gini 
coefficient allow inequality to be decomposed in the way that would be necessary to 
answer such a question. Shorrocks (1980) identifies the set of inequality measures that 
satisfies this “additive decomposability” property (in addition to the other properties that 
are necessary to be considered an appropriate measure of inequality). The set of inequality 
measures Shorrocks (1980) identifies is the Generalized Entropy Index. Two notable 
members of this family are the mean logarithmic deviation (sometimes called the “Theil-
L index”), which is given by the formula: 
  𝐿 =  
1
𝑁
 ∑ ln (
?̅?
𝑦𝑖
)𝑁𝑖=1 ,     (3.7) 
and the Theil Index (sometimes referred to as the “Theil-T index”), which is defined as: 
  𝑇 =  
1
𝑁
 ∑
𝑦𝑖
?̅?
 ln (
𝑦𝑖
?̅?
)𝑁𝑖=1 ,    (3.8) 
where ?̅? is the mean value of x in the sample, N is the sample size.  
These two measures differ in the region of the distribution of income to which they are 
most sensitive to transfers: the mean logarithmic deviation is more sensitive to transfers 
at the bottom of the distribution than the Theil Index.  
 
The second row of figure 3.9 illustrates that the key insights of this paper are robust to 
using the mean logarithmic deviation to measure inequality. Panel (c) continues to give 
the impression that inequality in net household income is declining. This decline is 
confirmed as being statistically significant in the second row of table 3.11, which reports 
the coefficients that result from re-estimating equation 3.1 using the mean logarithmic 
deviation as the dependent variable. Panel (d) plots the evolution of inequality in income 
  
111 
not remitted by children over synthetic cohorts using this measure of inequality. The 
overall impression that inequality in this component of household income is increasing 
linearly with age is also robust to this measure of inequality. Despite the possible presence 
of some heterogeneity within cohorts (inequality in the beginning of the panel for the 
cohort born in the 1930s is fairly high when this measure is used), the overall increase in 
inequality with age is statistically significant, as is demonstrated in the second column of 
table 3.11, which reports the coefficients yielded by re-estimating equation 3.3 using this 
measure of inequality. 
The pair of diagrams in the third row of figure 3.9 use the Theil (T) coefficient to measure 
inequality. The declines in inequality in net household income appear noticeably less 
pronounced than before. Nonetheless, when I re-estimate equation 3.1 for this measure 
of inequality, I continue to formally reject the hypothesis that inequality remains constant 
over time, in favour of the alternative that it is decreasing within each cohort.  The 
relevant coefficients are reported in the third column of table 3.10. Inequality in 
household income not remitted by children again appears to increase linearly using this 
measure of inequality, too. Again, there is some evidence of heterogeneity between 
cohorts, though as the third column of table 3.12 demonstrates, the overall increase is 
statistically significant. 
 
As noted above, the mean logarithmic deviation is more sensitive to transfers near the 
bottom of the income distribution, compared to the Theil (T) index. Thus differences in 
the evolution of income inequality between panels (c) and (e) may be informative about 
the part of the income distribution where inequality reduction is occurring. Graphically, 
the decline in inequality in net household income appears to be more pronounced for the 
mean logarithmic deviation, than the Theil (T) index, though formally we cannot compare 
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the declines in this way. Nonetheless, this suggests that the transfers that are leading to 
inequality reduction are disproportionately affecting the bottom of the income 
distribution. This impression is corroborated when I use the Atkinson’s (1970) inequality 
index, and vary the “inequality aversion parameter”, which determines that index’s 
sensitivity to transfers at the bottom of the distribution, though I do not report those results 
here for the sake of brevity. The declines in inequality in net income are more pronounced 
when the inequality aversion parameter is assigned a value of 2, as compared with when 
it is assigned a value of 1, supporting the narrative that inequality reduction is greater in 
the left tail of the income distribution. 
 
This section has demonstrated that the reduction in income inequality documented in the 
preceding section can be fully explained by remittances from the adult children of the 
heads of household. Then, it demonstrated that the inequality reducing effect of 
remittances was not driven by heterogeneity between villages in the propensity to receive 
remittances, but was rather a feature of the distribution of income between households, 
within villages. It went on to verify that these results are not unduly sensitive to the choice 
of inequality measure. Indeed, to the extent that the results differed between inequality 
measures, these differences suggested that inequality was being reduced by transfers 
affecting income the bottom of the distribution.  
 
3.5 The Distribution of Remittances  
The preceding section had established that the remittances from adult children of the 
heads of household were driving a reduction in income inequality among this panel of 
Thai village households. This section will study the characteristics of the distribution of 
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remittances from children, between households and over time, that enable it to reduce 
inequality. 
 
3.5.1 The Distribution of Remittances Over Time 
Figure 3.10 shows that the mean of the real value of remittance received by households 
in the panel from the children of the heads has been increasing from 1997 to 2011. These 
figures are of course, the outcomes of a variety of different forces. The children of those 
households which continue to be headed by the same person between 1997 and 2011, are 
ageing and so more of them enter the pool of potential remitters to their parents’ 
household. In other households, either death or retirement may cause the head of 
household from an older generation to be replaced by one from a younger generation. In 
such cases, the remitting children of the former head may no longer be obliged to provide 
support to what may have become their sibling’s household. Due to such heterogeneity, 
it is important to decompose remittance receipts into the familiar lifecycle components. 
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Figure 3.11 plots the proportion of household income that is accounted for by remittances 
from children, over the lifecycles of the heads of household. Unsurprisingly, remittances 
from children form an especially large proportion of the incomes of the households 
headed by the elderly. The figure illustrates that remittances from children start to gain 
importance as household heads enter their early 40s. Their share in household income 
continues to increase until the heads of household reach their late 50s or early 60s. On 
average these transfers continue to account for approximately 30% of household income 
for the remainder of the lifecycle of the heads of household. Appendix 7 reconciles the 
dip in the proportion of household income derived from children’s remittances in the last 
four years of the panel, illustrated in figure 3.11, with the lack of any corresponding dip 
in the overall level of remittances illustrated in figure 3.10. It finds that these are driven 
by rapid growth in rural incomes continuing while remittances remain at their peak. 
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The importance of remittances from children in the later stages of the lifecycle of the 
heads of household has implications for lifecycle savings: children can act as a substitute 
to ‘hump shaped’ lifecycle savings not only by living in the same household as their 
parents throughout adulthood as, for example, documented by Deaton (1989), but also by 
remitting money to their parents even in the case that they do not reside with their parents. 
Thus remittances not only help insure households from potential covariate risk that would 
otherwise be uninsurable as noted by Stark and Bloom (1985), but also against low 
productivity later in the lifecycle. As a result, the elderly may continue to receive a great 
deal of financial support from their children, even though the number of adults living 
together in East Asian households has been declining (Lo, 1987, cited in Deaton 1989; 
Deaton and Paxson 1995).  
Having understood how remittances, on average are distributed over time and over the 
lifecycle of the heads of household, I now study the distribution of remittances from 
children across households with differing levels of permanent income, where I use the 
average over time of each, individual household’s log of real, equivalised consumption 
as a proxy for permanent income. The strengths and potential weaknesses of this approach 
were discussed in section 2.4.4, of the preceding chapter. 
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3.5.2 Remittances across Households by Decile of Permanent Income 
The Proportion of Income Accounted for by Remittances by Decile of Permanent Income 
 
 
Figure 3.12 plots remittance receipts from the children of the head of household as a 
fraction of net household income, at each decile of household permanent income. For the 
first decile, remittances account for over 35% of household income; for the fifth decile 
this declines to a little over 25%, whereas for the tenth decile they account for less than 
10%. I have plotted an estimated local polynomial and the associated 95% confidence 
bands over these points. The decline in the fraction of household income that is accounted 
for by remittances from children with a household’s level of permanent income is clearly 
statistically significant.  
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The fact that in this sample, the heads of poorer households are older on average (a finding 
that is discussed in chapter 2), raises concerns that this figure may be conflating lifecycle 
effects with those that vary across the distribution of income. For this reason, it is 
important to make comparisons not just over levels of income permanent income, but 
within cohorts of birth. If data permitted, I would study the evolution of remittance 
receipts from children over the lifecycles of the heads of household at each decile of the 
distribution of household permanent income. However, the need to maintain reasonably 
large cohort-year cell sizes restricts me to breaking the sample into two parts: households 
with above and below median permanent income.  
Figures 3.13a and 3.13b illustrate how the proportion of household income that is 
accounted for by remittances from children evolves over the lifecycle for relatively poor 
and relatively rich households, respectively. On average, the proportion is higher for 
poorer households and over the course of the panel, it grows much more rapidly for these 
households. For richer households, remittances from children do not account for more 
than 30% of household income for any group. In contrast, poorer households headed by 
anyone older than 50 received over 30% of their household income in the form of 
remittances from children in every year after 2004. These differences are striking and all 
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indications are, that they would be even more striking at the extremes of the distribution 
of permanent income, if the data permitted me to observe them. 
 
The Total Number of Children by Decile of Permanent Income 
The larger share of remittances in the incomes of relatively poor households may be 
associated with higher rates of fertility in these households. Indeed, figure 3.5 (which 
plotted the number of cohabiting children over the lifecycle of the heads of household) 
found that richer and poorer households had similar numbers of children until their heads 
reached their late 30s. After this point, however, the number of cohabiting children in 
poorer households continued increase until these heads reached their mid 40s, while for 
richer households it did not. These descriptive statistics suggest that poorer households 
exhibit higher rates of fertility overall, than their richer counterparts.  
 
 
This is confirmed in figure 3.14, which plots total number of children of these heads of 
household by decile of permanent income. I also plot a local polynomial and the 
associated 95% confidence intervals. A household in the bottom decile of permanent 
income can be expected to have approximately 4.7 children, whereas one in the top decile 
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of permanent income may be expected to have only 3.6 children. Thus the households in 
the poorest decile have, on average, more than one additional child compared to those in 
the richest decile. The plotted 95% confidence intervals illustrate that this difference is 
statistically significant. A larger number of children constitutes a larger pool of potential 
remitters. However, for differential fertility to explain the inequality reducing role of 
remittances, the number of observed remitters (as opposed to the number of observed 
children) need to be higher among poorer households. I now turn to establishing whether 
or not this is the case. 
 
 
 
The ‘Quantity’ and ‘Quality’ of Remitters by Decile of Permanent Income 
The redistributive effect of remittances from children on the income distribution of their 
parents’ households may be due to the fact that poorer households have a larger number 
of children to support them later in the lifecycle, differences in the amount remitted by 
each child, or a combination of these forces. Figure 3.14 demonstrated that poorer 
households had a larger number of children overall, but figure 3.5 illustrated that fewer 
of these children tended to reside with their parents throughout adulthood. Thus the 
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number of potential remitters to these households is larger than it is for their richer 
counterparts.  
Figure 3.15 plots the average of the actual number of different children from which a 
household receives remittances in each year, by decile of household permanent income. 
The differences are economically (and statistically) significant: the typical household in 
the 1st or 2nd decile of the income distribution receives remittances from approximately 
3.5 children, as compared with households in the 9th and 10th decile, which typically 
receive remittances from less than 2.5 children. Thus differences in the number of 
remitting children across the distribution of household permanent income may indeed be 
an important channel through which remittances cause the distribution of income to 
converge over time.  
 
 
 
I now attempt to ascertain whether there are differences in the ‘quality’ of the average 
remitter, over the income distribution. Figure 3.16 plots the average real amount remitted 
by each child in each year, by decile of household permanent income. It is clear that on 
average, each child from a household with relatively high permanent income remits more 
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per year than one from a household with relatively low permanent income. A linear 
regression of a household’s percentile in the income distribution on the mean amount 
remitted by each child suggests that, on average, a 1 percentage point improvement in a 
household’s percentile in the income distribution, is associated with an increase in the 
amount of money remitted by each child annually of 148.4 Thai Baht, at 2011 prices. The 
null hypothesis that this coefficient is equal to zero is rejected, in favour of the alternative 
that it is positive, with a t-statistic of 12.17. Thus the convergence in the distribution of 
household income documented in section 3.3 cannot be explained by this absolute 
measure of ‘quality’ of remitters. However, it is not the absolute value of remittances that 
is important in explaining the evolution of income inequality, but the value relative to 
household income. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17 shows that remitters from poorer households tend to outperform their richer 
peers, when the average amount remitted each year by each remitter is expressed as a 
proportion of net household income, though the confidence intervals around the estimated 
local polynomial do not suggest that the difference is statistically significant. On the other 
  
122 
hand, a linear regression of each household’s percentile in the income distribution on the 
mean proportion of household income that is remitted by each child (and a constant) is 
able to discern a statistically significant difference, because such a test has higher 
statistical power due to the fact that it uses all the variation in the available data, as 
opposed to figure 3.17 which collapsed the variation into deciles. The estimated 
coefficient in this regression suggests that a 10 percentage point improvement in a 
household’s percentile in the distribution of permanent income is associated with a 
0.537% reduction in the proportion of household income that is transferred by the average 
remitter. The null hypothesis that this effect is equal to zero is rejected with a t-statistic 
of -4.86. As such, differences in the relative magnitude of transfers from individual 
remitters do help explain the reduction in income inequality documented in the preceding 
section. 
 
Inequality and the Gender of Migrant Children 
Section 3.3 noted that female adult children of the heads of these Thai households on 
average remit more than their male children. This could be associated with the inequality 
reducing effect of remittances in a number of ways. On the one hand, if the generosity of 
female remitters, relative to their male peers were constant across the distribution of 
income, then poorer households producing a greater number of female migrants may be 
a channel through which remittances from children of the head of household reduce 
inequality. On the other hand, if the daughters from richer households, who presumably 
earn more than their poorer counterparts, are more likely to select into migration outside 
the village, then this would explain the finding that on average women remit more, but in 
a way that is not associated with falling inequality among the households of origin.  
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Figure 3.18 plots the association between the number of female children of the head of 
household who reside outside the village by decile of permanent income. The 95% 
confidence intervals around the local polynomial suggests that poorer households do 
indeed have significantly more female children who live outside the village of origin than 
their richer counterparts. It is still possible that these women migrate for reasons that are 
unrelated to remittances, for example, because of the structure of the marriage market. 
Unfortunately, the information collected in the Townsend Thai Project does not catalogue 
the stated reason for leaving the village. Thus I cannot distinguish between women who 
left the village to seek employment and those who left due to marriage. I can however, 
observe whether or not this greater number of female migrants among poorer households 
is also reflected in a greater number of female remitters to those households.   
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Figure 3.19 plots the average number of female remitters by the decile of permanent 
income of the household of origin. The scatter points do not appear to display any clear 
pattern, so that despite producing a greater number of female migrants, poorer households 
do not produce more female remitters. The remaining women migrants are likely to be 
absorbed by the marriage market, though the available data do not allow me to rule out 
the possibility that they are unsuccessful economic migrants.  
Thus while the average woman remits more to the household of her parents than her 
average male sibling, poorer household are not any more likely to produce female 
remitters in a way that would explain the convergence of inequality documented in this 
paper. 
 
The analysis has thus established five aspects of the distribution of remittances which can 
explain their ability to substantively reduce household income inequality among these 
rural Thai households: 
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1. They constitute a large share of household income: the average of the proportion 
of net household income that is accounted for by remittances is approximately 
25%.  
2. They increase in importance later on in the lifecycle of the heads of household, 
accounting for 10% of household income, on average, when heads are in their 40s, 
a figure which rises to approximately 30%, by the time heads reach their 50s.  
3. They comprise a larger proportion of the incomes of poorer households, 
accounting for approximately 35% of the income of households in the bottom 
decile of the income distribution, and less than 10% for those in the highest. 
4. The heads of poorer households receive remittances from a significantly larger 
number of children. Households in the bottom decile of the distribution of 
permanent income receive on average receive remittances from 3.5 children, 
whereas those in the top do so from and average of fewer than 2.5 children. 
5. Among the relatively poor, the average amount remitted annually by each child, 
constitutes a greater proportion of household income than it does among the 
relatively rich. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
This paper has documented and analysed declining income inequality in a panel of Thai 
households with reference to the permanent income hypothesis and lifecycle theory. It 
noted on theoretical grounds that decreasing inequality was unlikely to result from a 
convergence in the distribution of incomes that was exogenous to the households. To the 
extent that the data permitted, it verified that the incomes of individual household 
members diverged in the standard way. It speculated that the number of children who 
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continued to live with their parents throughout adulthood was likely to vary endogenously 
with household income. If children from poorer households were more likely to stay on 
in their parent’s households thereby supplementing household income, this choice might 
explain the observed reduction in inequality, but the paper failed to find any support for 
this hypothesis in the data.  
The paper went on to observe that cohabitation was not the only strategy available to 
parents wishing to secure support from their children, later on in the lifecycle. It showed 
that village level income and remittance dynamics were not sufficient to explain the 
decline in inequality, and that these declines were robust to a number of different 
measures of inequality. Furthermore, the paper showed that differences in remittances 
received from children over the distribution of income account for the entirety of the 
reduction in income inequality observed between these households. The effectiveness of 
remittances in reducing income inequality in this context is associated with five features 
of the distribution of remittances from children between households: first, they constitute 
a large fraction of household income; second, they account for a larger proportion of the 
incomes of poorer households; third, their share of household income increases later on 
in the lifecycle of the recipients households causing inequality to fall as households age 
over the panel; fourth, poorer households receive remittances on average from a larger 
number of children; and finally, the average child from a poorer household remits a larger 
fraction of household income per year than one from a richer household.  
This paper’s primary contribution is to the literature on the effect of migration on income 
inequality in migrant producing areas. The perspective however, has been different from 
that of much of that literature: rather than ask whether migration ‘caused’ a decline 
income inequality, the paper has sought to establish that the observed reduction in 
inequality is explained by the effect of migrant’s remittances. 
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This paper has highlighted the importance of remittances from children in insuring the 
income streams of their parents against reduced productivity later in the lifecycle. The 
quality of the insurance yielded by this strategy is striking – it appears to be sufficient to 
reverse the typical increases in inequality that have been documented in a wide variety of 
countries, as predicted by lifecycle theory.  
This evolution of the household as an institution that pools income from multiple adults 
to insure itself against productivity declines of individual members, is likely to further 
enhance the income growth of younger generations. Where cohabitation required high 
productivity members to live within the same household and therefore work within 
geographical proximity to that household, exposing their income streams to many of the 
same sources of risk as other household members, supporting parental households 
through remittances allows high productivity members of the household the choice to be 
geographically mobile. If there is significant spatial heterogeneity in the returns to labour, 
this mobility may well enhance the earning capacity of these members.  
These findings have important implications for policy. Retirement benefits and other 
support from the government was found to be extremely rare among these Thai villages. 
Insofar as a wider provision of these services may crowd out these private transfers, their 
effect on the welfare of the elderly may be muted. Indeed, given that the private transfers 
are sufficient to actually engender a reduction in inequality, the sign of effect on the 
welfare of some of the elderly may even be debatable. On the other hand, elderly headed 
households that are unable to draw support from their children, including remittances, 
would indeed be made unambiguously better off by the introduction of such policies. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Income Inequality and the Extensive and  
Intensive Margins of Remittances 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter demonstrated that income inequality was declining over time in a 
panel of households surveyed by the Townsend Thai Project, and demonstrated that the 
receipt of remittances from the adult children of the head of household accounted for the 
documented decline in inequality. Descriptive analysis presented in that chapter identified 
two characteristics of the distribution of remittances across households that may be 
associated with the ability of these transfers to reduce income inequality among recipient 
households. First, poorer households were more likely to receive remittances than their 
richer counterparts; and second, conditional on receiving remittances, transfers accounted 
for a larger proportion of household income in poorer households than in richer ones. The 
objective of this paper is to ascertain the relative importance of each of these margins in 
explaining the inequality reducing role of remittances.  
To achieve this objective, this chapter models both the likelihood of receiving remittances 
and the proportion of remittances in household income as functions of observable 
household characteristics. Using these econometrics, the paper constructs counterfactual 
distributions of income where one of these margins is allowed to vary at a time, while the 
other is held constant. Depending on the measure of inequality used, differences in the 
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likelihood of receiving remittances at different points of the income distribution account 
for between 52% and 55% of the reduction in inequality that can be explained 
econometrically by these margins. Conversely, differences in the proportion of 
remittances in household income explain between 45% and 48% of these reductions. 
The key econometric issue that is addressed in this chapter is the potential endogeneity 
of a subset of the explanatory variables. In regressions that do not make allowances for 
endogeneity, the levels of household, agricultural and business assets (which will be 
defined in greater detail below), are found to be significant predictors of remittance 
receipts. By using village-level information on historical migration episodes as 
instruments for current remittance levels, I am able to identify the effect of remittances 
on asset levels, thereby addressing the initial endogeneity problem. After I have addressed 
endogeneity, asset levels no longer retain any significant explanatory power, suggesting 
that their predictive power in the single equation models was spurious. I also use the 
lagged number of households affected by a drought in each village as an alternative 
instrument for current remittances to check that these results are not unduly sensitive to 
the choice of instrument. Doing so does not cause a model that includes assets to 
substantively outperform one that does not.  
The remaining, exogenous explanatory variables allow me to model the extensive and 
intensive margins of remittance receipts at the household level. By comparing these 
estimates across the distribution of income, I find that these margins do indeed vary 
systematically with income. I identify this systematic variation and exploit it to construct 
the counterfactual distributions of income described above.  
These models are only capable of explaining the part of the effect of remittances on 
income inequality that is related to the observable characteristics of households. Some of 
the inequality reducing effect of remittances will be driven by unobservables, and will 
  
130 
therefore remain unexplained by the counterfactual distributions of income that I 
construct. The performance of these models in explaining the inequality reducing effect 
of remittances will depend on the measure of inequality that is used to assess them. Rather 
than select an arbitrary measure of inequality (and implicitly, an arbitrary social welfare 
function) I assess these models using a range of different measures of inequality. The 
models perform best for the Theil (T) index, for which they can explain 47.9% of the 
observed decline in inequality, and they perform worst for the standard deviation of the 
log, for which they can only explain 4.7% of the measured decline. For the mean 
logarithmic deviation, and the Gini coefficient, the models are able to explain 17.2% and 
24.9% of the measured declines in inequality, respectively. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section details some fundamental 
challenges to identifying the effect of remittances on the incomes of recipients. Section 
4.2 describes the data that will be used. Section 4.3 discusses the identification strategy 
that will be used to address potential endogeneity between remittance receipts and some 
of the observable household characteristics. Section 4.4 presents an econometric model 
of the probability with which a household receives remittances. This is complemented by 
the analysis in Section 4.5, where I model the proportion of household income received 
from each remitter. Section 4.6 conducts sensitivity analysis using an alternative 
instrument. In Section 4.7 I use the household-level predictions from the preceding 
models to construct counterfactual distributions of income which allow me to assess the 
extent to which the extensive and intensive margins of remittance receipts account for the 
inequality reducing effect of remittances, for a range of different measures of inequality. 
Section 4.8 concludes. 
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4.1 The Economics of the Counterfactual 
The identification of reliable counterfactuals in the context of remittances and the 
incomes of recipient households may be impeded by a number of factors. First, past 
migration decisions may affect both the costs of current migration and the current wealth 
and income prospects of a household, so that observed household characteristics are not 
exogenous to the migration process. Second, households select into migration, so that 
those which do not receive remittances do not provide an appropriate counterfactual for 
those that do. Third, a household is likely to change its behaviour in response to the receipt 
of remittances. Not all of these issues can be comprehensively addressed using 
observational data, though I do adopt some measures to mitigate their effects. 
Mckenzie and Rappoport (2007) address the endogeneity of household and community 
characteristics using information on historical migration between the US and 
communities in rural Mexico. The Townsend Thai data collects information on village 
migration histories which I am able to use to instrument for current migration propensities 
to address this source of endogeneity.   
McKenzie et al. (2010) very effectively illustrate the issue of selection, using random 
assignment via a ballot which New Zealand authorities used to allocate a fixed, but 
oversubscribed quota of migration opportunities to Tongans. Not only do the authors use 
this random assignment to identify the effect of migrating from a poor country to a rich 
one on the earnings of migrants, but they also compare these effects to those that would 
have been estimated by non-experimental methods. By interviewing people who applied 
for the ballot and a random selection from the general population, the authors find that 
potential migrants are positively self-selected on observable characteristics such as 
education and past income. Furthermore, by comparing estimates from the lottery with 
those yielded by non-experimental techniques, the authors find that the latter consistently 
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overstate the effect of migration on earnings. They interpret these results as evidence that 
migrants also positively self-select on unobservables such as ability.  
In contrast to McKenzie et al. (2010), this chapter focuses on assessing the effect of 
remittances on income inequality, so that biases in the estimated effect of remittances on 
the level of income will pose a threat to my results insofar as these biases affect 
households differentially by income level. The large share of the inequality reducing 
effect of remittances that I am unable to explain on the basis of observable characteristics 
is an indication that unobserved heterogeneity in the Thai sample plays an important role 
in the relationship between remittance receipts and household income. 
Finally, the possibility that the members of remittance receiving households may change 
their behaviour, say in labour market participation decisions, in response to receiving 
remittances is also difficult to address in the absence of random assignment. What is 
more, chapter 2 demonstrated that richer and poorer households in this sample 
significantly differ in the number of jobs held by the head of household and the number 
of active participants in the labour force. These systematic differences in labour market 
outcomes between households at different points in the income distribution suggest that 
these households will, very likely, differ in their behavioural responses to remittance 
receipts. This poses a potentially serious challenge to the identification of the effect of 
remittance receipts on income inequality. Indeed, McKenzie et al. (2010) argue that this 
challenge can only be robustly addressed using random assignment.  
Cognizant of these potential limitations, I proceed with analysing the inequality reducing 
effect of remittances among these Thai households with the available data. 
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4.2 The Data 
This chapter will again utilize observations from the Townsend Thai Project (Townsend, 
2011) that are drawn from the 64 villages which were surveyed in all 15 years of the 
project. It will model the probability that households receive remittances, and the 
proportion of household income that is accounted for by remittances. To do so effectively 
requires the use of a relatively large number of conditioning variables. For this reason, I 
use the full sample of (approximately) 960 households that are interviewed in each period,  
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Whether or not the household 
receives remittances 
14395 0.509 0.500 0 1 
Real value of remittances from 
children 
14397 14,924.240 37,361 0 1,096,907 
Real value of net household 
incomea 
14393 155,449.100 273,349 -1,165,068 12,050,222 
Raw proportion of remittances 
in net income 
14389 0.170 0.407 -19.075 10.370 
True proportion of remittances 
in income for remittance 
recipients 
7320 0.334 0.301 0 1 
Age of head of household 14365 54.906 13.135 16 103 
Head earns monthly or 
government wages 
12754 0.064 0.245 0 1 
Head is a rice farmer 14397 0.317 0.317 0 1 
Head farms crops other than 
rice 
14397 0.078 0.269 0 1 
Head raises livestock 14397 0.065 0.246 0 1 
Head is a blue collar 
professional 
14397 0.089 0.285 0 1 
Head is a white collar 
professional 
14397 0.030 0.170 0 1 
Head in jobs that vary 14397 0.110 0.313 0 1 
Head is inactive 14397 0.113 0.316 0 1 
Head has other occupation 14397 0.154 0.360 0 1 
Household owns a business 12754 0.699 0.459 0 1 
Whether the household is 
headed by a female 
14397 0.306 0.461 0 1 
Years of schooling of the head 14325 4.410 3.268 0 19 
Number of non-working age 
members 
14394 1.769 1.295 0 13 
Total number of adult children 14394 2.904 2.455 0 14 
Mean years of schooling of all 
adult children  
11408 8.812 3.859 0 19 
Household assets 14397 50,366.110 114,075 0 1,616,400 
Agricultural assets 14397 28,119.150 98,468 0 2,194,591 
Business assets 14397 30,569.620 171,872 0 4,277,450 
* 31.5147 Thai Baht = 1 U.S. Dollar on 31st Dec. 2011 (source: exchangerates.org.uk) 
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rather than the 609 households that comprise the balanced panel. 
The first row of table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for a dummy variable that takes 
on a value of 1 if a household receives remittances in a particular period, and 0 if it does 
not. Half the household-year observations report receiving remittances from the children 
of the head of household.  
Naturally, I calculate the proportion of remittances in household income by dividing the 
total amount of remittances received from the children of the head of household by the 
total amount of household income. The summary statistics for the real value of 
remittances from children, inflated to 2011 Baht, are presented in the second row of table 
4.11, whereas those for net household income appear in the third row.  
The fourth row presents the summary statistics for the proportion of remittances 
calculated by dividing the amount of remittances from children by net household income. 
It is important to note here that because of the way net household income is calculated, 
the share of remittances is not necessarily bounded between 0 and 1. Because the 
agricultural or business expenses of some households are so great and their incomes are 
so small, net income in a period can fall below zero. In the sample, there are 120 
households with negative net income. While realizations of negative net income are 
perfectly plausible in this setting, such observations confound the interpretation of the 
ratio of remittances to income as a simple proportion.  Since such an interpretation is 
crucial the exercise I plan on doing here, I address this issue in the following way.  
42 of these households report receiving some remittances from their children.  Because 
these households are wholly dependent on remittances, I assign a value of 1 to the 
proportion of remittances in household income. The remaining 78 of these households do 
                                                 
a These summary statistics are calculated inclusive of those households that do not receive remittances. 
  
135 
not report receiving remittances from children, and so I assign a share of 0 to the 
proportion of remittances in their income. 
In some circumstances, net household income (including remittances) is positive, but less 
than the value of remittances. These cases lead to the observations in the fourth row of 
table 4.1 which are greater than unity. In the sample there are 221 such households. 
Because these households are effectively wholly dependent on remittances in these 
periods, I assign the share of remittances in their incomes to equal 1. 
The summary statistics for the share of remittances in household income (for households 
that receive remittances) that arises after these adjustments have been made are presented 
in the fifth row of table 4.1. The average of the share of remittances in household income 
is 33.37%, among households that receive remittance. 
A number of observable household characteristics are likely be associated with the ability 
of the heads of households to secure remittances from their children. It has been reported 
elsewhere in this thesis that the likelihood of receiving remittances varies systematically 
over the lifecycle of the head of household, so it will be important to condition on the age 
of the head of household. The summary statistics for the age of the head are presented in 
the sixth row of table 4.1. The average head is approximately 55 years old, while the 
youngest is 16 and the oldest is 103.  
The type of employment contract the head is in may be related to their retirement 
strategies and so may influence their ability to attract remittances from their children. 
Therefore, I use a dummy variable for whether or not the head earns a monthly wage in 
their primary occupation. According to row 7, approximately 6% of heads are in this type 
of wage contract. 
The occupation of the head may also influence retirement strategies. For this reason, I 
include a set of dummies for different occupation types. These categories include rice 
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farming, farming a crop other than rice, raising livestock (including cows, pigs, poultry, 
shrimp and fisheries), blue collar professionals (working for example, in construction, as 
a rice miller, a factory worker or a mechanic), white collar professionals (including 
clerical workers, those in managerial positions, nurses, teachers, etc.), jobs that vary over 
the year, heads who are inactive, and those who have some other primary occupation. I 
note here, that there are 1,625 household-year observations where the head of the 
household is ‘inactive’. Unsurprisingly, inactivity of the head of household perfectly 
predicts the receipt of remittances from children. These observations would frustrate the 
computation of the intended counterfactual distributions of income, and so need to be 
dropped from the empirical models. 
Ownership of a business is very common among the sampled households. To ascertain 
whether or not this phenomenon is related to remittance receipts, I include a dummy 
variable for business ownership among my regressors. The summary statistics for this 
variable are also presented in table 4.1 
Female headed households may exhibit different propensities to attract remittances than 
their male headed counterparts. I capture this using a dummy variable, for which I also 
present the summary statistics in table 4.1. The education level of the head of household 
may also be an important determinant of whether a household receives remittances or not. 
It is plausible that even after conditioning on the type of work and the type of employment 
contract, high levels of education are associated with different retirement strategies. For 
this reason, I use the years of education of the household head as an explanatory variable, 
and also present the summary statistics of this variable in table 4.1. 
Household demographics may be crucially important for explaining remittance receipts.  
Households with high fertility rates have a larger pool of potential remitters, and so may 
be more likely to receive remittances. Households with a large number of members who 
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are not of working age may be more dependent on remittances than those with fewer 
dependents. The pool of potential remitters to a household will be determined by the total 
number of adult children of the head of household, including both children who live 
within the household and those who live away from the household. For the purposes of 
the chapter, I take ‘adult’ to mean over 18 years of age. The mean level of education 
among these adult children may also be an important determinant of remittances. The 
summary statistics of these variables are also presented in table 4.1.  
Finally, the stocks of assets available to the household may influence remittance 
behaviour among children within that household. Households that are particularly asset-
rich, may retire on the returns to these assets and therefore demand fewer remittances 
from their children. Alternatively, these assets may provide a bequeath motive for 
children to remit to their parents. The Townsend Thai project collects information on 
three categories of a household’s asset holdings. These are the stock of durable goods 
owned by the household, which I shall refer to as ‘household assets’, and the stocks of 
business and agricultural assets owned by the household. The summary statistics for these 
three types of assets are also presented in table 4.1. 
 
 
4.3 Endogeneity of Household Characteristics 
The structural characteristics of households, such as the age of the head, the type of job 
the head is employed in and the number of children in the household are arguably 
exogenous to both whether or not a household receives remittances, and the proportion 
of remittances in net household income. However, the stocks of household assets (i.e. 
durable consumption goods), agricultural assets and business assets are likely to vary in 
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response to the receipt of remittances, biasing estimates that do not explicitly allow for 
this endogeneity. 
Assets may vary in response to remittance receipts in a number of ways. On the one hand, 
households may use remittances to finance purchases of different categories of assets. In 
this case, the single-equation estimates will be biased upwards. Alternatively, households 
may finance migration by liquidating assets, leading to a negative contemporaneous 
correlation between asset levels and remittance receipts, when in fact high pre-existing 
levels of assets actually facilitate migration. Households of origin may also see 
remittances as a substitute to future income from productive assets, yielding a possible 
incentive to divest from business and agricultural assets in the presence of remittances. 
These channels could potentially bias the coefficient on assets downwards.  
Another channel through which asset levels may be endogenous to remittances is through 
the household’s history of remittance receipts. Households that receive remittances today 
are likely to have done so in the past as well. These past remittances constitute a part of 
the history of household income, on which current asset holdings will depend. These 
dynamics could potentially cause estimates of the effect of current assets on current 
remittances to be biased and inconsistent. Counterfactual distributions of income must 
therefore be constructed in a manner that is robust to these potential biases. 
To solve this problem using an instrumental variable would require an instrument that is 
correlated with current asset levels, but uncorrelated to remittances through any other 
channel. The descriptive statistics from the preceding chapter, which provide the 
motivation for this chapter, suggest that the level of household income may itself affect 
the probability of receiving remittances. The search for an external instrument that is 
correlated with asset holdings, but not with household income is unlikely to bear fruit, 
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because each of these variables is likely to be affected by the same processes as the other. 
As such, another approach is required.  
 
The preceding paragraphs have recognized why it is problematic to directly establish 
causation from assets to remittance receipts. The literature can, however, offer some 
guidance on establishing causation in the reverse direction. McKenzie and Rapoport 
(2007) use historical village-level migration to instrument for current migration levels in 
their ground breaking study on the relationship between remittances and income 
inequality in migrant-sending areas. In this chapter, I will use information on village-level 
historical migration to identify the effect of remittances on the stocks of different 
categories of assets. I will use the parameter estimates yielded by this model to predict 
what household assets would have been, if households had not received any remittances 
from their children. Assuming that the effect of remittances on assets was correctly 
identified by means of the instrument, these predicted asset levels will be purged of the 
endogeneity that posed a threat to identification of the single-equation model.  
 
4.3.1 Village Histories 
The 1997 wave of the Townsend Thai data reports information on historical migration 
from and to each village, that was collected from interviews with a village key informant, 
typically the village headman. Each informant is asked if in the history of the village there 
has ever been a period when three or more households moved away from that village, 
together. I use this information to construct a dummy variable for whether or not the 
village has experienced historical ‘out-migration’. In addition, each key informant is also 
asked if there was ever a period when three or more households moved to that village 
together, which I use to construct a dummy variable for historical ‘in-migration’. Of the 
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64 villages in my sample, 12 (approximately 19%) report experiencing historical out-
migration, whereas 25 (approximately 39%) report experiencing historical in-migration. 
I note here that these instruments are fixed, not only within villages, but also over time. 
Therefore, in all the subsequent analysis, the reported standard errors are clustered by 
village and by time period, wherever appropriate, unless otherwise stated.  
Applying the logic of McKenzie and Rapoport’s (2007) migration network model to these 
Thai villages suggests that instances of three or more households leaving a village 
together to settle in another region, are likely to reduce the costs of future migration from 
the village of origin to that destination, through a variety of channels. Information about 
transportation, housing, and employment prospects are likely to flow more freely between 
origin and destination. The extension of kinship networks to the place of destination may 
entail a reduction in the cost of housing and board, in the early stages of migration, when 
migrants are at their most vulnerable. These forces may reduce the risks and costs 
associated with migration. For these reasons, historical migration out of a particular 
village is likely to affect current village-wide migration rates, and consequently, the 
likelihood that a particular household in that village receives remittances from their 
children. Importantly, there is no obvious channel through which the current asset levels 
of households that remain at the place of origin would be affected by this type of historical 
migration, except through the migration process.  
It is possible that similar network effects are engendered when three or more households 
migrate to a village in the sample, though this narrative remains to be established in the 
literature. Such households would presumably maintain links with their communities of 
origin, and if employment prospects were to arise in those communities, these households 
may be able to facilitate the diffusion of this information to their current village of 
residence. This narrative however, is less compelling than the preceding one because it 
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involves a reversal in the direction of migration flows. Such a reversal implies either that 
the attractiveness of the historical origin and destination labour markets had switched, 
relative to one another, after the occurrence of the historical migration; or that the 
historical migration episode was not economically motivated. 
 
To test statistically if either of these variables are relevant instruments for household 
remittance receipts, that is, if they significantly predict the amount of remittances received 
by households, I regress each of them on a remittances received by households in a pooled 
OLS model of all years in the panel, estimating: 
  𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝑐 +  𝛼𝑚𝑣 + 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡,      (4.1) 
where r is the amount of remittances received by a household from the children of the 
head, inflated to 2011 Baht; m is whether or not a village has experienced at least one 
episode of historical migration (I run separate regressions for historical episodes of in- 
and out-migration),  is a mean-zero error term, and c and  are parameters to be 
estimated. As before, the subscript i refers to individual households, v refers to villages 
and t refers to the time period. 
 
Table 4.2: Results of Univariate Regressions of Potential Instruments on 
Real Remittance Receipts from Children 
 Without clustered 
errors 
F(1,12668) 
Village X time 
clustered errors  
F(1, 959) 
Historical inward migration 
 
11.82 7.02 
Historical outward migration 
 
18.22 11.56 
Remittance from people other than 
head’s children 
0.21 0.36 
Critical value for = 0.01 of F(1, ∞) = 6.635 
 
The F-statistics for tests of the null hypotheses that historical in-migration and historical 
out-migration are independent of income are reported in the first column of table 4.2. 
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Both of these F-statistics are greater than 10, the critical value that is conventionally used 
to differentiate between strong and weak instruments. Because the instrument does not 
vary over time, or within villages, a standard F-test may overstate its statistical relevance. 
I therefore repeat this diagnostic, after clustering errors by village and calendar year. 
Despite the fact that clustering somewhat diminishes the magnitude of the resulting F-
statistics, I continue to strongly reject the null hypothesis that historical migration is 
unrelated to remittance receipts at the 1% level of significance. I therefore conclude that 
both historical in-migration to a village, and historical out-migration are relevant 
instruments for current remittance receipts. 
In addition to remittances received from the children of the head of household who live 
outside the village, the Townsend Thai Project also collects information on remittances 
received from friends and family who are not children of the head of household. The 
presence of such remitters may be indicative of whether or not the children of the head of 
household have access to a migrant network, something which may also be used to 
instrument for remittance receipts. Unfortunately, only approximately 6% of the 
households receive remittances from members other than the children of the head of 
household. The first column of the third row of table 4.2 presents the F-statistic that 
results from a univariate regression of whether or not a household receives remittances 
from someone other than a child of the head of household in 1997, on remittances 
received from children of the head in all years of the panel. It is evident from this result 
that this variable fails the ‘relevance’ criterion necessary to be of use as an instrument for 
remittances from the children of the head of household. 
Historical migration in to and out of these villages, will therefore allow me to identify an 
arguably causal effect of remittance receipts on household asset holdings. I now turn to 
estimating this relationship. 
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4.3.2 Identifying the Effect of Remittances on Assets 
The objective of this section is to construct a measure of assets for each household in each 
period that is free from the influence of remittance receipts on asset holdings. To ensure 
that the resulting predicted assets are not correlated with the error term in the final stage, 
I model assets as a function of all other observable characteristics which I treat as 
exogenously determined, in addition to (instrumented) remittances. These include 
characteristics of the head of household (sex, age, occupation and type of employment 
contract) and household demographic variables (number of dependents, the number of 
adult children and the education level of children).  
Among the 14,271 household-year observations, 3,124 report owning no household 
assets, while 7,117 report holding no agricultural assets and 9,616 report holding no 
business assets. Because the distribution of these dependent variables are bounded below 
by zero, estimation strategies such as two stage least squares, which assume a dependent 
variable that is distributed over an unbounded support, will not be suitable to model these 
asset holdings. Instead, I use a Tobit model (Tobin, 1958), as generalized by Amemiya 
(1978) to accommodate endogenously determined dependent variables. In the first stage, 
I use historical migration and the exogenous characteristics of the household to model the 
receipt of remittances. 
  𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑣𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾𝑚𝑣 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡,   (4.2) 
where , , , and  are parameters to be estimated,  t  is a time trend, and the other terms 
remain as they have been previously defined. The resulting maximum likelihood 
estimates are used to predict remittance receipts for each household-year observation, 
    ?̂?𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑣𝑡?̂? + 𝛾𝑚𝑣 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡
2,    (4.3) 
where ?̂? is the predicted level of remittances while ?̂? and 𝛾 are the parameters estimated 
from equation 4.2. In the second stage, I use these predicted remittances, which are 
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constructed to be free of the influence of reverse causation from assets to remittance 
receipts, to identify the effect of remittances on assets. That is, I estimate the Tobit model: 
  𝑎∗𝑗𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑣𝑡𝛽′ + 𝜇?̂?𝑖𝑣𝑡 + 𝜃′𝑡 + 𝛿′𝑡
2 +  𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡,   (4.4) 
where the ‘j’ superscript is used to differentiate between the three classes of household, 
agricultural and business assets. The primes on the parameters are used to differentiate 
these coefficients from those that were estimated from equation (4.2). Finally, a* is an 
underlying latent variable such that observed assets, a take on the value: 
  𝑎 =  {
𝑎∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝑎∗ > 0
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑎∗ ≤ 0
      (4.5) 
The error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡, is assumed to be normally distributed and the model is estimated 
using the ivtobit package in STATA. The resulting coefficients for household, 
agricultural and business assets are presented in the first, third and fifth columns of table 
4.3. As mentioned before, the standard errors are clustered at the level of individual 
villages and time periods. For comparison, the un-instrumented, single equation estimates 
for household, agricultural and business assets are presented in the second, fourth and 
sixth columns of the table, respectively. Instrumenting makes a substantial difference to 
the estimated coefficients on remittances for all categories of assets, suggesting that 
endogeneity was indeed a problem (something that is confirmed by a Wald test, discussed 
below). The estimated coefficient on remittances for household assets is small, but 
positive and statistically significant. The coefficient on remittances for agricultural assets 
is positive, but insignificant, whereas the one for business assets was negative and 
statistically significant, but also relatively small in magnitude. 
After instrumenting for the potentially endogenous explanatory variables, I reject the null 
hypothesis that remittances have no effect on asset levels in favour of the alternative that 
remittances reduce asset holdings at the 5% level of significance for all three of these 
asset categories. For household and agricultural assets, a 1 Baht increase in remittances 
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is associated with between a 4 and 5 Baht decline in asset holdings, at the sample mean, 
other things remaining equal. The effect for business assets is stronger, with the same 
increase in remittances reducing holdings of business assets by over 9 Baht, on average 
and other things remaining equal (in the un-instrumented specification, a 1 Baht increase 
in remittances always leads to less than 1 Baht of a difference in holdings of a given asset 
category).  
Let ‘underlying assets’ describe the level of assets that would have prevailed in a 
particular village if that village had not experienced an episode of historical migration. 
As mentioned above, the coefficients on un-instrumented remittances are always 
relatively small, whereas those on instrumented remittances are always relatively large 
and negative. This suggests that the level of underlying assets in those villages that have 
experienced historical migration are lower than the observed level of assets. Thus 
historical migration episodes tend to increase the measured level of assets in these 
villages.  
Though these reduced form results need to be interpreted with caution, I note that the 
negative instrumented coefficients of the effect of remittances on assets (of which the 
effect on business assets is the strongest) are consistent with the narrative that households 
may liquidate productive assets because remittances provide a substitute to the future 
stream of income that could have been earned by combining these assets with the labour 
that is foregone when adult children migrate. 
The final row of table 4.3 presents the Chi-squared statistics for a Wald test of the null 
hypothesis that remittances are exogenously determined from assets. For all asset 
categories, the statistic is greater than the 5% critical value, leading us to reject the null 
in favour of the alternative that remittances are indeed endogenously determined with 
assets. Because of the inherently heteroskedastic nature of the Tobit model, I am unable 
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to perform an over-identifying restrictions test in this setting, despite having more 
instruments than endogenous variables for each asset category. For the purpose of running 
an over-identifying restrictions test, I repeat the analysis in a 2SLS setting. For the sake 
of brevity, I do not report those coefficients here, but I note that the Chi-squared statistics 
for the Sargan tests, for household, agricultural and business assets are 0.002, 0.264 and 
0.077, respectively. The 5% critical value of this distribution with 1 degree of freedom is 
3.84. Thus for all asset categories, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term and that the model is correctly specified. 
Using these estimated coefficients, I now predict the expected value of each category of 
assets for each household in each time period, assuming that remittances were zero, 
holding all other observable characteristics constant. That is, I predict: 
  𝑎?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑟𝑖𝑡=0 = max {0,  (𝑋𝑖𝑣𝑡?̂?
′𝑗 + 𝜃′?̂?𝑡 + 𝛿′𝑗𝑡2)},   (4.6) 
where the estimated parameters are those from equation 4.4, which were presented in 
table 4.3. These predicted assets are, by construction free of the influence of remittances 
on assets. Therefore, they can be used to address the endogeneity problem that is likely 
to confound identification of the effect of assets on a sample household’s probability of 
receiving remittances. 
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Table 4.3: Testing the Effect of Remittances on Asset Holdings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable 
Household 
assets 
Household 
assets 
Agricultural 
assets 
Agricultural 
assets 
Business 
assets 
Business 
assets 
Model Tobit Instrumented 
Tobit 
Tobit Instrumented 
Tobit 
Tobit Instrumented 
Tobit 
Remittances 0.0961** -4.329*** 0.00574 -4.355** -0.288** -9.458*** 
(or instrument) (2.10) (-4.38) (0.14) (-2.30) (-2.28) (-3.28) 
Sex -0.0811*** -0.171*** -0.0302 -0.119 -0.518*** -0.698*** 
 (-2.93) (-3.63) (-0.65) (-1.63) (-4.58) (-4.85) 
Age of head 0.0142 0.121*** 0.0797*** 0.184*** 0.0112 0.232** 
 (1.19) (3.44) (4.04) (3.30) (0.26) (2.29) 
Age of head  -0.0000917 -0.000952*** -0.000683*** -0.00153*** -0.000323 -0.00211** 
squared (-0.93) (-3.22) (-4.16) (-3.34) (-0.91) (-2.49) 
Head’s years 0.0651*** 0.0403*** -0.0125** -0.0368*** 0.0616*** 0.00947 
Of schooling (7.99) (3.33) (-2.23) (-2.69) (3.89) (0.36) 
Monthly or  -0.116 -0.162 -0.365*** -0.411*** -1.185*** -1.267*** 
govt. wages (-1.02) (-1.05) (-3.05) (-2.59) (-3.89) (-3.37) 
Business  0.147*** 0.188** 0.821*** 0.862*** 2.211*** 2.305*** 
owner (2.76) (2.24) (9.76) (7.79) (10.40) (9.02) 
Crops other  0.201*** -0.0788 0.275*** -0.000684 -0.553*** -1.128*** 
than rice (3.38) (-0.79) (2.99) (-0.00) (-2.64) (-3.92) 
Livestock 0.154*** 0.0644 0.181** 0.0929 1.674*** 1.479*** 
 (3.77) (0.84) (2.39) (0.91) (10.00) (7.03) 
Blue collar  0.245*** 0.0750 -0.548*** -0.714*** 2.285*** 1.937*** 
worker (4.78) (0.81) (-7.15) (-5.50) (12.43) (7.92) 
White collar 1.017*** 0.809*** 0.255* 0.0381 2.386*** 1.944*** 
worker (4.99) (3.57) (1.91) (0.20) (6.49) (4.41) 
Other work 0.274*** 0.0510 -0.0994 -0.322** 1.251*** 0.797*** 
 (5.78) (0.62) (-1.23) (-2.48) (6.45) (3.17) 
Work that  0.0897 -0.0934 -0.388*** -0.566*** 0.000123 -0.355 
varies (1.52) (-0.93) (-4.26) (-4.15) (0.00) (-1.22) 
Non working  0.0256** 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.191*** 0.227*** 0.400*** 
age (2.46) (4.03) (5.96) (4.29) (4.35) (4.53) 
Schooling of 0.0674*** 0.164*** 0.209*** 0.306*** 0.337*** 0.536*** 
children (3.27) (4.07) (7.10) (5.14) (4.88) (4.54) 
Schooling of  0.000720 -0.00112 -0.00647*** -0.00838*** -0.00753** -0.0113** 
children squared (0.65) (-0.62) (-4.84) (-3.94) (-2.54) (-2.48) 
Number of  0.0453*** 0.185*** 0.0000373 0.137** 0.0991*** 0.387*** 
Adult children (5.90) (4.92) (0.00) (2.17) (3.74) (3.77) 
Time -0.146*** -0.116*** -0.0215 0.00742 0.178*** 0.241*** 
 (-9.05) (-4.94) (-1.11) (0.27) (3.76) (3.77) 
Time squared 0.00462*** 0.00566*** -0.000120 0.000927 -0.00133 0.000751 
 (4.57) (3.66) (-0.09) (0.50) (-0.44) (0.18) 
_cons -0.840** -4.585*** -4.418*** -8.110*** -8.326*** -16.12*** 
 (-2.31) (-4.08) (-6.45) (-4.22) (-5.86) (-4.69) 
N 9871 9871 9871 9871 9871 9871 
Wald test of exogeneity 20.18  5.37  10.31 
Assets and remittances in 100,000 Baht 
t statistics in parentheses     
="* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01"    
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4.4 The Probability of Receiving Remittances 
In this section, I econometrically characterise the likelihood that a particular household 
will receive remittances. In the baseline specification, I use a simple Probit to model the 
likelihood of remittance receipts as a function of observed household characteristics. I 
then go on to address the potential endogeneity of assets by substituting the predicted 
values from equation 4.6, for the observed values. The resulting parameter estimates are 
then used to construct counterfactual distributions of income, where the likelihood of 
receiving remittances is allowed to vary over the distribution of income, but the 
proportion of net income that is accounted for by remittances is held constant, at the 
sample mean. 
In the Probit model, whether a household receives remittances in a particular period or 
not, which I denote by the dummy variable, dit, is assumed to be a function of an 
underlying latent variable, dit
*: 
 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,     (4.7) 
where  𝑑∗ is an unobserved latent variable such that: 
 𝑑𝑖𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
       (4.8) 
The other variables remain as they have been defined above. The results of this baseline 
specification are presented in the first column of table 4.4.  
In this naïve specification, where I do not address the endogeneity of asset levels, 
relatively large asset holdings appear to discourage the receipt of remittances. Households 
that are headed by women appear to be more likely to receive remittances. The lifecycle 
variables, such as the age of the head of the household (and its square) and the number of 
adult children of the head of household are highly significant and have the expected signs. 
Better educated heads of household are less likely to receive remittances, potentially 
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explaining part of the inequality reducing effect of remittances. Other things remaining 
equal, a larger number of non-working age members does not significantly affect the 
likelihood that a household receives remittances. 
Due to reasons discussed in the preceding section, assets are likely to be endogenously 
determined with remittances. If so, these coefficients will be biased and inconsistent. To 
address this issue, I replace observed assets for a given household in a given time period 
with their predicted values from equation 4.6. These predicted values are, by construction, 
unaffected by the endogeneity that is likely to confound the naïve estimates that were 
presented in the first column. Specifically, I assume a latent variable of the form: 
𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼
𝑗𝑎?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑟𝑖𝑡=0 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,   (4.9) 
where  is a parameter to be estimated, and other variables are as before (with the 
exception that observed household, agricultural and business assets are no longer 
included among the Xs). Two distinct approaches may be used to handle the standard 
errors in this application and each has its own advantages and disadvantages. Because 
one of the explanatory variables is constructed on the basis of an instrument that does not 
vary between villages or over time periods, a case can me made for proceeding with 
clustering standard errors at the village and time period levels. On the other hand, because 
the value of these variables are predicted, rather than observed, a case can be made for 
bootstrapping the standard errors (unfortunately, the available statistical software does 
not enable me to bootstrap within clusters). For this reason, I present two sets of results 
for this regression, with the only difference being the way the standard errors are 
calculated. In the second column of table 4.4, the standard errors are clustered at the 
village and time-period level, whereas in the third column, they are bootstrapped. These 
results however, suggest that there is no material difference between these two methods 
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of estimating the standard errors as the degree of statistical significance varies only 
slightly, for only two of the conditioning variables.  
Purging assets of their endogenous component reverses the signs of the coefficients on 
household assets and agricultural assets and greatly increase their magnitude. Despite the 
increase in magnitude, the coefficients remain statistically indistinguishable from zero, 
due to the larger errors associated with the two-stage model on which the prediction is 
based. In contrast to these coefficients, the sign on the coefficient for business assets 
remains the same, and the magnitude is somewhat diminished. The coefficient on the 
predicted value of this asset too, is statistically indistinguishable from zero, at 
conventional levels of significance. 
It appears then, that the apparent explanatory power of assets on the extensive margin of 
remittance receipts was through reverse causation – possibly because remittances are seen 
as a substitute to the future stream of payoffs from these assets.  
 
4.4.1 Modelling the Probability of Remittance Receipts 
Section 4.2 presented statistical evidence that the levels of different categories of assets 
did indeed vary endogenously with the level of remittances received by households. After 
addressing this endogeneity however, the estimated coefficients for the effect of the levels 
of different categories of assets on the probability of a household receiving remittances 
was not statistically distinguishable from zero. This begs the question, how important are 
assets in explaining the likelihood of a household receiving remittances? 
The pseudo R-squared from the Probit model that utilized the predicted values of assets 
that were designed to be free of endogeneity was 0.1469. This was based on a sample of 
9513 household-year observations and 21 regressors (without counting the constant 
term).  
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Table 4.4: The Probability of Receiving Remittances 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables: 
Observed 
Assets 
Predicted 
assets 
Predicted 
assets 
Core 
variables 
Standard errors 
Analytical 
 
Clustered 
errors 
Bootstrapped 
errors 
Analytical 
Agricultural -0.0980*** 0.431 0.431  
assets (-6.44) (1.47) (1.18)  
Business  -0.0606*** -0.0467 -0.0467  
assets (-6.41) (-0.54) (-0.55)  
Household -0.0949*** 0.602 0.602  
assets (-6.48) (1.40) (1.37)  
Sex of head 0.0713** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.0681** 
 (2.17) (2.69) (3.24) (2.01) 
Age of head 0.130*** 0.0441 0.0441 0.123*** 
 (9.48) (1.19) (1.30) (7.87) 
Age of head  -0.000964*** -0.000287 -0.000287 -0.000920*** 
squared (-8.25) (-0.97) (-1.06) (-7.03) 
Head’s years -0.0405*** -0.0549*** -0.0549*** -0.0520*** 
Of schooling (-6.98) (-3.10) (-2.88) (-10.13) 
Monthly or  0.280*** 0.444*** 0.444*** 0.127* 
govt. wages (3.14) (4.39) (3.60) (1.87) 
Business  -0.0208 -0.297*** -0.297** -0.230*** 
owner (-0.39) (-2.59) (-2.51) (-5.33) 
Crops other  -0.338*** -0.384*** -0.384*** 0.0336 
than rice (-6.58) (-5.00) (-5.02) (0.56) 
Livestock -0.137** -0.207** -0.207*** 0.237*** 
 (-2.36) (-2.36) (-2.64) (3.72) 
Bluecollar  -0.361*** -0.233 -0.233  
worker (-6.37) (-1.24) (-1.18)  
Whitecollar -0.436*** -0.873*** -0.873***  
worker (-3.72) (-2.98) (-2.97)  
Other work -0.358*** -0.332*** -0.332***  
 (-7.75) (-3.35) (-3.06)  
Work that  -0.148** -0.0311 -0.0311  
varies (-2.17) (-0.28) (-0.30)  
Non working  0.00572 -0.0877** -0.0877***  
age (0.48) (-2.53) (-2.60)  
Schooling of 0.0408** -0.0858* -0.0858*  
children (2.10) (-1.76) (-1.65)  
Schooling of  -0.00187** -0.000418 -0.000418  
children squared (-2.06) (-0.27) (-0.23)  
Number of  0.178*** 0.0707 0.0707 0.178*** 
Adult children (18.04) (1.44) (1.47) (16.88) 
Time 0.0920*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.0985*** 
 (6.96) (3.94) (4.09) (6.51) 
Time squared -0.00414*** -0.00721*** -0.00721*** -0.00375*** 
 (-4.69) (-3.66) (-4.07) (-3.61) 
Rice farmer    0.490*** 
    (12.08) 
_cons -4.606*** -1.956* -1.956* -4.498*** 
 (-11.34) (-1.80) (-1.88) (-9.97) 
N 9513 9513 9513 9513 
Assets and remittances in 100,000 Baht 
t statistics in parentheses  
 
="* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01"  
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I also estimate the same model on only a core group of clearly exogenous variables. To 
do so, I drop not only the three asset categories as conditioning variables, but also the 
number of non-working age members of the household, the mean years of education of 
the adult children of the head of household (and its square) and the dummy variables for 
whether or not the head of household owns a business, is in a blue-collar job, is in a white-
collar job, is in jobs that vary over the course of the year, or in some ‘other’ kind of job. 
This leaves me with a group of core variables that include the sex of the head of 
household, his or her age (and age square) and years of schooling, the type of agriculture 
the household is dependent on (rice, crops other than rice, livestock), whether or not the 
head of household is in work that pays a monthly wage, the number of adult children of 
the head of household and a time trend and its square. Estimating this model using these 
11 regressors on the same 9513 observations as the previous one, yields a pseudo R-
squared of 0.1465. That is, almost halving the number of regressors leaves the pseudo R-
squared unchanged to three significant figures. 
Furthermore, the eleven core variables are quite plausibly exogenous to the receipt of 
remittances. Most of these are structural characteristics of the household that are unlikely 
to vary in response to the receipt of remittances.  
The claim that a small subset of the variables account for the vast majority of the 
explained variation in the likelihood with which a household receives remittances can be 
tested formally by minimizing the Akaike (1973) or Bayesian (Schwarz 1978) 
information criteria, which not only compare the goodness of fit of these models, but also 
include a penalty for increasing the number of covariates. The Akaike information 
criterion for the model with the full set of regressors is 10,931.26, whereas that for the 
core set of regressors is 10,916.8, recommending use of the simpler model. A similar 
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conclusion is reached by minimizing the Bayesian information criterion, which takes on 
a value of 11,088.79 for the richer model, but 11,002.73 for the simpler model.  
These information criteria help inform a discussion of the amount of variation explained 
by additional regressors, but this is not the only reason to include additional covariates in 
a regression. If an omitted covariate is correlated with other covariates, then the omission 
can bias coefficient estimates of the included regressors. The fourth column of table 4.4 
presents the estimated coefficients on the core group of regressors discussed above. It is 
apparent from these results that no significant bias is incurred by the exclusion of the 
variables which measure asset levels, the education levels of adult children and the 
substitution of a number of the occupation categories for the existing base group (rice 
farmers). These considerations lead me to conclude that the predictive power of assets in 
the naïve specification was spurious, and driven by endogeneity. Furthermore, no 
discernable bias is incurred by omitting these variables as regressors. For this reason, I 
proceed by using the stripped down specification, with only the core variables to predict 
the likelihood of a household receiving remittances.  
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Figure 4.1 plots the probabilities of receiving remittance for each household in each year 
against the permanent income2 of that household over the duration of the panel. The 
scatter points suggest that poorer households are substantially more likely to receive 
remittances than their richer counterparts. The line of best fit and the associated 95% 
confidence intervals confirm that this pattern is statistically significant. 
 
In this section, I have modelled the extensive margin of remittance receipts at the 
household level, using a core set of observable household characteristics. Section 4.5 will 
model the intensive margin, also at the level of individual households. In section 4.6, I 
will study how the extensive and intensive margins of remittance receipts vary over the 
distribution of income. This will allow me to decompose the inequality reducing effect of 
remittances into three components: a part that is explained by the extensive margin of 
remittance receipts, a part that is explained by the intensive margin, and a part that 
remains unexplained by these econometrics. 
 
 
4.5 The Proportion of Remittances in Household 
Income 
The preceding section has established that poorer households are indeed significantly 
more likely to receive remittances from their adult children than their richer counterparts. 
In this section I will complement that analysis by modelling the proportion of household 
income that is accounted for by remittances. 
                                                 
2 Permanent income is calculated as it was in the preceding two essays, by taking the mean of real, 
equivalised consumption over the 15 year duration of the panel, for each household. 
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In the baseline specification, I will use a Tobit model to for the proportion of remittances 
in household income as a function of the full set of observable household characteristics 
that were identified in section 2. This specification, too, however is likely to suffer from 
the same endogeneity problem that was encountered when modelling the likelihood that 
a household receives remittances – namely that assets will not only determine remittance 
contributions, but may also be a function of those contributions. To address this issue, I 
will again rely on the predicted asset levels from equation 4.6, which were constructed to 
be free of this endogenous component.  
In the baseline specification, I assume: 
 𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,     (4.10) 
where 𝜀 is a mean-zero, normally distributed error term and  𝑠∗ is an unobserved latent 
variable such that: 
 𝑠𝑖𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ > 1
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ < 0
𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
      (4.11) 
where s is the share of remittances in household income and all other variables are as they 
were defined previously. The naïve estimates are presented in the first column of table 
4.5. 
Over all, the narrative that emerges from this benchmark specification for the proportion 
of remittances in household income is very similar to that which characterised the 
probability of a household receiving remittances. High levels of assets appear to be 
associated with a reduction in the share of remittances in household income. Female 
headed households receive a significantly larger share of their household income in the 
form of remittances.  
The variables that are associated with the lifecycle of the head of household are found to 
be key determinants of the proportion of remittances in household income. The share of 
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remittances in household income increases with the age of the head of household, though 
the sign of the second order term suggests that the rate of increase diminishes somewhat 
with age. The better educated a head of household is, the smaller is the share of 
remittances from children in net income. Having an additional adult child significantly 
increases the share of remittances in household income. 
As mentioned above, the coefficients from this baseline specification are likely to be 
biased and inconsistent because a number of the conditioning variables are likely to vary 
endogenously with the proportion of remittances in household income.  I now use the 
values predicted by equation 4.6, which I constructed to be free of influence of 
remittances on assets, in place of observed assets to model the proportion of remittances 
in household income. That is, the latent variable in equation 4.10 is now specified as 
being: 
 𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼
𝑗𝑎?̂?𝑖𝑡|𝑟𝑖𝑡=0 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,   (4.12) 
where the Xs no longer include the observed level of household, agricultural and business 
assets. The resulting estimates are presented in the second and third columns of table 4.5. 
As was discussed in the preceding section, I present standard errors that are clustered at 
the village-time level in the second column, whereas bootstrapped standard errors are 
presented in the third column. Again, the choice of standard error does not meaningfully 
alter inference. 
Replacing observed assets with their predicted counterparts from equation 4.6 has similar 
effects on the coefficients of these assets as it did when modelling the probability of 
receiving remittances. The coefficient for business assets diminishes slightly and loses 
significance. That of household assets reverses sign and increases greatly in magnitude, 
but remains statistically indistinguishable from zero. The coefficient on agricultural assets 
also changes sign and increases in magnitude, but here, it is statistically different from  
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Table 4.5: The Proportion of Remittances in Income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Endogenous 
Variables 
Observed 
Assets 
Predicted 
assets 
Predicted 
assets 
Not included 
Standard errors Analytical 
Clustered 
errors 
Bootstrapped 
errors 
 
Analytical 
Agricultural -0.0376*** 0.154* 0.154  
assets (-7.94) (1.75) (1.61)  
Business  -0.0242*** -0.0193 -0.0193  
assets (-8.09) (-0.82) (-0.86)  
Household -0.0302*** 0.135 0.135  
assets (-7.01) (1.20) (1.20)  
Sex of head 0.0405*** 0.0607*** 0.0607*** 0.0413*** 
 (4.77) (4.17) (4.04) (4.73) 
Age of head 0.0389*** 0.0153 0.0153 0.0368*** 
 (10.72) (1.51) (1.44) (7.88) 
Age of head  -0.000296*** -0.000107 -0.000107 -0.000281*** 
squared (-9.69) (-1.32) (-1.26) (-7.25) 
Head’s years -0.0126*** -0.0150*** -0.0150*** -0.0145*** 
Of schooling (-7.85) (-3.07) (-2.67) (-10.85) 
Monthly or  -0.0460* 0.00140 0.00140 -0.0623*** 
govt. wages (-1.85) (0.06) (0.05) (-3.69) 
Business  -0.0400*** -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.101*** 
owner (-2.78) (-4.01) (-3.35) (-8.46) 
Crops other  -0.118*** -0.137*** -0.137*** 0.0135 
than rice (-8.42) (-6.58) (-6.09) (0.82) 
Livestock -0.0217 -0.0340 -0.0340* 0.112*** 
 (-1.51) (-1.44) (-1.72) (6.63) 
Blue collar  -0.136*** -0.0814 -0.0814  
worker (-8.68) (-1.47) (-1.43)  
White collar -0.101*** -0.202** -0.202***  
worker (-2.99) (-2.56) (-2.61)  
Other work -0.0984*** -0.0847*** -0.0847***  
 (-7.84) (-2.88) (-2.90)  
Work that  -0.0748*** -0.0346 -0.0346  
varies (-4.15) (-1.11) (-1.10)  
Non working  0.00132 -0.0252*** -0.0252**  
age (0.44) (-2.70) (-2.42)  
Schooling of 0.0185*** -0.0195 -0.0195  
children (3.60) (-1.40) (-1.27)  
Schooling of  -0.000754*** -0.000187 -0.000187  
children squared (-3.12) (-0.40) (-0.37)  
Number of  0.0371*** 0.00962 0.00962 0.0358*** 
Adult children (16.19) (0.75) (0.67) (15.35) 
Time 0.0296*** 0.0454*** 0.0454*** 0.0313*** 
 (8.35) (4.18) (4.88) (6.67) 
Time squared -0.00133*** -0.00208*** -0.00208*** -0.00119*** 
 (-5.70) (-3.82) (-4.22) (-3.76) 
Rice farmer    0.170*** 
    (15.22) 
_cons -1.341*** -0.597** -0.597* -1.298*** 
 (-12.20) (-1.96) (-1.82) (-9.44) 
N 9513 9513 9513 9513 
Assets and remittances in 10,000 Baht 
t statistics in parentheses  
 
="* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01"  
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zero at the 10% level of significance. These changes suggest that assets did indeed vary 
endogenously with the proportion of remittances in household income in ways that 
seriously biased the coefficients on these assets in the baseline model. 
Using the predicted value of assets has substantive implications for some of the other 
coefficients estimated in this model. Notably, the coefficients on the variable for the age 
of the head of household are smaller in magnitude but still statistically distinguishable 
from zero at the 10% level with bootstrapped standard errors. The dummy variable for 
those who earn monthly or government wages is also much smaller in magnitude and no 
longer statistically distinguishable from zero, as is the coefficient on the number of adult 
children of the head of household. 
 
4.5.1 Assessing Models using Information Criteria 
Using observed asset levels in the model that did not account for endogeneity suggested 
that assets were important predictors of the proportion of remittances in household 
income (as the results in the first column of table 4.5 illustrate). Addressing the 
endogeneity problem between asset levels and remittance receipts reduced much of the 
predictive power of assets. Only agricultural assets were found to predict the proportion 
of remittances in household income at the 10% level of significance (but not at the 5% or 
1% levels).  
As in section 4.3, I use the Akaike (1973) and Bayesian (Schwarz 1978) information 
criteria to select between these models. The Akaike information criterion for the model 
with the full set of regressors is 8,768, whereas the Bayesian information criterion is 
8,933. These statistics for the model with only the core set of variables are 8,648 and 
8,748 respectively. Minimizing the criteria recommends the use of the simpler model. 
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A crucial difference between the Tobit results here and the Probit results presented before 
is that in the Tobit model, the level of agricultural assets is found to have some predictive 
power, whereas in the Probit model it did not. Therefore, I also compute information 
criteria scores for a model where the predicted level of agricultural assets is used in 
addition to the 11 core variables. The Akaike information criteria for this model is 
evaluated at 8650 whereas the Bayesian information criteria is 8,757. Both of these values 
are greater than the corresponding values for the model with only the core variables, 
leading me to prefer the simpler model. 
These considerations lead me to conclude that the predictive power of assets in the naïve 
model was spurious and driven by the endogeneity of these variables. I therefore use the 
model with only the core group of exogenous variables as regressors to predict the 
proportion of remittances in household income. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 plots the predicted proportion of remittances in the income of each household 
in each year, against the permanent income of that household over the duration of the 
panel. The scatter plot supports the descriptive evidence from the preceding chapter, 
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which observed that the share of remittances in the incomes of poorer households is larger 
than those of richer households. A line of best fit and the associated 95% confidence 
intervals confirm that this pattern is statistically significant. 
 
I now turn to testing if the conclusions of this section and the one that preceded it are 
unduly sensitive to the choice of instrument.  
 
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis: Drought as an Alternative 
Instrument for Remittance Receipts 
The preceding analysis suggests that making econometric corrections for the endogeneity 
of assets in a model of remittance receipts, rids them of their explanatory power. That 
finding may be sensitive to the choice of instrument used to identify the effect of 
remittances on asset holdings. Specifically, historical migration episodes may be driven 
by processes which also affect historical asset levels. As asset levels are known to display 
high persistence, this may lead to a violation of the exclusion restriction and hence 
invalidate the instrumental variable. Though the results of an overidentifying restrictions 
test suggest this is not the case, it may nonetheless be useful to verify the main 
implications of the preceding sections with an alternative instrument. In the second 
chapter of this thesis I demonstrated that drought was a significant covariate shock to 
incomes in these villages. I now use the proportion of households in a village that are 
affected by drought3 as an instrument for the amount of remittances received by village 
                                                 
3 Chapter 2 contains a detailed description of how this variable was constructed, and the descriptive 
statistics of this variable. 
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households, with a view to constructing counterfactual underlying assets as was done in 
the preceding sections. 
Within the period that a village is affected by a drought, households may well run down 
their assets to cover the shortfall in income. Thus asset levels may still be endogenously 
determined with the current prevalence of drought. For this reason, I use the lagged 
proportion of households in each village affected by drought as my instrument for the 
level of remittance receipts. 
A univariate regression of the proportion of households in each village affected by 
drought on the level of remittances a household received by a household yields an F-
statistic of 25.2, well over the standard F-statistic of 10 that is the general benchmark to 
establish instrument relevance. The use of clustered standard errors, to account for the 
fact that the regressor is measured at the village level reduces this to 17.97, but this is still 
well over the threshold value of 10. I therefore conclude that the instrument is relevant. 
Table 4.6 presents the results from re-estimating equation 4.4 using the lagged value of 
drought as in instrument, as opposed to village migration histories where were used 
earlier. The results in this table should be compared with those presented in table 4.3. In 
contrast to those results, the estimates from the instrumented Tobit presented here are not 
able to discern a statistically significant effect of remittances on assets. Using these new 
estimates, I again compute what assets would have been in the counterfactual where 
remittance receipts were equal to zero, using equation 4.6. Using these ‘underlying’ assets 
(which are constructed to be free of the estimated influence of remittances on assets) in 
place of observed assets allows me to identify the effect of remittances on assets, that is 
arguably free of reverse causation. The results of re-estimating equation 4.9 using 
underlying assets as identified by the drought instrument are presented in table 4.7.  
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Table 4.6: Testing the Effect of Remittances on Asset Holdings Instrumenting with Lagged Drought 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable 
Household 
assets 
Household 
assets 
Agricultural 
assets 
Agricultural 
assets 
Business 
assets 
Business 
assets 
Model Tobit Instrumented 
Tobit 
Tobit Instrumented 
Tobit 
Tobit Instrumented 
Tobit 
Remittances 0.0961** -2.501 0.00574 -3.028 -0.288** 5.656 
(or instrument) (2.10) (-0.89) (0.14) (-0.77) (-2.28) (0.60) 
Sex -0.0811*** -0.117 -0.0302 -0.0731 -0.518*** -0.342 
 (-2.93) (-1.53) (-0.65) (-0.67) (-4.58) (-1.28) 
Age of head 0.0142 0.100 0.0797*** 0.203 0.0112 -0.178 
 (1.19) (1.11) (4.04) (1.58) (0.26) (-0.60) 
Age of head  -0.0000917 -0.000793 -0.000683*** -0.00168 -0.000323 0.00122 
squared (-0.93) (-1.09) (-4.16) (-1.63) (-0.91) (0.50) 
Head’s years 0.0651*** 0.0441** -0.0125** -0.0373 0.0616*** 0.100 
Of schooling (7.99) (2.06) (-2.23) (-1.28) (3.89) (1.47) 
Monthly or  -0.116 -0.139 -0.365*** -0.443*** -1.185*** -1.216*** 
govt. wages (-1.02) (-0.94) (-3.05) (-2.71) (-3.89) (-3.14) 
Business  0.147*** 0.106 0.821*** 0.770*** 2.211*** 2.228*** 
owner (2.76) (1.51) (9.76) (7.28) (10.40) (8.66) 
Crops other  0.201*** 0.0284 0.275*** 0.139 -0.553*** -0.0544 
than rice (3.38) (0.12) (2.99) (0.41) (-2.64) (-0.07) 
Livestock 0.154*** 0.0184 0.181** 0.118 1.674*** 1.747*** 
 (3.77) (0.22) (2.39) (0.91) (10.00) (5.72) 
Blue collar  0.245*** 0.119 -0.548*** -0.648*** 2.285*** 2.543*** 
worker (4.78) (0.79) (-7.15) (-3.05) (12.43) (5.11) 
White collar 1.017*** 0.712*** 0.255* 0.219 2.386*** 2.821*** 
worker (4.99) (2.85) (1.91) (0.83) (6.49) (4.28) 
Other work 0.274*** 0.0758 -0.0994 -0.242 1.251*** 1.598** 
 (5.78) (0.42) (-1.23) (-0.92) (6.45) (2.55) 
Work that  0.0897 -0.0776 -0.388*** -0.529** 0.000123 0.173 
varies (1.52) (-0.53) (-4.26) (-2.51) (0.00) (0.34) 
Non working  0.0256** 0.0835 0.109*** 0.190** 0.227*** 0.110 
age (2.46) (1.22) (5.96) (1.96) (4.35) (0.47) 
Schooling of 0.0674*** 0.138* 0.209*** 0.291** 0.337*** 0.219 
children (3.27) (1.72) (7.10) (2.56) (4.88) (0.81) 
Schooling of  0.000720 -0.00122 -0.00647*** -0.00795*** -0.00753** -0.00579 
children squared (0.65) (-0.59) (-4.84) (-2.77) (-2.54) (-0.88) 
Number of  0.0453*** 0.128 0.0000373 0.0982 0.0991*** -0.0834 
Adult children (5.90) (1.40) (0.00) (0.78) (3.74) (-0.28) 
Time -0.146*** -0.0975 -0.0215 0.0689 0.178*** -0.0126 
 (-9.05) (-1.38) (-1.11) (0.66) (3.76) (-0.05) 
Time squared 0.00462*** 0.00324 -0.000120 -0.00370 -0.00133 0.00631 
 (4.57) (1.22) (-0.09) (-0.92) (-0.44) (0.71) 
_cons -0.840** -3.736 -4.418*** -8.783* -8.326*** -1.571 
 (-2.31) (-1.14) (-6.45) (-1.86) (-5.86) (-0.14) 
N 9871 9871 9871 9871 9871 9871 
Assets and remittances in 100,000 
Baht 
t statistics in parentheses     
 
="* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01"    
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These results should be juxtaposed with those of table 4.4 which provide analogous 
results using the migration history instrument.  
Here, also there are substantive changes in the estimated coefficients. Whereas in table 
4.4, none of the instrumented coefficients were statistically significant, here, 
(counterfactual) agricultural assets have a strong, positive effect on predicted remittances 
and business assets have a strong negative effect. Household assets remain insignificant. 
As before, however, there are indications that these results may not be as informative as 
they appear. The pseudo R-squared of the instrumented regression with the full set of 
regressors, is 0.1507, while that of a regression which restricts attention to the core 
regressors (discussed in section 4.5) yields an R-squared of 0.1487. The Bayesian 
information criteria for the full set of regressors including (counterfactual) assets is 
11041.34, where that of the core set of regressors is 10984.48. Minimizing this 
information criterion therefore recommends use of the simpler model. However, the 
Akaike information criteria for the full model is 10883.81 and that of the core model is 
10891.4. Thus the two information criteria recommend different models.  
The substantial differences between the results yielded by the two instruments raises 
concerns about the accuracy with which either identifies the effect of assets on the 
probability of receiving remittances. Furthermore, the mixed results from the information 
criteria suggest that again, no significant explanatory power is added by the inclusion of 
these potentially mis-identified regressors. Together, these findings confirm the 
conclusions of section 4.4 which proceeded to model the extensive margin of remittance 
receipts using just the core set of plausibly exogenous regressors. 
I now establish similar results using counterfactual asset holdings identified using the 
drought instrument for the proportion of remittances in household income, that is, the 
intensive margin of remittance receipts. 
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Table 4.7: The Probability of Receiving Remittances (Drought as Instrument) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables: 
Observed 
Assets 
Predicted 
assets 
Predicted 
assets 
Core 
variables 
Standard errors 
Analytical 
 
Clustered 
errors 
Bootstrapped 
errors 
Analytical 
Agricultural -0.0980*** 0.532** 0.532**  
assets (-6.44) (2.29) (2.25)  
Business  -0.0606*** -1.055*** -1.055***  
assets (-6.41) (-6.90) (-8.57)  
Household -0.0949*** 0.358 0.358  
assets (-6.48) (0.87) (0.81)  
Sex of head 0.0713** 0.0608 0.0608 0.0681** 
 (2.17) (1.33) (1.34) (2.01) 
Age of head 0.130*** 0.00572 0.00572 0.123*** 
 (9.48) (0.17) (0.15) (7.87) 
Age of head  -0.000964*** -0.0000184 -0.0000184 -0.000920*** 
squared (-8.25) (-0.07) (-0.06) (-7.03) 
Head’s years -0.0405*** -0.0193 -0.0193 -0.0520*** 
Of schooling (-6.98) (-1.07) (-0.97) (-10.13) 
Monthly or  0.280*** 0.151 0.151 0.127* 
govt. wages (3.14) (1.41) (1.49) (1.87) 
Business  -0.0208 0.310** 0.310*** -0.230*** 
owner (-0.39) (2.37) (2.62) (-5.33) 
Crops other  -0.338*** -0.467*** -0.467*** 0.0336 
than rice (-6.58) (-7.67) (-7.46) (0.56) 
Livestock -0.137** 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.237*** 
 (-2.36) (2.60) (3.15) (3.72) 
Bluecollar  -0.361*** 0.506*** 0.506***  
worker (-6.37) (3.24) (3.41)  
Whitecollar -0.436*** -0.0486 -0.0486  
worker (-3.72) (-0.17) (-0.16)  
Other work -0.358*** 0.0955 0.0955  
 (-7.75) (1.01) (1.05)  
Work that  -0.148** 0.228** 0.228**  
varies (-2.17) (2.35) (2.47)  
Non working  0.00572 -0.0516* -0.0516  
age (0.48) (-1.72) (-1.57)  
Schooling of 0.0408** -0.0432 -0.0432  
children (2.10) (-1.00) (-0.99)  
Schooling of  -0.00187** -0.000324 -0.000324  
children squared (-2.06) (-0.25) (-0.28)  
Number of  0.178*** 0.0966*** 0.0966** 0.178*** 
Adult children (18.04) (2.85) (2.44) (16.88) 
Time 0.0920*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.0985*** 
 (6.96) (2.97) (2.91) (6.51) 
Time squared -0.00414*** -0.00299* -0.00299* -0.00375*** 
 (-4.69) (-1.82) (-1.91) (-3.61) 
Rice farmer    0.490*** 
    (12.08) 
_cons -4.606*** -0.839 -0.839 -4.498*** 
 (-11.34) (-0.81) (-0.73) (-9.97) 
N 9513 9513 9513 9513 
Assets and remittances in 100,000 Baht 
t statistics in parentheses  
 
="* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01"  
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Table 4.8: The Proportion of Remittances in Income (Drought as Instrument) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Endogenous 
Variables 
Observed 
Assets 
Predicted 
assets 
Predicted 
assets 
Not included 
Standard errors Analytical 
Clustered 
errors 
Bootstrapped 
errors 
 
Analytical 
Agricultural -0.0376*** 0.193*** 0.193***  
assets (-7.94) (2.76) (2.87)  
Business  -0.0242*** -0.307*** -0.307***  
assets (-8.09) (-7.25) (-6.73)  
Household -0.0302*** 0.111 0.111  
assets (-7.01) (0.99) (0.98)  
Sex of head 0.0405*** 0.0399*** 0.0399*** 0.0413*** 
 (4.77) (3.36) (3.30) (4.73) 
Age of head 0.0389*** -0.000354 -0.000354 0.0368*** 
 (10.72) (-0.04) (-0.04) (7.88) 
Age of head  -0.000296*** 0.00000656 0.00000656 -0.000281*** 
squared (-9.69) (0.09) (0.09) (-7.25) 
Head’s years -0.0126*** -0.00629 -0.00629 -0.0145*** 
Of schooling (-7.85) (-1.25) (-1.39) (-10.85) 
Monthly or  -0.0460* -0.0731*** -0.0731** -0.0623*** 
govt. wages (-1.85) (-2.61) (-2.49) (-3.69) 
Business  -0.0400*** 0.0298 0.0298 -0.101*** 
owner (-2.78) (0.83) (0.85) (-8.46) 
Crops other  -0.118*** -0.159*** -0.159*** 0.0135 
than rice (-8.42) (-9.35) (-11.46) (0.82) 
Livestock -0.0217 0.0831*** 0.0831*** 0.112*** 
 (-1.51) (3.46) (3.10) (6.63) 
Blue collar  -0.136*** 0.118*** 0.118***  
worker (-8.68) (2.84) (3.07)  
White collar -0.101*** -0.00429 -0.00429  
worker (-2.99) (-0.06) (-0.06)  
Other work -0.0984*** 0.0306 0.0306  
 (-7.84) (1.19) (1.23)  
Work that  -0.0748*** 0.0397 0.0397*  
varies (-4.15) (1.55) (1.79)  
Non working  0.00132 -0.0203** -0.0203**  
age (0.44) (-2.37) (-2.58)  
Schooling of 0.0185*** -0.0128 -0.0128  
children (3.60) (-1.03) (-1.13)  
Schooling of  -0.000754*** -0.000149 -0.000149  
children squared (-3.12) (-0.38) (-0.37)  
Number of  0.0371*** 0.0112 0.0112 0.0358*** 
Adult children (16.19) (1.23) (1.21) (15.35) 
Time 0.0296*** 0.0335*** 0.0335*** 0.0313*** 
 (8.35) (3.25) (3.58) (6.67) 
Time squared -0.00133*** -0.000982** -0.000982*** -0.00119*** 
 (-5.70) (-2.06) (-2.62) (-3.76) 
Rice farmer    0.170*** 
    (15.22) 
_cons -1.341*** -0.121 -0.121 -1.298*** 
 (-12.20) (-0.40) (-0.43) (-9.44) 
N 9513 9513 9513 9513 
Assets and remittances in 10,000 Baht 
t statistics in parentheses  
 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  
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Table 4.8 presents the results obtained by re-estimating equation 4.12 using 
counterfactual asset holdings constructed by using the drought instrument. These results 
should be compared to those in table 4.5 which estimates 4.12 using migration histories 
to instrument for current migration. Here too, the effect of (counterfactual) agricultural 
assets on the share of remittances in household income is positive and significant and 
those of business assets are significant and negative. Household assets remain 
insignificant, as they were in table 4.5.  
The fourth column of the table presents the coefficients from the model estimating the 
intensive margin of remittance receipts with only the core set of explanatory variables. 
The Akaike information criteria for this model takes on a value of 8648.03, whereas that 
of the full model is 8705.17. The Bayesian information criteria for the model with the 
core variables is 8748.27, and that of the full model is 8869.86. Thus both information 
criteria recommend use of the core model with plausibly exogenous regressors, 
confirming the conclusions of sections 4.4 and 4.5. 
 
I now turn to studying how the intensive and extensive margins of remittance receipts 
vary over the distribution of household income, so as to understand the relative 
importance of each of these margins in explaining the inequality reducing effect of 
remittances. 
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4.7 Accounting for Inequality on the Extensive and 
Intensive Margins 
 
So far, the analysis in this chapter has been conducted at the level of individual 
households, though the key research question pertains to the distribution of income across 
households. I start this section by extrapolating from the preceding household-level 
results to characterise how the extensive and intensive margins of remittance receipts vary 
over the distribution of income. Having done so, I will move on to identifying the share 
of the reduction in inequality that can be explained econometrically, and to subsequently 
decomposing that share into parts that are explained by the extensive and intensive 
margins of remittances. 
I characterise the estimated probability of a household receiving remittances, ?̂? (from 
equation 4.7) as a function of the real value of the component of household income that 
is not remitted by children using a univariate Tobit model, because the household-level 
predictions of the likelihood of receiving remittances vary continuously between zero and 
one. I assume a latent variable 
 ?̂?𝑖𝑡
∗
=  𝑐 + 𝜑𝑦−𝑟
𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (4.13) 
such that  
 ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 ?̂?𝑖𝑡
∗
> 1
0 𝑖𝑓 ?̂?𝑖𝑡
∗
< 0
?̂?𝑖𝑡
∗
, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,
        (4.14) 
where  is the parameter to be estimated and all other terms remain as they have been 
defined before. The estimates yielded by this regression are presented in the first column 
of table 4.9. The probability of receiving remittances does indeed vary significantly over 
the distribution of income, and the likelihood of remittance receipts is higher for 
households that are lower down the income distribution. The resulting estimates for the 
  
168 
way in which the probability of receiving remittances varies over the distribution of 
household income (that was not remitted by children) is illustrated in figure 4.3. I denote 
these distribution level predictions as 𝑝?̂?.  
 
Table 4.9: The Extensive and Intensive Margins as Functions of Income 
not Remitted by Children 
 Probability of 
receiving 
remittances 
Proportion of 
remittances in 
income 
Income not remitted1 -0.8882*** -0.5293*** 
 (-10.05) (-15.09) 
Constant 0.5270*** 0.1911*** 
 (196.52) (173.70) 
N 9512 9512 
1In10,000,000 Baht 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01" 
 
Heterogeneity on the intensive margin of remittance receipts over the distribution of 
household income is characterised in an exactly analogous way, only with the estimated 
probability of receiving remittances ?̂?, replaced by the estimated share of remittances in 
household income ?̂?, in equations 4.13 and 4.14. The estimates from this model are 
presented in the second column of table 4.9. The share of remittances in household 
income is also found to decline significantly as the level of household real income that 
was not remitted by children increases. Figure 4.4 illustrates the resulting predicted values 
of how the share of remittances in household income varies over the distribution of this 
component of income. In the following analysis, I refer to these distribution-level 
predicted shares as 𝑠ℎ̂. These shares are illustrated in figure 4.4. 
Using these estimates for the way in which the likelihood of receiving remittances and 
the share of remittances in household income varies over the distribution of income, I will 
now construct three counterfactual distributions of income. In the first, I allow the 
extensive margin of remittance receipts to vary over the distribution of household income, 
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using the values illustrated in figure 4.3, while holding the share of income remitted to 
each household constant at the sample mean of 33.4% (from table 4.1). That is, I compute: 
 𝑦𝑖?̂? =  𝑦𝑖𝑡
−𝑟 ∙ (1 + 0.3337 ∙ 𝑝?̂?(𝑑 = 1|𝑦𝑖𝑡
−𝑟)),    (4.15) 
where 𝑝?̂? is the probability of a household receiving remittances conditional on its 
observed level of income that was not remitted by children. In what follows, I will refer 
to this as ‘the extensive margin’ distribution. 
The second counterfactual income distribution that I generate is where I allow the 
intensive margin of remittance receipts to vary as a function of income that was not 
remitted by children, as it illustrated in figure 4.4, while holding the likelihood with which 
each household receives remittances at the sample mean of 0.4832. I do so by computing: 
 ?̂̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡
−𝑟(1 + 0.4832 ∙ 𝑠ℎ̂(𝑦𝑖𝑡
−𝑟)).    (4.16) 
I will refer to this distribution as the ‘intensive margin’ distribution. 
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Finally, I construct a counterfactual distribution where I allow both of these to margins 
to vary simultaneously. That is, I calculate:  
 ?̂̂̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡
−𝑟(1 + 0.3337 ∙ 𝑝?̂?(𝑑 = 1|𝑦𝑖𝑡
−𝑟))(1 + 0.4832 ∙ 𝑠ℎ̂(𝑦𝑖𝑡
−𝑟)). (4.17) 
I refer to this as the ‘explained’ distribution, because it captures the total shift in the 
distribution of income that I am able explain econometrically by a combination of the 
extensive and intensive margins of remittance receipts.  
I now turn to assessing the degree of inequality in each of these counterfactual 
distributions of income for each year of the panel. I also compare measured inequality in 
each of these distributions to measured inequality in the distribution of income not 
remitted by children, and in the distribution of net household income, inclusive of 
remittances from children. I do so for the same range of inequality measures that I used 
in the preceding chapter4, namely the standard deviation of the log, the Gini coefficient, 
the Theil (T) coefficient and the mean logarithmic deviation. The extent to which I am 
able to explain the reduction in measured inequality varies depending on the measure that 
                                                 
4 The definitions of each of these measures and a brief description of their relevant properties can 
also be found in chapter 3. 
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is used, but I am able to make some general comments on the extent to which the 
extensive and intensive margins of remittance receipts account for the explained 
reduction in inequality. 
Table 4.10 presents the Theil index, evaluated for each of these distributions for each year 
of the panel. The first column measures inequality in the component of income that is not 
remitted by children and the second does so for the ‘extensive margin’ distribution. 
Comparing the values reported in these two columns, I find that the second column does 
indeed exhibit less inequality than the first, in all years of the panel. The third column 
presents the Theil index evaluated on the counterfactual distribution where only the 
intensive margin is allowed to vary. This distribution also exhibits less inequality in every 
year than the component of income that is not remitted by children. A comparison of the 
levels of inequality reported in the second and third columns reveals that on average, the 
intensive margin accounts for a slightly larger reduction in inequality than the extensive 
margin.  
 
Table 4.10: Thiel (T) Index for different Income Distributions 
Year Income 
not 
remitted 
Extensive 
margin 
counterfactual 
Intensive 
margin 
counterfactual 
Counterfactual 
where both 
vary 
Observed 
net 
income 
Proportion 
of observed 
decline 
explained 
1997 0.7630 0.7437 0.7459 0.7273 0.7034 0.5995 
1998 0.7543 0.7239 0.7320 0.7036 0.6942 0.8445 
1999 0.7636 0.7185 0.7357 0.6941 0.7025 1.1383 
2000 0.7940 0.7542 0.7650 0.7279 0.7286 1.0108 
2001 0.6558 0.6344 0.6389 0.6188 0.5961 0.6193 
2002 0.6275 0.6159 0.6171 0.6059 0.5461 0.2651 
2003 0.6380 0.6201 0.6225 0.6053 0.5668 0.4591 
2004 0.6913 0.6661 0.6703 0.6465 0.5908 0.4462 
2005 0.7137 0.6874 0.6918 0.6670 0.6039 0.4260 
2006 0.5933 0.5784 0.5807 0.5666 0.4745 0.2244 
2007 0.6222 0.6051 0.6075 0.5913 0.4933 0.2397 
2008 0.5494 0.5404 0.5412 0.5325 0.4259 0.1370 
2009 0.5950 0.5774 0.5799 0.5632 0.4780 0.2722 
2010 0.5119 0.5003 0.5015 0.4904 0.4021 0.1959 
2011 0.5118 0.4969 0.4987 0.4844 0.4235 0.3110 
Average percentage 
of decline explained 54.79% 45.20% 47.93%   
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Table 4.11: Mean Logarithmic Deviation for different Income Distributions 
Year Income 
not 
remitted 
Extensive 
margin 
counterfactual 
Intensive 
margin 
counterfactual 
Counterfactual 
where both 
vary 
Observed 
net 
income 
Proportion 
of observed 
decline 
explained 
1997 1997 0.7423 0.7313 0.7325 0.7218 0.6693 
1998 1998 0.6949 0.6818 0.6846 0.6721 0.6114 
1999 1999 0.6663 0.6503 0.6555 0.6405 0.5955 
2000 2000 0.6850 0.6687 0.6726 0.6571 0.6078 
2001 2001 0.6263 0.6161 0.6178 0.6080 0.5369 
2002 2002 0.6624 0.6551 0.6558 0.6485 0.5350 
2003 2003 0.6011 0.5912 0.5923 0.5827 0.5057 
2004 2004 0.6755 0.6628 0.6646 0.6523 0.5084 
2005 2005 0.7081 0.6950 0.6970 0.6845 0.5323 
2006 2006 0.6686 0.6606 0.6616 0.6538 0.4571 
2007 2007 0.6732 0.6637 0.6649 0.6557 0.4447 
2008 2008 0.6336 0.6271 0.6277 0.6213 0.4126 
2009 2009 0.6098 0.5996 0.6009 0.5910 0.4243 
2010 2010 0.5430 0.5353 0.5360 0.5285 0.3723 
2011 2011 0.5107 0.5013 0.5024 0.4933 0.3794 
Average percentage 
of decline explained 54.07% 45.93% 17.20%   
 
 
Table 4.12: Gini Coefficient for different Income Distributions 
Year Income 
not 
remitted 
Extensive 
margin 
counterfactual 
Intensive 
margin 
counterfactual 
Counterfactual 
where both 
vary 
Observed 
net 
income 
Proportion 
of observed 
decline 
explained 
1997 0.6071 0.6026 0.6031 0.5987 0.5844 0.3666 
1998 0.5919 0.5864 0.5876 0.5822 0.5683 0.4107 
1999 0.5798 0.5730 0.5752 0.5687 0.5580 0.5120 
2000 0.5938 0.5869 0.5886 0.5820 0.5700 0.4964 
2001 0.5693 0.5647 0.5655 0.5611 0.5435 0.3185 
2002 0.5762 0.5730 0.5733 0.5701 0.5390 0.1626 
2003 0.5642 0.5596 0.5602 0.5557 0.5318 0.2616 
2004 0.5746 0.5690 0.5698 0.5643 0.5288 0.2253 
2005 0.5835 0.5779 0.5787 0.5733 0.5349 0.2097 
2006 0.5546 0.5510 0.5514 0.5478 0.4959 0.1158 
2007 0.5638 0.5595 0.5601 0.5559 0.4985 0.1212 
2008 0.5494 0.5464 0.5466 0.5437 0.4831 0.0861 
2009 0.5523 0.5475 0.5481 0.5434 0.4921 0.1475 
2010 0.5253 0.5214 0.5218 0.5179 0.4632 0.1185 
2011 0.5177 0.5129 0.5134 0.5086 0.4688 0.1861 
Average percentage 
of decline explained  54.11% 45.89% 24.92 %  
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Unsurprisingly, when both margins are allowed to vary, inequality declines even further. 
These results are reported in the fourth column of the table. Comparing these measures 
to those in the fifth column (which reports inequality in net household income inclusive 
of observed remittances) reveals that inequality in actual net income was typically lower 
than in this counterfactual. Thus while the econometrics presented in this chapter have 
been able to explain some of the decline in inequality that was caused by remittance 
receipts, they have not been able to explain it all (the exceptions are the years 1999 and 
2000 where inequality is higher in observed net income than in this counterfactual). The 
final column of the table computes the percentage of the observed decline in inequality 
that these models have been able to explain, showing that there is substantial variation in 
the performance of these models from year to year.  
In the final row of table 4.10 I present some percentages which summarize the relative 
success of each of the counterfactuals5. On average, the share of the decline in inequality 
that is explained by the extensive margin is 54.8%, and the corresponding share for the 
intensive margin is 45.2%. Allowing both margins to vary simultaneously on average 
explains 47.9% of the measured decline in the Theil index between the distributions of 
income not remitted by children, and net income. 
Table 4.11 presents the corresponding results where the mean logarithmic deviation 
(sometimes called the Theil-L index) is used to measure inequality. Again, from year to 
year there is some variation in the extent to which allowing the extensive and intensive 
margins to vary simultaneously explains the reduction in this measure of inequality. On 
average however, the models perform reasonably well explaining 17.2% of the observed 
                                                 
5 Not all of the inequality measures presented here are additively decomposable. As a result, 
percentages calculated in the obvious way do not add up to 100. Instead, I compute the ‘total 
decline’ as the sum of the declines in measured inequality between income not remitted and the 
extensive and intensive margins, and express the declines in each margin as a percentage of this 
total.  
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decline in inequality. What remains consistent is that the extensive margin explains 
slightly more of the decline in inequality than the intensive margin, this time accounting 
for 52.9% of the decline. 
A similar narrative emerges from table 4.12, which presents the Gini coefficients for these 
distributions for the 15 years of the panel. This time, on average I am able to explain 
24.9% of the observed reduction in inequality. The intensive margin again accounts for 
slightly more than half the explained decline in inequality, approximately 52.9%. 
Table 4.13 uses the standard deviation of the log of income to measure of inequality. On 
this measure, a great deal of the observed decline in inequality remains unexplained, with 
the counterfactual where both the extensive and intensive margins are both allowed to 
vary explaining only 4.6% of the observed decline in inequality. Within the explained 
decline in inequality however, the results continue to be very consistent with the 
preceding tables. The extensive margin is again slightly more important than the intensive 
margin, explaining 52.4% of the reduction.  
 
Table 4.13: Standard Deviation of the Log for different Income Distributions 
Year Income 
not 
remitted 
Extensive 
margin 
counterfactual 
Intensive 
margin 
counterfactual 
Counterfactual 
where both 
vary 
Observed 
net 
income 
Proportion 
of observed 
decline 
explained 
1997 1.2307 1.2268 1.2272 1.2233 1.1569 0.0997 
1998 1.1899 1.1862 1.1867 1.1830 1.0781 0.0617 
1999 1.1593 1.1558 1.1564 1.1529 1.0731 0.0745 
2000 1.1415 1.1375 1.1380 1.1340 1.0454 0.0777 
2001 1.1277 1.1241 1.1244 1.1208 0.9949 0.0521 
2002 1.2014 1.1979 1.1982 1.1948 1.0230 0.0371 
2003 1.0813 1.0771 1.0775 1.0733 0.9557 0.0636 
2004 1.2180 1.2137 1.2141 1.2099 0.9598 0.0314 
2005 1.2483 1.2441 1.2445 1.2404 1.0010 0.0318 
2006 1.2949 1.2916 1.2919 1.2886 0.9625 0.0189 
2007 1.2640 1.2602 1.2605 1.2567 0.9116 0.0207 
2008 1.2381 1.2345 1.2348 1.2313 0.8938 0.0199 
2009 1.1622 1.1576 1.1581 1.1536 0.8759 0.0301 
2010 1.1026 1.0982 1.0986 1.0942 0.8364 0.0313 
2011 1.0353 1.0302 1.0307 1.0256 0.8299 0.0473 
Average percentage 
of decline explained  52.69% 47.30% 4.65 %  
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4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to understand the relative importance of the extensive margin and 
the intensive margin of remittance receipts in explaining the ability of remittances to 
reduce inequality. To do so, it modelled the likelihood of a household receiving 
remittances and the proportion of remittances in a household’s income as functions of 
observable household characteristics.  
Some potentially endogenous regressors appeared to have significant explanatory power 
in single-equation models. Addressing the endogeneity however, revealed that the 
apparent power of these variables in explaining remittance receipts was spurious. The 
chapter therefore went on to model the extensive and intensive margins of remittance 
receipts using a core group of plausibly exogenous variables. I used the resulting 
estimates to construct counterfactual distributions of income where I allowed either the 
probability of receiving remittances, or the proportion of remittances in household 
income, or both of these margins to vary.  
I then used a variety of measures of inequality to assess the extent to which these 
econometrics explained measured reductions in inequality, and the relative importance of 
the extensive and intensive margins of remittance receipts in driving these reductions. For 
the Theil (T) coefficient the extensive and intensive margins together explained 
approximately 47.9% of the observed reduction in inequality. The performance of these 
models were somewhat diminished when the mean logarithmic deviation, which is more 
sensitive to transfers near the bottom of the distribution than the Theil index, was used to 
measure inequality. On that measure, the models explained approximately 17.2% of the 
observed reduction in inequality. For the Gini index and the standard deviation of the log, 
the models were able to explain 24.9% and 4.6% of the observed reduction respectively. 
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Again, the models performed better on the measure that was less sensitive to transfers 
near the bottom of the distribution. 
For all measures of inequality, the decline in inequality was slightly larger on the 
extensive margin than the intensive margin, with the former accounting for between 52 
and 55% of the explained decline depending on the measure of inequality used. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
 
The recurrent themes in this thesis have been inequality and insurance. In each of the 
three preceding chapters, I have studied some particular aspect of the behaviour of rural, 
Thai households with respect to these themes, with detailed panel data that has been made 
available by the Townsend Thai Project.  
 
The second chapter of this thesis studied the extent to which these households depend on 
the smoothness of their income streams to satisfy their insurance needs. Descriptive 
evidence suggested that in rural Thailand, richer households derive a greater share of their 
insurance needs from the smoothness of their income streams, while poorer households 
depend more heavily on traditional consumption smoothing. These descriptive statistics 
were inconsistent with the existing narratives of income smoothing which have typically 
studied this insurance strategy among the poor and vulnerable. The chapter showed 
formally, using Morduch’s (1994) analytical model of income smoothing that if the 
income streams of richer households offer greater insurance possibilities then (holding all 
other things including credit constraints constant) these rich households will depend more 
heavily on their income streams to satisfy their insurance needs than their poorer 
counterparts. I used the incidence of drought as a source of exogenous variation in the 
income streams of these households. I failed to reject the null hypothesis that income 
streams were fully insured against this covariate shock for households that were headed 
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by people from younger cohorts, by people with more than a primary education, or by 
people who were in jobs that paid a monthly wage. These characteristics were more 
prevalent among richer households, and so the income streams of richer households 
offered better insurance possibilities. I was unable to reject the hypothesis that households 
which enjoyed above median permanent income over the duration of the panel had 
income streams that were fully insured against the covariate shock. In contrast, the effect 
of drought on income was double the average effect for the whole sample when I 
restricted attention to households which exhibited below median permanent income.  
Chapter 2 thus contributes to this literature by re-interpreting the existing theory to allow 
for the possibility that the income streams of richer households offer better insurance 
possibilities, and by documenting empirical results from rural communities in a middle-
income country that support this re-interpretation. It remains to be established whether 
these insights are peculiar to rural Thailand or if they are of broader relevance. The 
increasing availability of high quality panel data from a number of low- and middle-
income countries means that future research can convincingly answer this question. If 
these insights are more broadly applicable, then the increased prevalence of salaried jobs 
in many rapidly industrializing parts of the world may enhance workers’ welfare, not only 
by increasing their mean wages, but also by fulfilling a valuable insurance function. 
Welfare evaluations that neglect this insurance function are likely to underestimate the 
welfare gains from industrialization. Future work may also be directed at carefully 
quantifying these welfare gains so as to better inform the policies that many governments 
undertake to foster industrialization. 
 
The third chapter of this thesis documented and analysed declining income inequality in 
a panel of Thai households with reference to the permanent income hypothesis and 
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lifecycle theory. I found no evidence of convergence in individual earnings, or differences 
in the propensity of adult children to cohabitate with their parents between richer and 
poorer households that could plausibly explain the decline in inequality within decade of 
birth cohorts of the heads of household. Rather, I found that declining inequality was 
explained by differences in the receipt of remittances from the children of the head of 
household, which supplemented the incomes of the ageing parents. Over the duration of 
the panel the average of the proportion of remittances in the incomes of households in the 
bottom decile of permanent income was over 35% whereas that of households in the top 
decile of permanent income was less than 10%. The strong lifecycle component of this 
inequality reducing transfer causes it to become more and more prevalent as households 
age over the duration of the panel. The chapter also presented some descriptive evidence 
that poorer households were both more likely to receive remittances, and that remittances 
accounted for a larger share of their household income than it did for richer households.  
The main contribution of this chapter is to study the link between remittance receipts and 
income inequality from a lifecycle perspective.  The robust decrease in income inequality, 
even between households grouped by the cohort of birth of their heads is a striking finding 
that contrasts with the results of the usual studies of the evolution of inequality over the 
lifecycle. These descriptive results can be fruitfully extended in future research by 
implementing matching methods on the observable characteristics of households which 
could, in principle, justify a stronger causal interpretation. Furthermore, the narrative that 
younger generations of adults are responsible for providing material support to their 
ageing parents is germane to a number of East Asian countries. Widespread, rapid 
industrialization and urbanization experienced by many of these countries over the last 
quarter century are likely to have created similarly high rates of reliance on remittances 
among the family members of rural to urban migrants that remain in the communities of 
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origin. Future research may therefore also be directed at ascertaining whether remittances 
engender similar declines in lifecycle inequality in these other East Asian countries. 
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis studied the inequality reducing impact of remittances more 
formally, by modelling the extensive and intensive margins of remittances as functions 
of observable household characteristics. It noted that a household’s economic position 
was in part determined by its migration history, so that some current household 
characteristics such as asset holdings might be endogenous to the migration process. 
These variables appeared to explain substantial variation on both of these margins in 
single-equation models. The paper addressed endogeneity by explicitly modelling the 
effect of remittances on assets holdings, and found that doing so relieved assets of any 
substantive explanatory power over the extensive and intensive margins of remittance 
receipts. Therefore, I proceeded by using a core set of exogenous characteristics to model 
these margins. 
Using these estimates, I identified the degree to which the likelihood of receiving 
remittances and the share of remittances in household income varied over the distribution 
of income. These estimates informed the construction of three counterfactual income 
distributions: 1. where the extensive margin of remittances were allowed to vary over the 
distribution on income, but the intensive was held fixed at the sample mean; 2. where the 
intensive was allowed to vary but the extensive margin was held at the sample mean; and 
3. where both margins were allowed to vary simultaneously. The last counterfactual 
distribution allowed me to quantify the share of the inequality reducing effect of 
remittances which these econometrics were able to explain, whereas the first two allowed 
me to measure the relative importance of the extensive and intensive margins in 
accounting for these explained reductions. I evaluated inequality for these distributions 
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for a variety of different measures. Though the share of net explained inequality varied 
from measure to measure, the proportions that were explained by the extensive and 
intensive margins remained remarkably consistent. The extensive margin always 
accounted for slightly more than half (between 52% and 55%) of the explained reduction 
in inequality with the intensive margin accounting for the rest. 
While this chapter addressed the potential endogeneity of various household 
characteristics to the migration process, it was unable to adequately account for 
behavioural responses that remittance receipts may engender among recipients. Given the 
observational nature of these data, matching remittance recipients to non-recipients 
appears at first to be an attractive option. But while there is an established literature on 
using matching methods to identify average treatment effects, I do not know of any such 
methods that are suitable to identify differential treatment effects across a distribution, as 
is the objective here. Indeed, McKenzie et al. (2010) suggest that there may be no way to 
comprehensively address this issue except with the use of experimental data. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated inequalities that affect households among these villages in 
rural Thailand are substantive and pervasive. It has documented that the welfare of the 
relatively poor in these communities is more affected by a lack of insurance opportunities 
than was previously understood. The income streams of these poor village households 
bear the brunt of uninsurable covariate shocks. But these poor also benefit 
disproportionately from the receipt of remittances from their migrant offspring. The 
support that poor ageing heads of household receive from their children is striking in that 
it is sufficient to reverse the increase in inequality that is typically observed within birth 
cohorts over the lifecycle.  
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Appendix 1: Deleted observations 
 
 
 
Table A1: Deleted observations 
Household ID: year Expenditure Income 
072136660911 1998 430 99999997952 
072840610910 1997 33603.13 116951000 
493141600924 2010 0 12000 
532938650940 1999 5.88E+10 764.7059 
493141650962 1999 2.78E+10 63097.22 
493141600902 1998 3.23E+10 34370.97 
492838650923 1998 7.32E+10 50243.9 
492624650927 1999 2.78E+10 22666.67 
272931620968 1999 4.88E+10 24817.07 
072436540977 1998 4.17E+10 12500 
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Appendix 2: Robustness of differential insurance over the income distribution 
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Appendix 3: Quantile regressions of drought on income by characteristic 
  
(a) Entire sample (b) Not earning monthly wages 
  
(c) At least two breadwinners (d) Head holds multiple jobs 
  
(e) Female headed (f) Business owner 
 
Notes: 
1. Line linking quantile estimates 
2. Shaded area is the 95% confidence 
interval 
(g) Involved in agriculture  
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Appendix 4: Inequality in agricultural profits over the lifecycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Cohort-year cell sizes for monthly wage earners 
 
 
Table A 5: Cohort – Year Cell Sizes for Monthly Wage Earners 
Decade of 
birth 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 0 1 1 9 14 48 57 74 16 
1999 0 1 2 6 13 46 53 84 21 
2000 0 0 2 4 15 45 62 75 18 
2001 0 0 3 5 10 45 59 86 23 
2002 0 0 2 5 12 41 58 81 39 
2003 0 0 0 3 9 37 61 65 31 
2004 0 0 1 5 8 33 62 71 46 
2005 0 0 1 6 7 34 61 78 37 
2006 0 0 1 5 6 32 45 69 46 
2007 0 0 1 4 6 29 33 49 37 
2008 0 0 0 4 8 26 38 54 55 
2009 0 0 0 3 8 23 38 51 65 
2010 0 0 0 3 5 25 40 61 70 
2011 0 0 0 3 2 23 36 52 81 
 
 
  
  
192 
 
Appendix 6: Cohort-year cell sizes for daily wage earners 
 
 
Table A 6: Cohort – Year Cell Sizes for Daily Wage Earners 
Decade of 
birth: 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 0 1 6 29 49 72 106 105 37 
1999 0 0 5 29 61 86 105 130 45 
2000 0 0 7 23 62 79 101 129 65 
2001 0 0 4 17 62 64 101 134 83 
2002 0 0 4 22 55 53 93 115 92 
2003 0 0 4 17 56 57 112 111 109 
2004 0 0 4 17 52 66 101 123 126 
2005 0 0 6 19 56 84 107 101 126 
2006 0 0 1 15 50 72 100 99 121 
2007 0 0 1 16 50 89 129 129 141 
2008 0 0 1 23 61 101 138 136 140 
2009 0 0 1 7 41 81 120 118 120 
2010 0 0 1 6 35 74 103 94 133 
2011 0 0 1 5 41 76 101 93 142 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7: Real income growth over the lifecycle 
 
 
 
